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FOREWORD AND 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
On 23 and 24 November 2009, more than 70 people, including activists, NGO
practitioners and academics, met at the Chalsty Centre of the University of
Witwatersrand, to reflect on civic mobilisation for social justice. Five research
projects on South Africa, led by a group of researchers that naturally straddle the
academic-practitioner divide, formed the backbone of the conference. Through
different lenses, these projects have analysed the dynamics of civic strategies for
change, and have served as the basis for a wide range of discussions and
workshops. 
Under the umbrella theme of Mobilising Social Justice, the conference dealt
with a variety of topics, ranging from the question of how citizens can influence
state policy and parliamentary actions, to explaining the underlying interests
behind community efforts to advocate for rights to basic services and freedom of
expression. The conference also addressed the interests underpinning civic
mobilisation – or rather, the lack thereof – by migrant communities. We felt it was
useful to devote critical attention to the under-explored relationship between
civic actors and state institutions – not only the police and unaccountable
government officials, but also what Professor Peter Alexander refers to as the
more ‘cosy aspects of the state’: the courts, local government, and parliament.
The conference marked an important milestone for the Civil Society Building
Knowledge programme, a joint initiative by the Dutch Humanist Institute for
Development Cooperation (Hivos) and the Institute of Social Studies in The
Hague. 
The primary purpose of this book is to provide an account of the research
findings, and some of the key conclusions and questions that emerged from the
conference. Many of the contributions of the conference participants in the
debates, presentations and workshops have also been included. 
In many ways, our conversation is just beginning. There was much critical
discussion generated at the conference itself, which is to some extent also
captured by the facilitators in their preface to this book. The knowledge
programme has been a process of ‘weaving’: weaving past with present,
academics with activists, the personal with what we might call the sectoral, and
weaving identities and experiences. The process has given us access to new
insights, new connections, new questions, new energy, and perhaps also some
new answers. In addition, it gives us insights into gaps in our thinking that we
need to address in the future – indeed a valuable process.
There are people we wish to thank especially for their contributions to the
conference. First of all we would like to thank the Christian family of K’s
Catering, for the halaal coffees, snacks and lunches. We would also like to thank
Rachid Adams of AR tours, who picked up people from the airport and gave
everyone a very warm welcome, and Andrew Geldenhuys of DV8 micro and
digital in Cape Town, for printing the programme, the folders and the posters.
The Josephine Mumbaing family produced the beautiful conference bags. Abdul
Whahid, Bilal Houssain and their colleagues from Africa Real Time Productionsviii 
organised the video recording and photography. Michael Powers helped with the
registration of the participants. Rudi Baarsens, Sweetness Mubantu and all the
staff from the Sunny Side Park Hotel welcomed us with patience and friendliness.
We offer a special thanks to the Mandela Institute of the School of Law at the
University of the Witwatersrand, and especially Magda van Noordwijk, who
helped us with some key logistical issues and booked this wonderful space for us,
thanks to an institutional link between the Wits Law School and the Institute of
Social Studies. The Mandela Institute also hosted a preparatory meeting that took
place in July 2009. 
Of course, we also offer deep thanks to all the researchers, participants and
discussants, and everybody who has shared their experiences and their work with
us. 
There are a few more people to whom we are especially grateful; first of all,
Ghadija Vallie, who has been part of our process since July 2009; her very
personal touch has been profound. We are also grateful to Lee Mondry and other
staff from the Hivos South Africa office, who have been working alongside
Ghadija. 
We wish to also warmly thank the editors and staff of Pretoria University Law
Press (PULP), and in particular Danie Brand, Lizette Besaans and Yolanda
Booyzen, for their enthusiasm in and flexibility with this project and agreement
to publish through PULP.
Finally, we wish to thank those colleagues at ISS and Hivos who provided
much-valued feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript, including Kees
Biekart, Ria Brouwers, Rosalba Icaza, Marlieke Kieboom, Josine Stremmelaar, as
well as independent consultants Helen Moffett and David Buchanan. Of course,
any remaining errors or inconsistencies remain ours alone.
Our weaving process will now pause for a while; but we assure the reader that
it will continue in the future.
Jeff Handmaker and Remko Berkhout
The Hague, April 2010ix 
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R
E
F
A
C
E A CRITICAL HISTORICAL
CONTEXT ON
MOBILISING SOCIAL JUSTICE
Liepollo Lebohang Pheko and Edward Sebastien1
The conference on Mobilising Social Justice, which took place at the Chalsty Centre
at the University of Witwatersrand on 23 and 24 November 2009, was envisaged
as an open and critical forum for discussing academic investigation and activism,
as well as other forms of social justice practice. This offered an exciting
opportunity to rigorously examine some of the contradictions and tensions
between theory and practice.
The Hivos-ISS Knowledge Programme, which organised the conference,
intended to develop a knowledge-based methodology, while also encouraging
research into responsive governance. In addition, the organisers aimed to
interpret and create material for activists to work more optimally with by-passed
and vulnerable communities. Lastly, the process was intended to encourage
knowledge sharing, in order to enable processes for enhancing civil society and
its struggles through academic, activist and other practitioner circles.
The five research projects provided excellent intersections and offshoots for
continuing study and investigation into various social phenomena, political
contexts, and legal instruments; for example, the use of force, limitations of the
rights agenda, and the posture of the state towards its citizens and in relation to
the global governance and finance architecture. Definitions of citizenship,
gendered experiences of citizenship, and access and rights within the neo-classical
state, were also investigated, among many other topics. 
It was significant to note that all researchers whose work is contained in this
volume made a strong case for continued exploration and development, and the
sharing of experiences with neighbours in the region, on the continent, and
further afield. The conference created space for this, but needs to broaden its
1 Conference facilitators, Mobilising Social Justice.xv
xvi    Prefacehorizons and strengthen its leverage if it is truly to succeed in its quest to explain
social justice. 
But the path ahead is a thorny one. Continual conflict between state authority
and those that challenge the current course is inevitable. The choice of partners
and cohorts will be critical in devising strategies and modalities of engagement. 
The history of South Africa is a critical component in understanding the
social justice issues addressed at the conference. South Africa’s liberation
struggle, in common with others across Africa, was based on the right to self-
determination. This was originally conceptualised both as a programme of action
for reconstruction and development, and as an instrument for consolidating the
country’s programme of nation-building. While this has, unfortunately, become a
defining characteristic of one-party states, it has also been the driving force
behind aggressive education and development programmes. Many of Africa’s
developmental problems may be traced back to European colonialism, and
Western hegemony continues to constrain Africa’s development. A long history
of colonisation has led to a situation in which the continent has been forcefully
absorbed into the global capitalist order. These brutal colonial experiences have
been identified by Ihonvbere as:
including the experience of slavery; the termination of endogenously driven patterns
of state and class formation; the imposition of colonial rule; the balkanisation of the
continent and imposition of alien values, tastes, and institutions; the domination of
the African economy by profit-and-hegemony-seeking transnational corporations
dedicated to making profit at all cost; the total denigration of local cultures, values,
and institutions; and finally, the structured integration of the African economy into
the periphery of the global division of labour and power as a vulnerable, dependent,
underdeveloped, weak, and largely raw material-producing region, to mention a few.2 
South Africa is no exception to the ravages of the colonial project, and the social
and political landscape in the country is increasingly beginning to show signs of
the perilous nature of the post-independence African state. This has been
illustrated by recent and ongoing struggles at both community and political level.
In the words of an African proverb, it is the grass that suffers as the elephants –
in this case, narrow, Western-led capitalist interests and political elitism – dance
upon it. The requirement for survival is the ability to do new things, and to do
them in a different way. It is indeed time to consider the lean, mean, fighting
machine of civic action, and to recall Kwame Nkrumah’s words: ‘We prefer self-
government with danger to servitude in tranquillity.’
Recent developments in South Africa may be traced back to the actions of
Nelson Mandela, the country’s first democratically elected president. To some,
Mandela is a superhuman, iconic statesman, who dragged a nation from the brink
of annihilation to international statehood. To others, he represents a moment
missed, and the collective suppression of national outrage in the name of instant
2 Ihonvbere, 2003: 3–4.
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thought prevail; the exciting thing is that we have the freedom and opportunity
to wrestle with each other’s arguments and to forge ahead, despite our
contradictory viewpoints. This spirit of fraternalism has shown us that we are
more similar in our pursuit of light and truth in this world than we might think. 
Mandela was by no means the only South African leader to champion the
poor and the marginalised. Many others, such as Robert Sobukwe, Mothopeng
and Masemola, have almost been forgotten, their Herculean courage mere
footnotes in history. Some heroes – women such as Elizabeth Sibeko and Victoria
Mahlemakhulu – are remembered once a year at Women’s Day events, rather than
being venerated as national icons. A nation without complete remembrance of
itself is like a person who does not know his or her own face. However, it has also
been said in some quarters that this is South Africa’s first phase of liberation; the
second is in the making. 
Reversing the country’s historical colonial legacies (one of which is massive,
one-sided accumulation of wealth) and assisting the country in re-constructing a
cohesive society goes beyond the promotion of socio-economic rights. It is going
to be a daunting task to weave a new tapestry from our diverse nation. South
Africa has been blessed with a population that is racially and ethnically
heterogeneous, despite apartheid’s efforts to divide us forcefully; it has religious
and cultural diversity; in short, it is a unique microcosm of the world.
However, the nation now needs to summon its vision, courage and
determination. This is a process that must be stimulated by social conscience and
the need for moral regeneration. We need to mobilise people of good will in state
institutions, religious organisations, and in corporate and civil or civic society,
both nationally and internationally. The movement has begun in a small way, but
how and when it will gain momentum and progress is anyone’s guess.
At the conference, there was excellent representation from many within the
sectors covered by the presentations; some of the best qualified in these sectors
made themselves available, bringing their academic and experiential knowledge
and inspiring others. However, the voices of the dispossessed were not loud
enough. There was a notable absence of representatives from certain sectors,
particularly the ‘foot-soldiers’ of civic society: students (though a few were
present), policy-makers, cultural experts and traditional leaders.
Consequently, the findings of the various research papers were typically not
spoken of by the subjects themselves, but by observers. The presence of several
community activists proved to be limited in the ability to present other
perspectives and challenge the methodology (and even the findings) of research.
Another critical observation is that, as at many such gatherings, the vast
majority of presenters were white. In terms of creating a new and alternative
vision and exchange of knowledge, certain epistemological questions should be
taken into account: who is answering, why questions are asked and why the
xviii    Prefacerespondents respond in a particular manner, what the intention and
understanding is between the researcher and the respondent. All these factors are
key to the success of the Knowledge Programme. These issues are not value-free,
just as research itself is not neutral, but driven by agendas, passions, choices,
biases and even prejudices. As a result, experiences, perspectives and perceptions
– of women and men, Africans and white researchers, young and middle-aged
respondents – will all have different nuances and consequences. 
On the other hand, the conference organisers’ aim was to make all present
relaxed and at ease with each other, and to create an inclusive mood. The venue
of the Chalsty Centre, and the creative African bead- and other artwork in brilliant
colours on its walls, accompanied by African music flowing through the entrance
hall during the breaks, helped set the tone. Further enhancing this feeling was the
park-like setting of the west campus of Wits University, with its trees and green
lawns.
Cultural symbols carry a very profound message. South Africa, in spite of 16
years of democracy, is still in its infancy in terms of building a non-racist (as
opposed to non-racial), plural, cohesive and caring society. At a similar
colloquium, at which many pre-eminent scholars were present,  debate raged
around what and who could be termed African, and more specifically South
African. Participants grappled with the concept for hours, yet nothing definitive
emerged. We still yearn for an inclusive national identity; one that encapsulates
sisterhood and brotherhood; one that defines the inner and outer self; one that
affirms a positive self-image of our Africanness; a single value system, shared by
all those who embrace it in contributing to nation-building for a cohesive society. 
As Robert Sobukwe, first president of the Pan Africanist Congress, noted:
‘We are fighting for the noblest cause on earth, the liberation of mankind … there is
only one race the human race’.
1CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  TO MOBILISINGSOCIAL JUSTICE: CRITICALDISCUSSIONS ON THE POTENTIALFOR CIVIC ACTION ANDSTRUCTURAL CHANGE
Remko Berkhout and Jeff Handmaker
In October 2009, the Constitutional Court of South Africa delivered its final
verdict in the Mazibuko water case. The judgment marked the end of a struggle
by a group of residents from Phiri, a poor suburb in Soweto, against the
installation of pre-payment water meters. After other forms of protest had been
crushed (often violently) or exhausted, the community took the legal route to
demand adequate access to water, provided for in South Africa’s constitution.
This strategy, which saw social movements, human rights NGOs, lawyers and
local communities working together in support of citizen action, had previously
been followed with some success. Although the Constitutional Court failed to
support the complaint of the Phiri community, an earlier 2008 High Court ruling
had declared the water meters to be unlawful, signalling that South Africa’s
emerging ‘culture of constitutionalism’ had something to offer to the poor. The
Mazibuko case showed that the road ahead would be long and difficult, but it did
help to further define the terms of the social justice struggle for affordable water;
and it served as a positive impulse for activists and movements around the
country involved in other struggles for basic human rights.
The Mazibuko case illustrates what this book is about. Drawing on
contemporary events in South Africa, the chapters reflect critically on various
civic strategies to promote social justice. The results of five research projects
(four of which were supported by the Hivos-ISS Civil Society Building
Knowledge Programme) examine different dynamics of civic action, ranging
from the nature of community protests to civic participation in the national
budget process. The findings engage directly with the main questions of the
Programme: What are the dynamics of civil society formation? What is the
(potential) role for outside actors? And how can civil society-building contribute
to structural social change?
The Knowledge Programme focuses on issues concerning civil society,
defined as ‘the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks
located between the family, the state and the market and operating behind1
  
  Mobilising Social Justice    3the confines of national societies, polities and economies’. 1 It aims to study the
roles of citizens and organisations in processes of societal change. The subtitle of
this book reveals our contention that much of the potential of civic action
remains to be unlocked. The Programme has recognised that the many
dimensions of academics’ and practitioners’ work on civil society-building require
further clarification and research. It aims to fill these knowledge gaps by fostering
joint research and critical reflection by academics and practitioners. 
We believe that exploring various forms of knowledge – academic
knowledge, activist knowledge, educational and cultural expressions of
knowledge – can generate new insights and reveal dynamic strategies for civic
action. Furthermore, and echoing many of the reflections raised by Pheko and
Sebastien in their Preface, we are convinced that in doing so, we must be very
conscious of the socio-cultural, historical and political context in which these
issues are being discussed.
1 THE CONTEXT
South Africa, sometimes referred to as ‘a world in one country’, provides a fertile
context for reflection on these issues. Its history of civic action is still very
evident. The country’s broad-based civic struggle against apartheid serves as a
point of reference for social movements the world over. By common consent, the
early years of South Africa’s post-apartheid record, following the country’s first
democratic elections in 1994, were nothing short of impressive, with milestones
such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, strong macro-economic
performance (albeit not sufficiently evenly distributed), a rich and still-expanding
record of progressive legislation, and an emerging culture of constitutionalism. 
In the early post-apartheid years, civic actors were at the forefront of these
change processes. But by the turn of the millennium, optimism had started to
wear thin. The South African elite, both in the private and public sectors, had
firmly embraced a (neo-)liberal ideology. The optimistic vision of the rainbow
nation began to fade against the reality of slow social progress amid persistent
poverty, high crime rates, and the devastating and well-publicised effects of the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. The ANC government struggled under the weight of its
own ambitions and expectations, hampered also by debilitating internal power
dynamics and the limited delivery capacity of the state apparatus it had inherited.
As Yasmin Sooka has argued in the epilogue to this book, civil society
organisations have struggled as well. The end of the anti-apartheid struggle left
a strategic vacuum and generated a civic brain-drain as many former activists and
civil society leaders moved into government and politics. Civic actors found
themselves negotiating complex problems, while searching for new niches
1 Kaldor, 2009: 1.

  Mobilising Social Justice    5and confronting difficult dilemmas: service delivery or advocacy? Maintaining old
loyalties or adopting a critical distance? Walking the road less travelled, or
succumbing to the comfort zone of the aid chain? 
Fast-forwarding to 2009, we have found that these questions and dynamics
are still at play, the dilemmas still relevant. The country’s vigorous efforts to
celebrate a democratic South Africa with the staging of the 2010 World Cup in
the country have been tarnished by xenophobic violence, violence against
women, record levels of socio-economic inequality, unprecedented restrictions
on informal traders and police violence against social justice campaigners
protesting the lack of basic services. The ANC’s massive victory in the country’s
last national elections cannot obscure a continued erosion of public trust in
politics and governance, and debilitating constraints such as corruption and
official abuses of power. A marked increase in public protests vividly illustrates
the growing impatience of ordinary South Africans who have seen too little
progress. High levels of state repression, police violence, and unresponsive courts
are extremely frustrating for those who fought against similar abuses during the
apartheid era. As one of the conference participants remarked bitterly: ‘South
Africa currently finds itself in a situation where the people have turned against the
state, the state has turned against the people, and the people have turned against
the people as well.’
2 CIVIC-STATE INTERACTIONS: CO-OPERATION OR 
MAINTAINING A CRITICAL INDEPENDENCE? 
If the future of South Africa rests upon both active citizens and an accountable
state, then it is the interplay between the two that merits further investigation.
Based on the analyses of a broader study, Handmaker’s contribution in chapter 2
reflects on civic-state interactions to protect the rights of refugees in South Africa
and to enhance their potential for structural change. Central to this research is a
recurring tension faced by many human rights organisations in the context of an
emerging culture of constitutionalism. At what point does it make sense for civic
actors to provide active support to the government, and under which
circumstances is it preferable for civic actors to maintain their critical
independence? 
Reflecting on more than a decade of civic advocacy for government
accountability to protect and promote refugee rights, this chapter explores how
the dynamics of civic advocacy in this context may be strengthened. Under what
circumstances do civic state interactions lead to structural change, and what do
these interactions have to say about the potential and pitfalls of realising rights in
general? 
6    Chapter 1The chapter, which is based on a larger study,2 analyses the results of three
critical studies of co-operative and confrontational civic-state interactions in the
context of refugee rights. The importance of context, the primacy of the state for
the realisation of rights, and the notion of social distance emerge as important
ingredients for explaining the potential for strategic civic action. Civic actors are
encouraged to reflect more often upon their roles and actions, in order to make
strategic use of the limited yet significant space in which civic action can flourish. 
3 PARTICIPATION IN THE BUDGET PROCESS: WHY 
BOTHER? 
According to Frank Jenkins, a law advisor to the South African parliament, the
budget process presents an important, yet under-utilised space for civic influence.
As he argues in chapter 3, at the end of the day, it is the state budgets that reveal
the true priorities and choices of the government. Therefore, civic actors who aim
to influence government policy should seriously consider participating in the early
stages of the budget process.
This is reinforced by the second part of Jenkins’ argument, namely that the
South African constitution firmly enshrines the right to participate in public
processes. The constitutional obligation to guarantee this lies with parliament.
This obligation also includes preserving transparency of parliamentary processes,
openness towards the media, and public meetings. Parliament can and should be
held accountable in terms of this obligation.
Jenkins sounds a wake-up call to activists, while also unravelling the
complexity of parliament in action. He sets out the technical workings of the
budget cycle and specific provisions for civic intervention. Clearly, the
technocratic complexity of the budget process presents great challenges for civic
involvement. Jenkins readily admits that interventions offer little guarantee of
tangible results. So why bother? Despite the limitations of budget participation,
Jenkins argues that it is a form of democratic development in action that,
alongside other peaceful civic interventions, may be a constructive alternative to
violent expressions of civic anger, which risk spiralling out of control and further
deepening the polarisation of South African society.
4 LEGAL MOBILISATION: AN OPTION FOR THE POOR? 
The existence of laws and spaces allowing for participation are no guarantee of
the realisation of rights, especially for the poor, as discussed in chapter 4. Jackie
Dugard, founder of the Social and Economic Rights Institute (SERI), and
formerly a senior researcher with the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) at
the University of Witwatersrand, documents the struggle of the residents of Phiri,
2 Handmaker, 2009.
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(PPMs). This struggle first took the form of direct protests, accompanied by
concerted efforts to negotiate with local government and the water company, but
when these efforts proved unsuccessful, the community turned to rights-based
litigation.
The starting point for this litigation is the South African Constitution, which
guarantees the right of access to sufficient water. But in 2001, the city of
Johannesburg introduced a project to limit water consumption in Soweto by
installing PPMs. These meters automatically disconnect the user once the
(inadequate) supply of free water is exhausted, forcing very poor citizens to go
through a complicated and often unaffordable process of purchasing additional
water credits. 
Community resistance, which has been supported by the Anti-Privatisation
Forum, has ranged from meetings and marches to attempts to physically obstruct
the digging of PPM trenches. These efforts were met by a combination of legal
action, arrests, and harassment of activists, and ultimately, by disconnecting
households that continued to refuse PPMs. By 2005, resistance had virtually been
crushed. 
It was at this low ebb of the struggle that rights-based litigation emerged as
an additional route for activism. This strategy changed the game. In 2008, the
High Court in Johannesburg declared PPMs unlawful. The Court’s ruling was an
unprecedented victory for the poor, and one that attracted widespread national
and international media attention.
Just before the conference, in what Dugard terms a ‘shock decision’, the
Constitutional Court overturned the findings of two previous courts. Does this
defeat imply that legal action has little to offer the poor? Was it all in vain? Dugard
concludes that the process reverberates in unanticipated ways. Such collaborative
interventions help to clarify the terms of a social justice struggle; they confront
lawyers and academics with the harsh realities of the social justice issues they
advocate in the court rooms, or speak about at academic conferences; and in
many other respects, they re-energise social activism in South Africa. 
5 RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION
Budget participation and legal action may be viable strategies for some civic
actors. Yet they require skills, resources and connections that are well beyond the
reach of most South African citizens. In chapter 5, Marcelle Dawson from the
Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Johannesburg reflects on the
increased incidence of community protests, and the police response to these
protests. The mainstream media have been quick to define the protests in terms
of ‘bread and butter issues’, fuelled by the global financial crisis. However, critical
observers have pointed out that the voices of the dissenting communities were
absent in the analyses, and that deeper, more complex causes were often at the
8    Chapter 1heart of the protestors’ dissent. It is crucial to find out what the real motivation
was for the people’s mobilisation, and why they chose protest (which often
turned violent) over other strategies. 
Dawson suggests that an over-exaggeration of the service delivery element of
popular resistance runs the risk of solving the problems with piecemeal or ‘band-
aid’ remedies that are short-lived, and often glosses over the underlying causes.
Yet basic needs cannot be ignored. 
For many demonstrators, involvement in popular protests has been met with
unreasonably forceful responses from the police. Whatever the drivers behind
resistance and repression, the interplay between these factors provides a
dangerous cocktail for social unrest. Heavy-handed repression seems to fuel
rather than deter violent resistance. 
Furthermore, repression of resistance may be used as a mirror to reflect on
the state of democracy. A certain measure of stability has been achieved since
democratic elections in 1994, but apartheid’s legacy of immense social problems
remains a grave threat to social order. Beyond the content of rights as contained
in the Constitution, and in particular the right to vote, what do these problems
say about the quality of South Africa’s democracy? 
6 MOBILISING BELOW THE RADAR 
In chapter 6, Zaheera Jinnah and Rio Haloday from the Forced Migration Study
Programme at the University of Witwatersrand turn to the mobilising of rights by
and for migrants. How do migrants claim their rights in a context where, despite
the guarantees contained in South Africa’s Constitution, citizenship is not
acknowledged in society, and where the threat of xenophobic violence looms
large?
Group interviews in Johannesburg confirm notions from social movement
theory that, for some groups, there are benefits in not mobilising. Fears of
deportation, self-exclusion and time constraints lead some migrants to accept,
rather than protest, infringements of their rights. Migrants tend to rely on social
networks, privately funded help and small, community-based organisations such
as churches and credit associations. Furthermore, levels of rights awareness are
low, which also hinders mobilisation; and xenophobic tensions have exacerbated
the low levels of trust between migrants and South Africans. 
The overwhelming feeling among migrants is that there are not sufficient
institutions to turn to when help is needed. There is a disconnect, confirmed by
interviews, between migrant realities and the agendas of NGOs and international
organisations. With a few exceptions, national NGOs seldom work exclusively
with migrant groups. Migrant-led organisations are better connected, but struggle
to maintain stable levels of funding and to establish working relations with other
groups. Finally, faith-based organisations tend to provide relief and material
  Mobilising Social Justice    9assistance without advocacy. These organisations seem to be the best-connected,
and enjoy high levels of credibility among migrants. 
Jinnah and Haloday conclude that migrants have not mobilised significantly
to close the gap between their constitutional entitlements and the actual
realisation of their basic rights. There are several issues that require mobilisation,
including protection from police harassment and access to basic services. But
civic actors need to develop strategies and co-operate to ensure that the basic
human rights enjoyed by citizens also come within reach of migrants who wish to
make South Africa their home. 
7 WEAVING THREADS
The research projects described in the core chapters of this book served as the
backbone for a two-day dialogue on mobilisation and social justice. Sooka’s
contribution in the epilogue includes the hopeful notion that civil society in South
Africa is entering a new era of social activism, illustrated by some of the cases in
this book, and including well-known initiatives such as the Treatment Action
Campaign and the Abahlali shack dwellers’ movement. This is good news for
millions of South Africans and others resident here, but these examples can also
serve as an inspiration for other social justice movements in the rest of the world.
If South Africa’s ‘world in one country’ label also extends to its social dynamics,
then these positive signs may (as Handmaker describes) be able to travel across
other spaces and time, and once again inspire civic actors around the world to end
the macro-structural dimensions of global apartheid.
Unlocking the potential for structural change will not be easy. This book adds
to a growing body of critical voices that call upon civil society organisations, and
their donors, to become more self-critical and reflective, more analytical and
strategic. Good intentions, commitment and the moral high ground of civic
action, while crucial, are insufficient on their own. Civic action requires resolve
and strategic responses. As one conference participant remarked, civil society
spends too much time shouting about what’s going wrong, instead of analysing
what’s going on.
This brings us back to the key questions of the Knowledge Programme. How
can we understand the dynamics of civil society formation, and the role of local
actors in this process? How does civil society-building as a process contribute to
structural changes in the unequal balance of power in society? And how do
external actors – donors as well as support or solidarity organisations – contribute
to this process? 
The concluding chapter also addresses knowledge integration. The findings
of the research projects discussed here suggest that the strategies of donors and
the organisations they support should be far more knowledge-based than they are
at present. Such strategies may indeed hold the key to deeper insights, especially
if further research can strengthen grass-roots perspectives and citizen narratives.
10    Chapter 1In their preface, Pheko and Sebastian suggest that this conference is merely a
beginning. Their words demonstrate the extent to which the research projects and
the conference together succeeded in creating an inclusive space, and we welcome
their critical reflections. 
The concluding chapter of this book reflects on all three of these research
questions. And yet a grand theory on civic action remains elusive, and may not
even be necessary. While some mobilisation strategies (ranging from peaceful
marches to civic education) have not been covered by the conference or this
book, the studies show that successful collective action lies in combining several
mobilisation strategies. Moreover, conference participants rightly remarked that
some important perspectives, such the role of traditional authorities in rural areas,
did not feature prominently enough in the discussions. There was also a marked
lack of gender analysis. This we acknowledge. However, the studies never
intended to provide an exhaustive or conclusive analysis of mobilisation
strategies. Rather, they offer an opportunity to appreciate the complexity of social
processes and civic action. 
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2CHAPTER CIVIC-STATE INTERACTIONS ANDTHE POTENTIAL FORSTRUCTURAL CHANGE
Jeff Handmaker1
On 31 January 2008, South African police officers raided the Central Methodist
Church in Johannesburg. Employing heavy-handed tactics, allegedly including
pepper spray and dogs, the police proceeded to round up suspected
undocumented migrants, who they claimed had no permits to stay in South
Africa.2 Among those arrested were Zimbabwean asylum-seekers who had fled
growing violence in Zimbabwe, and had managed to avoid detention at a
notorious detention facility in Musina on the South Africa-Zimbabwe border,
before seeking refuge in Johannesburg.3 These asylum seekers had a legitimate
right to stay in terms of national and international laws that the South African
government was legally obliged to respect.
In the months that followed the January raid, a growing number of reports
in the media highlighted widespread abuses of asylum-seekers and refugees by the
police and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Civic organisations stepped
up their advocacy and launched a series of further public and legal challenges.4
Civic organisations insisted upon the government’s accountability to migrants
and asylum-seekers in general, and condemned the police raids on the Methodist
church.5 
1 This chapter is adapted from Handmaker (2009) ‘Conclusion’, in Advocating for Accountability:
Civic-State Interactions to Protect Refugees in South Africa, pp. 191–211. Antwerp: Intersentia.
2 ‘Raid Highlights Migrant Abuse’, 2008.
3 As explained by Hermes (2008) and others, the growing number of asylum-seekers from
Zimbabwe was due to growing state-organised violence by Mugabe’s authoritarian regime,
which peaked in 2005, in the context of Operation Murambatsvina, and again in April 2008,
following the Zimbabwe government’s rejection of the 29 March 2008 elections.
4 Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South
Africa (CoRMSA) issued a series of press releases condemning the behaviour of the South
African police and the DHA. Later, this series of public challenges was posted on their
websites: http://www.lhr.org.za/news and http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/. Last checked on
31 December 2008.
5 Burger, 2008.11

  Civic-state interactions    13In May, local and international media began reporting a wave of attacks
against foreigners, mainly in township areas. Houses and shops were looted.
People were beaten and even set on fire in the street. By 31 May 2008, at least 62
people had been killed, and many more forced to flee.6 The violence was so
widespread that the government was compelled to establish emergency relief
centres to protect the victims of xenophobic violence. However, in August 2008
the government threatened to close the relief centres,7 while at the same time, the
government refused to close the detention centre in Musina, which had
developed a reputation for widespread abuses, including allegations of torture.8
Civic organisations responded to these developments with co-ordinated
responses and legal challenges that illustrated a growing sophistication in
advocating for accountability. Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) – supported by
numerous other civic organisations, including the Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC), Consortium on Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA) and
others – launched constitutional challenges to the closure of the relief centres.9
After South African civic organisations repeatedly appealed for the closure of the
Musina immigrant detention facility – run by the South African Border Police, in
co-ordination with the DHA – LHR found itself supporting the Director-General
of the DHA, who eventually agreed that the facility should be closed. LHR issued
a press release on 20 November 2008:
[LHR] supports the call by the Director-General of the Department of Home
Affairs for the closure of the detention facility in Musina for foreign nationals …
The facility is run by the South African Police Service with no safeguards to prevent
unlawful detentions, the deportation of refugees or independent monitoring of the
conditions of detention.
LHR described the conditions at the Musina detention facility, making extensive
reference to international law and South African law:
We have found large numbers of children, often unaccompanied, detained along
with adults in contravention of both the Constitution and the Children’s Act …
South Africa has been cited for its mistreatment of detainees in immigration
detention by the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention …
[including] abusive handcuffing, beatings with hosepipes and in one incident,
detainees were forced to roll in urine on the floor. Such treatment is not only a
criminal offence, but a violation of South Africa’s obligations under the UN
Convention Against Torture.
Reflecting on a lengthier study that looked at more than a decade of civic
advocacy for government accountability for refugee rights in South Africa,10 this
chapter will revisit the following research question: how can the dynamics of civic
interactions to advocate state accountability to promote, protect and fulfil refugee
6 ‘Xenophobic Attacks Plague the Country’, 2008; ‘Xenophobia Death Toll Hits 62’, 2008.
7 Bell, 2008.
8 Mbelle and Dissel, 2008.
9 IRRI, 2008.
10 Ibid, footnote 1.
14    Chapter 2rights in South Africa be strengthened; under what circumstances do civic-state
interactions lead to structural change; and what do these interactions teach us
about the potential and pitfalls of realising rights in general?
Discovering answers to this question will help to explain the emergence of
civic capacity, the strategic importance of recognising the structural boundaries
of the state, and the role of civic actors in mediating the translation of global rules
into local contexts, which can lead to structural change.
This chapter presents the findings of a study of civic-state interactions to
protect the rights of refugees in South Africa, conducted between 2004 and 2008,
which explains how civic actors have interacted with governments through both
co-operation and confrontation. Secondly, it explains the context in which civic
actors have acquired capacity to advocate for government accountability, and
how this has shaped the possibilities for realising refugee rights in South Africa.
Thirdly, the chapter explains the importance of respecting structural boundaries
in a culture of constitutionalism. Fourthly, it explains how civic actors translate
global rules into their locally relevant contexts. Finally, this chapter explains how
civic capacity to realise rights travels across time and space: across time, in terms
of the ongoing relevance of social justice strategies from one historical period to
the next; and across space in terms of the global relevance that social justice
strategies in one country have for similar struggles in different countries.
1 CIVIC CAPACITY, STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES AND 
THE SCOPE FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE
Civic-state interactions in the fourteen years that have passed since the South
African government ratified the international refugee conventions have
reaffirmed the capacity of civic actors to hold states accountable for their human
rights obligations, clarified the structural boundaries of civic-state interactions,
and revealed the scope for these interactions to lead to structural change. 
In seeking to better understand the potential for civic action to lead to
structural change, I have tried to explain the dynamics of civic interactions to
advocate state accountability in promoting, protecting and fulfilling refugee rights
in South Africa; the circumstances under which civic-state interactions lead to
structural change; and the potentials and pitfalls of these interactions in realising
rights in general. Civic interventions to promote the South African state’s
accountability for its human rights obligations are principally understood through
the country’s culture of constitutionalism. Carefully honed in the struggle against
apartheid, civic actors – including lawyers and legal advocacy organisations in the
post-1994 democratic era – have wielded both ‘shield’ and ‘sword’ in their
advocacy of new human rights issues (including refugee rights), advocating a new
kind of ‘politics by other means’.11
11 Abel, 1995.
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decision were almost unthinkable, administrative law has proven to be a dynamic
mechanism, available to challenge a government directly on the content of its
policies. It has been a powerful shield against ill-informed, biased or arbitrary
decisions made in individual applications for refugee status. It has also become an
effective sword, both in halting restrictive policies for admission to the country,
and in advocating for economic and social rights, such as the right of refugees to
study, receive social grants, and work in particular employment sectors.
Beyond explaining the civic potential for realising refugee rights, I have
questioned how such a role could be strengthened. Further, I have asked what
this has taught us about the potential of civic interventions in realising rights in
general. Civic advocacy for refugee rights in South Africa demonstrates how state
accountability can be promoted, or in more limited circumstances enforced, by
way of co-operative and confrontational interactions between government and
civic actors. The principal means of explaining the nature of the relationship
between civic actors and the state in these interactions is what Kidder has referred
to as social distance, as measured by divergences in interests, meanings and
political positions; in other words, the externally grounded reasons for
participating in a given civic-state interaction.12
Civic-state interactions in refugee policymaking
The first example of civic-state interactions discussed in the longer study involved
civic actors engaged in the development of national policies to protect refugees
in South Africa. These interactions revealed various opportunities and challenges
for civic actors. In many respects, South Africa is a model of participatory
democracy, in which the government has a duty to ensure that there has been
some level of civic involvement in the policymaking process. While the courts in
South Africa have determined that some specific civic involvement duties are
enforceable, it is generally a matter of discretion as to what form this public
involvement takes.13
Where a process was too one-sided in terms of the dominant role played by
civic actors, the South African government questioned the legitimacy of the
process, as was shown by its reluctance to follow-up on the Refugees Green
Paper. Similarly, when the government neglected to consult civic actors, as was
the case in the development of the Regulations to the Refugees Act, civic actors
contested the outcome of that process, labelling it illegitimate. By contrast, where
civic actors participated actively in a government-led policy initiative – as was the
case in the Refugees White Paper process – the legitimacy of the process, as well
as the possibilities for its implementation, was correspondingly enhanced.
12 Kidder, 1979.
13 Hoexter, 2007: 75–76, commenting on the Doctors for Life case (2006) and the Matatiele case
(2007).
16    Chapter 2Broadly speaking, government and civic actors alike welcomed the outcome of
the White Paper process – the Refugees Act.
Clarity regarding the respective roles of civic and state actors has made it
possible to explain the motivations for the participation of each in a policymaking
or implementation process at a particular historical moment. This has in turn
illustrated how the presence of social distance, at that moment, defined the
strategic possibilities for a desirable outcome at a particular time, at least from the
perspective of civic actors participating in a given policy or implementation
process.
In the formation of the Refugees Act of 1998, it was notable that both civic
and government representatives in the White Paper Task Team (as well as most
observers of the process) recognised the need for the Department of Home
Affairs (DHA) to set policy, as long as appropriate consultation also took place.
In other words, the opportunities for exercising civic agency were conditioned by
administrative and legal structures already in existence. Furthermore, there was a
common understanding that the South African government was obliged to give
effect to its ratification of the international refugee conventions. However, this
common understanding did not mean that the views of all civic actors were the
same. Indeed, there were many differences of opinion as to the extent to which
the Refugees White Paper and Bill needed to make explicit reference to the rights
of asylum-seekers and refugees, and to the obligations of the government. 
And yet it was still possible to advocate structural change (in Archer’s
terminology, ‘elaboration’) in the DHA’s legal and administrative structure. The
legal structure that emerged from the White Paper process incorporated
international law principles regarding the status determination procedure, as well
as due process principles contained in South Africa’s constitution. The
administrative structure included various possibilities for internal appeal, as well
as for oversight by the Standing Committee and Refugees Appeal Board.
Civic-state interactions in refugee policy implementation
Unlike in the refugee White Paper policymaking process, the possibilities for civic
actors to influence the direction of the DHA’s policy were more limited in the
context of the second example, namely civic involvement in an ostensibly
government-led project to regularise the legal status of former Mozambican
refugees. This second example of co-operative civic-state interactions was
informed by South Africa’s historical involvement in the violent civil war in
Mozambique, and the legal and administrative structure that had denied these
refugees a formal status.14 By the same token, the desire of the South African
14 According to Rupiya and others (1998), the previous South African government’s support for
the right-wing, opposition RENAMO forces that were fighting the once-Soviet-backed, left-
wing FRELIMO government forces formed part of South Africa’s regional destabilisation
campaign. The civil war in Mozambique generated millions of refugees, many of whom sought
refuge in countries throughout the region, including South Africa.
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meant that it was possible for civic actors to promote a correction of this injustice,
and to elaborate the legal and administrative structure by granting these former
refugees legal residential status. Unfortunately, the actual implementation of this
project severely constrained the possibilities for civic agency due to the role of the
leading civic actor, a Dutch NGO known as AWEPA.
As far back as the early 1990s, a Tripartite Commission consisting of the
governments of Mozambique and South Africa, together with the UNHCR,
aimed to resolve the situation for the hundreds of thousands of Mozambican
refugees who ended up in South Africa.15 The commission’s two main
commitments were to repatriate those who wished to return to Mozambique, and
to regularise the legal status of former Mozambican refugees (FMRs) who wished
to remain in South Africa.
When civic actors (and particularly AWEPA) expressed an interest in
facilitating the implementation of the regularisation project, it was clear that the
structural conditions favouring administrative due process were hardly in place
for this to happen. The marked lack of political will on the part of the DHA, and
the shaky legal and administrative structure that finally emerged to implement the
project (which involved extensive closed-door involvement by AWEPA) created
a situation in which the ability of local civic actors and FMRs to exercise their
agency was highly circumscribed. 
Particularly uncomfortable for local civic actors was the role that AWEPA
played in conflating its interests with that of the South African government. The
AWEPA co-ordinator’s lack of distinction between his organisation’s interest and
the interests of the DHA – coupled with AWEPA’s central co-ordinating role –
artificially reduced the social distance between the DHA and local civic actors.
This situation made it extremely difficult for local civic actors to challenge the
behaviour of DHA officials, and ensure that administrative due process was being
respected.
Furthermore, the significance of a credible monitoring presence was under-
emphasised, as were concerns about ‘survival fraud’. Finally, a moratorium on
deportations was first downplayed and then sidelined altogether by the
government, with no objection from AWEPA. To make matters worse, when
civic actors eventually did raise concerns about the project’s implementation,
AWEPA openly undermined them. This combination of factors both
compromised the independence of local civic actors and had catastrophic results
for thousands of FMRs, who were denied regularised status in structural
circumstances that failed to comply with basic standards of administrative due
process.
15 The forming of the Tripartite Commission followed a 1992 peace agreement in Rome between
the two main parties to the Mozambican conflict.
18    Chapter 2Litigation and shaming by civic actors
While co-operative interactions represented something relatively new to civic
actors, emerging as they did from political struggle, and later from a negotiated
constitutional transition that led to an accountable government, confrontational
measures – through litigating and shaming the government into fulfilling its
obligations to refugees – have been far more familiar territory for civic advocates.
The history of the anti-apartheid struggle mapped out two specific directions
for civic actors, which to some extent continued in the post-1994 dispensation,
although the experience of advocating refugee rights has tended to stress one
particular direction over the other. As civic actors accustomed to litigating refugee
rights took advantage of expanded opportunities for judicial review of
administrative decisions, as provided for in the constitution, there have been
correspondingly fewer efforts to publicly shame government. On one level this is
surprising, given that advocacy efforts that have combined litigation with a civic
mobilisation campaign (and strategic use of the media) have tended to lead to
more favourable outcomes. On another level, this might be explained by the facts
that (1) the DHA was obliged to radically transform its administrative structure;
and that (2) the opinions of the general public – and the media – were generally
unsympathetic to refugees and migrants.
The potential for structural interdicts to precipitate concrete and lasting
improvements – or structural elaboration, in refugee protection standards –
remains to be seen. Structural interdicts create a special relationship between the
court, government and civic actors in which this elaboration can take place.
However, this relationship also contains underlying tensions. The first (and more
obvious) source of tension is between the government and civic actors, as acutely
observed in the case of LHR (2001), in which the credibility of civic actors and
their ability to challenge government decisions were explicitly brought into
question. The second source of tension is between government and the courts;
civic groups and individuals have only recently been permitted to
comprehensively challenge decisions of the government on the grounds of
whether they have acted in a ‘reasonable’ manner. Hoexter sums up the problem
well:
More than any other ground, review for reasonableness exposes the tension between
two conflicting judicial emotions: the fear of encroaching on the province of the
executive arm of government by entering into the merits of administrative decisions,
and the desire for adequate control over the decisions of administrative authorities.16
In other words, the courts in South Africa have faced the structural dilemma of
maintaining what Klaaren has referred to as a ‘delicate balance’ between, on one
hand, allowing government to fulfil its role in determining the content of policy
16 Hoexter, 2007: 293–294.
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government abuse of power.17
From structural conditioning to structural change: translators, 
social distance and public law
These three examples of civic-state interactions explain how the opportunities for
civic agency have specific historical roots – which have conditioned civic agency
to promote, protect and fulfil human rights, but have also allowed for structural
elaboration (or structural change). Civic actors have fulfilled an important
mediating role in the translation of global rules into the development,
implementation and challenges of national policies. This study of civic advocacy
for refugee rights in South Africa has also emphasised the importance of social
distance as a strategic factor for civic actors, when assessing the possibilities for
interacting with government in promoting state accountability towards refugees.
Finally, this study highlights the usefulness of public (administrative and
constitutional) law as a means of translating global rules into their local,
vernacular contexts, and enforcing state accountability to international human
rights norms.
As the following sections explain, civic interactions to advocate state
accountability for respecting refugee rights can be explained through three
theoretical propositions. Firstly, the capacity of civic actors to promote and
impose state accountability is shaped by structural changes in the normative
international and national legal frameworks. Secondly, boundaries which define
the structural relationship between civic actors and the state shift in very specific
ways; these must be understood by civic actors (agents) if they want to be strategic
and successful in their advocacy efforts. And finally, civic actors play a crucial role
in mediating the translation of international legal norms into local contexts.
2 CONTEXT SHAPES THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CIVIC-
STATE INTERACTIONS
The social and political context from which civic actors have emerged has shaped
both the nature of civic organisations and the possibilities for civic actors to
influence state policies, mobilise for their enforcement, and hold states
accountable. In South Africa, two distinct types of civic actors emerged from a
long political struggle against racist governmental policies. The first mobilised in
strategic, proactive ways to resist the apartheid regime. The other type of civic
17 Klaaren, 2006b.
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through a range of legal interventions, from providing protection to those facing
potential torture in the course of police interrogations, to challenging forced
removals by blocking the implementation of the Group Areas Act.
Since the country’s first democratic elections in 1994, civic actors have
operated in a rapidly shifting context that has challenged civic actors, and
especially legal advocates, to develop new strategies. With the emergence of a
constitutional culture, and a correspondingly accountable government in South
Africa, civic actors have not only had to challenge government in order to hold it
accountable; they have also been obliged to engage in policymaking and
implementation programmes, supporting government when it has demonstrated
a willingness to move in a progressive direction. 
Where co-operative interactions have failed, confrontational strategies by
civic actors have tried to fill the gap in legal protection. However, litigation on its
own tends to provide little guarantee of a productive outcome. Well co-ordinated
civic advocacy strategies, combining public shaming and mass mobilisation with
legal interventions, have produced the most successful outcomes.
The process of developing refugee policy in South Africa has drawn upon
global policy discussions on refugee protection. In particular, the refugee policy
discussion in South Africa has engaged in debating whether refugee law ought to
be ‘reformulated’ in order to correspond better with state interests, or,
alternatively, ‘reinvigorated’ in order to correspond better with its original
intentions. The dominant position advocated by civic organisations in the process
of refugee policy formulation in South Africa has more closely reflected
Goodwin-Gill’s view that mechanisms to encourage compliance need
strengthening, and that NGOs play an important role in this respect.19 Refugee
rights are the product of contestation, and civic actors have endorsed the need for
institutional strengthening to ensure state compliance. Furthermore, the process
of forming a refugee policy has demonstrated that the principal medium through
which these rights are realised is the field of administrative law.
Pressures on the DHA to produce a new refugee policy came both internally
and from outside, partly because of its ratification of the UN and OAU Refugee
Conventions in 1996. With the ratification of these documents, and South
Africa’s increasing prominence in international relations, the DHA came under
particular pressure both from the UNHCR and other arms of government,
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and ANC parliamentarians, to give
18 Abel, 1995, passim.
19 Goodwin-Gill, 1999.
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opportunities for civic interaction were constrained by structural factors from
within the then-Government of National Unity. Buthelezi, of the opposition
Inkatha Freedom Party, remained Minister of Home Affairs for some years, and
openly clashed with the ANC on the government’s policy towards refugees and
migrants.
Consequently, as Crush and McDonald argued, ‘progressive immigration
reform was ultimately held hostage to the broader politics of IFP appeasement’
in the Unity government.20 In some cases, civic actors used this to their
advantage, as when lawyers challenged the DHA’s crude ‘safe third country’
policy.
Furthermore, the DHA (following the advice of US government officials
who drafted many of the Regulations to the Refugees Act) has appeared to follow
the mantra of ‘irregular migration’, which holds that explicit provisions to protect
refugees lead to abuse of the procedure. If this assessment is correct, it explains
the reluctance of the DHA to engage civic actors in the development of the
Regulations. Whatever the reasons, this proved to be a strategic miscalculation on
the part of government. While civic participation in the development of the
Refugees Act created a basis for co-operative civic-state interactions, the DHA’s
lengthy and non-consultative development of the Regulations, set the
Department on an inevitable path of confrontation with civic actors.
The contextual challenges faced by civic actors in promoting a
comprehensive administrative law regime (by way of co-operative interactions
that translate South Africa’s global human rights obligations appropriately) have
been considerable. As Klaaren has noted,21 the asylum-determination procedure
in South Africa – and the rule of law in general – have operated for some time in
a climate in which opportunities to claim rights have been decidedly limited –
particularly prior to 1994. Although structural shifts have been noted with regard
to the policy itself, implementation of the asylum procedure has become steadily
more restrictive since its introduction in 1993.
Civic-state interactions must be seen as a cumulative process demanding
ongoing reflection, possible co-operation, and (potentially) confrontation as well.
By explicitly translating South Africa’s international obligations and the rights
contained in the constitution into the Refugees Act, civic actors have promoted
a situation in which the DHA is obliged to correct its own behaviour. Where this
has not succeeded, civic participation has advocated government accountability
through a string of legal challenges to the DHA’s policies. 
20 Crush and Mcdonald, 2001: 9.
21 Klaaren, 2006b.
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CULTURE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM
The strategic importance of civic actors in respecting structural boundaries is
especially important in a country that respects a culture of constitutionalism. As
mentioned earlier, this creates a primary tension in which civic actors may (1)
support government as it expresses a desire to move in a progressive direction,
but in addition (2) would want to maintain their critical independence. In this
section, the structural conditioning of civic actors is explained in relation to the
possibilities for structural elaboration, followed by a discussion of the
circumstances in which civic actors make strategic choices on the basis of their
assessment of the state-created structural boundaries with which they interact.
Structural conditioning of civic actors and the possibilities for 
elaboration
It has been possible to explain the outcome of civic refugee rights advocacy from
a structure-agency view that draws on Archer’s approach of analytical dualism.
This approach assumes that specific historical events determine state-created
structures, and that the exercise of civic agency has been conditioned by these
structures. This approach also assumes that civic actors are able to elaborate these
structures through a strategic assessment, thereby contributing to structural
change.
On one hand, the three main illustrative examples of this study have
demonstrated that civic advocacy interventions have played a significant role in
holding states accountable. On the other hand, these same examples have
confirmed that state accountability is by definition state-centred; civic actors that
place themselves too centrally in a civic-state interaction – such as in the Refugees
Green Paper policymaking process, or the AWEPA-led regularisation project –
risk eclipsing this essential role of the state or government. Consequently, while
the role of civic actors in promoting legal and social normative compliance is
important, it should not be over-emphasised. The principal responsibility for
realising rights always remains with the state.
Civic actors played key roles in the process of negotiated transition, and
continue to fulfil multiple roles in South Africa’s participatory democracy by
making oral and written contributions to parliamentary hearings, participating in
policy task teams, and even engaging in joint civic-state implementation projects.
As Arnstein argues, assessment of whether this participation is ‘meaningful’ and
‘likely to have an impact’ depends from which rung of the ladder the civic actors
make contributions. These range from the state avoiding civic participation
  Civic-state interactions    25altogether, through forms of manipulation, to ‘token’ consultation, and finally to
‘partnership, delegated power and citizen control’.22
In navigating the narrow but significant channels for advocating state
accountability, civic actors have assessed and made strategic decisions, based on
their growing knowledge of global standards of refugee protection, to interact
with government on the basis of structural boundaries on which civic actors
believe the government might be prepared to compromise. A strategic
consideration of this principal conditioning factor increases the likelihood that a
civic-state interaction will lead to structural change.
Civic agencies’ capacity to interact with and elaborate the country’s legal and
administrative structure providing for the reception of refugees and the
determination of their legal status arises from specific historical events. In the
context of refugee rights protection in South Africa, these events were related to
a long-fought social justice struggle for dignity and self-determination, which was
ultimately overtaken by a process of negotiated transition, during the course of
which the state abandoned minority rule, and a democratic, accountable
government came into being.
As South Africa has emerged from international isolation and begun to re-
engage with the international legal and political order, the new government has
been obliged to change its approach to refugees. Even during the apartheid era,
the government demonstrated a willingness to allow applications for refugee
status on an individual basis, beginning with the Russian applicants. Post-1994,
the democratic government also welcomed critical civic voices in the elaboration
of a comprehensive refugee policy through a new legal and administrative
structure – at least initially. This openness changed as government took a more
defensive stance against civic criticism; but as the White Paper process illustrated,
possibilities still remained for structural elaboration of the refugee policy and its
implementation.
Structural boundaries and strategic choices
Successful civic-state interactions depend on the strategic choices made by civic
actors on the basis of a sober appreciation of state-created structural boundaries
that not only condition their agency, but also allow for structural elaboration. By
extension, the roles and responsibilities of both civic and state actors must be
clear. This applies to any such civic-state interaction, whether it is the
development of a nationally enforceable human rights policy, participation in an
implementation project to realise human rights, or the enforcement of human
rights obligations against a state. In all instances, the principal responsibility lies
with the state and its government, although civic actors often play a
complementary role as ‘translators’ of global rules in local contexts.
22 Reference to Arnstein in Hoexter, 2007: 79–80.
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surrounding a government department that is the focus of a civic interaction, a
variety of strategic responses can be made. In Archer’s assessment, taking time to
assess the structural challenges in which a civic interaction will take place is
essentially about ‘being human’, not least because civic agency itself produces
structurally conditioning factors. As Archer claims: ‘people are indeed perfectly
uninteresting if they possess no personal powers which can make a difference.’23
This entails a careful consideration as to who is representing a government
department, what particular issue is at stake, how the government has handled
itself in the past, what resources are available to the government to respond to the
claims against it, and why government may be motivated to take action at all.
For example, individual government officials may have particular views or
experiences that shape their interpretation of a particular policy. The issue of
asylum-seekers’ right to work will be an especially sensitive one for the DHA,
which also represents the interests of South African citizens. This is just one
example of the kinds of meanings, interests and/or political positions that shape
how government officials frame, interpret and enforce a particular policy. Civic
actors must always bear these in mind when formulating strategy.
In making strategic choices, civic actors may (and should) assume that it is
always primarily government’s task to develop policy, not just as a matter of good
governance, but in order to facilitate greater buy-in to that policy. Of course, this
is not to say that civic organisations should not play a role. Indeed, governments
often consult civic actors as experts or as concerned stakeholders. In some cases,
there may even be a legal obligation to consult. Civic actors also participate in
policymaking processes by confronting the state with their obligations during a
legislative process.
Just as it is primarily government’s responsibility to make policy, it is also
primarily the responsibility of government to implement it. Civic actors can (and
often do) participate in policy implementation projects. They train officials,
advise on implementation frameworks, and even provide services on behalf of
government. Civic actors do this in order to encourage and support government
when it has displayed a willingness to move in a progressive direction. Such
interventions ought not to be conducted uncritically, since there is always the
danger of governmental and civic responsibilities becoming blurred. While civic
actors have recognised the utility of supporting government in carefully defined
circumstances, they have also learned the pitfalls of becoming unwitting
apologists for maladministration.
Finally, enforcement of policy is (or ought to be) also primarily the
responsibility of government, through self-corrective mechanisms. These may be
components of the trias politica, with the elected legislative and independent
judicial branches of government holding the executive accountable without the
23 Archer, 2000: 19.
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independent, constitutionally protected institution such as an ombudsman, semi-
autonomous commission, or auditor-general. Unfortunately, more often than
not, such mechanisms are inadequate, and so the roles of civic actors have
become crucial complements in national and global efforts to hold states
accountable to their international obligations. These may include initiating a claim
through judicial review in the courts, appealing to a global institution such as a
human rights treaty body, publicly shaming the government through generating
attention in the media, or communicating a strong, collective message by way of
mass mobilisation.
The elaboration of the legal and administrative structures that define South
Africa’s refugee policy also illustrates how these structures are cultural systems
that are susceptible to change. As the next section explains, civic translators have
played an important role in the process of elaborating these cultural systems.
4 MEDIATING THE TRANSLATION OF GLOBAL RULES 
INTO LOCAL CONTEXTS
In this study I have tried to illustrate how civic actors have contributed to a
culture of constitutionalism, which has both national and international
dimensions that highlight the utility of administrative law as a principal medium
for translating global rules into local contexts. Furthermore, the examples
provided in this study of civic advocacy for refugees have shown how civic actors
can mediate the translation of global norms into local contexts, critically engaging
within the external relationship – as measured by social distance – that always
exists between civic actors and the government, represented by divergent
interests, meanings and political coalitions. From different disciplinary
perspectives, these illustrative examples have shown how civic actors could have
an influence – at least in a modest way – on the content of laws and policies to
protect refugees in South Africa, and on the manner in which they are
implemented.
Legal culture and civic translators
As socio-legal scholars maintain, legal culture is itself an object of investigation.
This can be either the ‘internal legal culture’24 of legal academics and
practitioners, courts and other institutions, or how the legal culture is shaped by
external factors. As Cotterrell has put it:
participants in law are not just lawyers but all those who seek to use legal ideas for
their own purposes, to promote or control the interests of others … understand legal
ideas in practical terms … legal ideas are a means of structuring the social world.25
24 Friedman, 1975.
25 Cotterrell, 1998: 192.
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promoting and respecting refugee rights in South Africa entails a critique of many
different variables that characterise the legal culture in which civic actors operate.
This study has considered the approaches and means, as well as the mechanisms,
adopted by civic actors to promote the South African government’s
accountability to refugees in terms of its global and constitutional legal normative
obligations. As already shown, the government had clear interests, demonstrated
by its inviting civic participation in the White Paper Task Team. Clear – though
distinctly different – interests motivated civic actors’ participation in the refugee
policymaking process. Consequently, the task team became a highly productive
mechanism through which the competing interests of civic actors, the state and
other bodies such as the UNHCR and Section Nine institutions (most notably the
South African Human Rights Commission) could be mediated.
A less productive mechanism was employed by AWEPA and the DHA to
regularise the status of FMRs, in which the interests of civic actors were far less
clear – and in some cases, inextricably linked with those of the government. As a
result, the potential of South African civic actors to exercise their agency was not
only attenuated, but the due process of FMRs themselves became dangerously
compromised, as there was no critical monitoring presence or independent
mechanism of appeal.
Moore determined three decades ago that semi-autonomous social fields
exist in which social actors are affected by legal norms, but that they also adapt
by establishing their own social norms. In other words, each semi-autonomous
social field is capable of producing its own rules, but is also vulnerable to external
forces.26 Merry’s development of Moore’s ideas into a theory that explains how
global norms become translated or ‘vernacularised’ into local contexts provides a
useful explanation for how rights translators have emerged, translating global
rules through contributions towards policymaking processes, including (in South
Africa) co-operation in refugee policymaking and implementation projects.27
By participating in global refugee protection discussions, a number of South
African NGOs and academics became familiar with international rules designed
to protect refugees; in other words, they became trans-national elites. However,
their participation in the refugee policymaking process in South Africa remained
conscious of local realities, which included the manner in which the refugee
policy had been implemented since 1993. Consequently, they possessed what
Merry terms a ‘double consciousness’.28 This made them effective translators of
global rules, drawing on human rights as a resource both in terms of their
substantive content (as a tool) and in the possibilities for the realisation of these
rights (their consciousness). In addition, these legal translators had access to
various legal enforcement institutions. Furthermore, by employing extra-legal
26 Moore, 1978.
27 Merry, 2006b.
28 Merry, 2006b: 217.
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created more space to engage with government on a critical basis.
Appreciating the value of social distance
Evaluating interactions in terms of social distance is another means of assessing
civic participation, for the purpose of understanding the potential of civic
interventions in realising refugee rights in South Africa, and in realising rights in
general. As this study of civic advocacy for refugees has illustrated, the
corresponding social distance between government lawmakers and civic actors
has narrowed or widened according to the strategic decisions taken by civic
actors, with various consequences.
The externally grounded reasons for civic participation in the process of
refugee policy reform in South Africa diverged from those of the government, in
terms of interests and meanings, but there were important areas of convergence
in terms of political positions. During the refugee policymaking process, there
were disagreements on the explicit wording of entitlements that refugees would
be given as protected persons, in accordance with the country’s constitutional and
international obligations. On the other hand, the government generally agreed to
implement refugee status determination through a hearings-based procedure, as
proposed by civic actors. Therefore, the degree of social distance created by
whether or not civic actors and government diverged or converged in their
political positions on a particular policy issue varied considerably throughout the
policymaking process, although convergence of political positions was clearly
necessary before government would be willing to adopt a particular measure.
Government always had the last word.
During the implementation of a status regularisation project for former
Mozambican refugees (FMRs), the social distance or externalisation between
AWEPA and the South African government was initially very great, as civic actors
raised multiple concerns about how the project ought to be implemented.
However, the interests, meanings and political positions of civic actors and the
government became almost indistinguishable as the project took final shape and
a critical monitoring presence was abandoned. What began as an ostensibly
government-run project became known as the AWEPA project. In the absence
of a credible monitoring presence, this social distance remained narrow
throughout the project’s implementation, resulting in limited space for critical
responses by civic actors, and an administrative justice deficit for the FMRs.
Where refugee rights have been litigated, the social distance between civic
actors and the government (as measured by their respective interests, meanings
and political positions) has remained substantial, as civic actors have affirmed
their role as an independent critical voice. And yet, even in these circumstances,
it has not always been possible to hold the government accountable.
  Civic-state interactions    31The courts have often proven reluctant to question the merits of a
government’s policy or exercise of discretion. But even where judges have found
against the government, lawyers have often had to return to the courts,
sometimes repeatedly, in order to secure compliance with an order or to argue a
virtually identical case to one litigated earlier. In short, a high degree of social
distance, or independent critical voice, has not been a reliable indicator of success.
Not all legal challenges necessarily produce results.
However, a distinction should be made between litigation aimed at
restraining government behaviour, in which more social distance exists, and cases
aimed to promote good behaviour, which tend to involve a narrowing of the
social distance. Put simply, the first type of case negatively insists that a certain
policy be stopped, and tends to be more likely to succeed, while the other
positively encourages the government to improve itself, which has proven to be
more problematic. As one lawyer has argued:
confrontations are necessary ... [and] it is easier to engage in public interest litigation
when trying to stop something from happening; for example, seeking to stop the
deportation of an asylum-seeker by way of an urgent interdict. It is not so easy to
insist that something happens.29
Structural interdicts may offer new possibilities in the latter type of case. Where
structural interdicts have been ordered to encourage good government
behaviour, social distance has narrowed, as competing interests and political
positions between government and civic actors have been replaced by structural
undertakings by government to the court that it will take deliberate steps to
improve a situation. Civic actors in such cases have made contributions in helping
the government to improve its behaviour. In the access cases, for example,
process engineers who were hired by the DHA, on the basis of a consent order,
to improve management and procedures at the Refugee Reception Offices, spent
considerable time interviewing the civic actors who had brought the case against
the government. While it is still too early to assess its lasting impact, the structural
interdict may yet prove to be a significant tool to ensure positive compliance,
since the process of reporting back to the court recognises both the legitimate
interests of both civic actors and the government, and the essentially voluntary
nature of human rights implementation.
29 Interview with S. Magardie, 2006.
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lead to structural change within the government by assessing the extent to which
government has conceded to demands by civic actors in sharing their meanings,
interests or political positions. This deserves further empirical study. In recent
years, the DHA has faced persistent demands for reform from civic
organisations, which have grown more sophisticated in their advocacy. Civic
actors representing various groups and interests have protested – often
simultaneously – to the media, parliament and courts about abuse by government
officials, departmental inefficiency, corruption and mismanagement.
The DHA has responded to a considerable extent to these demands from
civic organisations, and has initiated a consultative process to amend the Refugees
Act. A draft bill was released for public comment in 2007.30 Following public
hearings in South Africa’s parliament that involved several civic organisations,31
and responding to long-standing criticisms from civic organisations about gaps in
the refugee policy and its implementation, the government released a further draft
bill in March 2008.32 The government has also responded to the concerns raised
by civic actors by calling for the closure of the Musina detention facility, as
described above. Furthermore, the DHA initiated a ‘turnaround strategy’ that has
involved participation from a number of civic actors, and the Minister has
responded directly to questions regarding mismanagement of the DHA.33
With these acknowledgements from the government – to some extent, in
response to the demands of civic actors – the social distance between civic actors
and the government has narrowed as their respective interests in refugee
protection and meanings about what this protection entails have converged, but
not to the point that civic organisations have abandoned their critical monitoring
role. Drawing on specific obligations contained in international and South
African law, CoRMSA’s June 2008 Annual Report comprehensively addresses the
obligations of South Africa’s local and national government to protect refugees
and migrants, from the role of government in addressing the root causes of
xenophobic violence to its role in facilitating access to employment and basic
services.34 As the report confirms, while to some extent the interests and
meanings of civic actors and the government may have converged, their
respective political positions continue to diverge, as civic actors remain focused
on holding the South African government – and especially the DHA –
accountable for its legal obligations to protect refugees and migrants.
30 Government of South Africa, ‘Publication of the draft Refugees Amendment Bill 2007’,
General Notice 730 of 2007, Government Gazette No. 29976, 7 June 2007.
31 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, ‘Refugees Amendment Bill: Public Hearings’, Audio and
written transcripts available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/print/11282. Last checked 29 August
2008.
32 Government of South Africa, ‘Refugees Amendment Bill’, Government Gazette No. 30835,
B11-2008, 4 March 2008. Available at: http://www.pmg.org.za/files/bills/080313b11-08.pdf.
Last checked 29 August 2008.
33 ‘DHA Turnaround Strategy’, 2007.
34 CoRMSA Annual Report, 2008.
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The interactions explored in this study concern the role of South African civic
actors in developing the government’s refugee policy, implementing policy, and,
in certain cases, forcing government to comply with its policy through litigation.
However, these civic-state interactions hold universal lessons for realising rights
in general, across time (at different points in South Africa’s history) and space (in
other countries and as part of other human rights struggles). In applying these
generalisations, the notion of the state in terms of its more formal institutions,
such as the courts and Parliament, might need to be distinguished from the ‘less
cuddly’, less caring and occasionally violent aspects of the state, such as the police
and municipal governments that directly threaten civic action and fail to provide
public services.35 At the same time, one must be cautious about over-
essentialising these aspects of the state; not all police officers are violent, and not
all municipal government officials are necessarily uncaring towards refugees and
migrants.36
Realising rights across time (in South Africa)
This study of civic advocacy for refugees provides vivid illustrations of the
interplay between civic actors and the state in promoting a culture of
constitutionalism for all persons (in the language of the Constitution) and not just
South African citizens. Refugees and asylum-seekers who demonstrated in front
of Union Buildings in 1996, demanding that the UNHCR and South African
government respond to their predicament, did not merely generate interest in the
media. Just as the defiance campaigns in South Africa from the 1950s mobilised
thousands of South Africans to re-examine their position and resist apartheid, the
July 1996 demonstration critically engaged South Africans in re-examining their
relationship with refugees; and it precipitated a response from civic organisations.
The July 1996 refugee demonstration took place at a historical moment.
Having just brought into being the country’s final constitution, South Africa was
at a crossroads. Other external factors certainly also played a role, particularly the
government’s obligations acquired as the result of having assented to
international refugee conventions. Rather than only holding government
accountable, the demonstration spurred on South African civic actors, mobilising
them not just to provide assistance, but also to advocate wide-ranging
improvements in the way refugees were received and integrated at that time. In
the months and years following the demonstration, South African lawyers,
churches and other civic organisations were eventually instrumental in achieving
a good refugee policy, sound implementation and a more accountable
government.
35 As observed by Peter Alexander at the Mobilising Social Justice conference in Johannesburg on 23
November 2009.
36 As observed by Darshan Vigneswaran at the Mobilising Social Justice conference in Johannesburg
on 23 November 2009.
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human rights obligations towards refugees, joint refugee-NGO initiatives that
have secured key rights for refugees, and a number of landmark legal challenges
through the South African courts, with which to confront the government with
its obligations towards non-South Africans in general, and refugees in particular.
Of course, the picture has not always been so positive. As legal advocates
have paid more attention to this issue, reports have emerged of arbitrary
detention and ill-treatment at the hands of the police and immigration officers,
poorly motivated refusals to grant refugee status, and allegations of corruption
and abuse of power.
Ten years after South Africa became party to the international refugee
conventions and the country’s final constitution came into being, the government
faced another crossroads. Building a culture of constitutionalism has demanded
responses at multiple levels. At the local level, municipalities have begun to see
migrants from other countries, including asylum-seekers and refugees, as citizens
of Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg. Confronted by lawyers and as-yet-
unfulfilled obligations created by structural interdicts, national government has
begun to respond seriously to technical, process and management-related
problems in implementing a fair and efficient status-determination procedure.
Most notably, the government has accepted the need to develop and improve
policy through amendments by way of parliamentary process rather than through
ad hoc administrative regulations.
Finally, at a global level, South Africa has been actively engaging in global
policy discussions on migration that are edging towards containment, with so-
called irregular migration as their centrepiece.37 On the other hand, South Africa
has noted the highly unproductive and even violent consequences of maintaining
a restrictive policy that unduly prioritises national interests over its international
obligations to protect migrants in general, and refugees in particular.
Realising rights across space (other struggles in different 
countries)
Recalling the measures used to hold the government accountable in the past on
the basis of international human rights norms also resonates with other social
justice struggles in different countries. The importance of clear roles and
responsibilities and strategic recognition of structural boundaries both have
global application beyond the South African scenario. The strategies and moral
resonance of South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle have motivated accountability
advocates around the world, and not necessarily because what happened in the
country was unique. South Africa’s struggle against racial injustice, and the efforts
37 Ghosh, 1998, passim.
36    Chapter 2that have been made to achieve social transformation, reflect universal principles
that define any social justice struggle engaged in advocating for accountability.
For example, civic actors in Eastern European countries, many of whom are
recent member-states of the European Union (EU), have mobilised for better
protection standards for refugees and migrants by recognising EU-determined
structural boundaries, and by translating global refugee protection standards into
national advocacy efforts to protect refugees.38 Civic actors in Eastern Europe,
whose activities prior to the early 1990s were highly constrained, have also
participated in the development of refugee policies.39
In the Middle East, civic actors also play important roles in refugee
protection. A deeply problematic geo-political situation and ongoing military
occupation prevent a local, rights-based solution to the plight of Palestinian
refugees, and serious structural constraints make it virtually impossible to
advocate for the accountability of Israel, especially concerning Palestinian
refugees. Consequently, civic actors around the world – including academics,
lawyers, church leaders and pressure groups – have managed to generate
widespread global awareness concerning the issue of historical, and continuing,
dispossession of Palestinians. Furthermore, may of these groups have responded
to a call by Palestinian civil society organisations for the economic, social, cultural
and political isolation of Israel through boycotts, divestment and sanctions
(BDS).40 Furthermore, by recognising structural limitations and shifting to supra-
national mechanisms instead, civic actors have advocated strategically for
recognition of Palestinian residency and refugee rights to particular UN agencies’
international legal processes. Lacking impact at the local level, civic actors have
translated Palestinian rights to UN organisations and treaty bodies, including the
UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.41 Third states have
also become an important forum for civic actors, making legal claims against
companies that participate in violations of Palestinian refugee and residency
38 As Lavanex (1999) has argued, refugee rights advocacy and policy development in Eastern
European countries has been intrinsically linked with their desire to become part of the
European Union. With the possibility of gaining admission to the EU taking on greater
momentum, countries such as Bulgaria have steadily brought their country’s policies into line
with EU expectations, including the European Union’s human rights requirements, while
simultaneously having to contend with great political uncertainty regarding the gradual
harmonisation of asylum policies at the level of the EU. Much of this work has been conducted
together with the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. See http://www.ecre.org. Last
checked on 29 August 2008.
39 UNHCR, ‘Summary report of the Varna joint meeting’, Bulgaria, 28 February 2002. Available
at: http://www.unhcr.bg/events_records/2002/varna_workshop/summary_ report_varna.
pdf. Last checked on 29 August 2008.
40 For example, the Badil Resource Centre on Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights has
worked with grass-roots activists and solidarity partners around the globe to advocate respect
for international law towards Palestinian refugees. See www.badil.org. Last checked on 6
September 2008.
41 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of reports submitted by
states parties under Article 9 of the Convention Israel, Seventieth session 19 February–9 March
2007, CERD/C/ISR/CO/13, March 2007; Badil Resource Centre on Palestinian Residency
and Refugee Rights, Survey of Palestinian Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 2006–2007,
Bethlehem, 2007.
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in refugee camps.43
Whether in South Africa, Eastern Europe or Palestine, and regardless of
whether civic actors are engaged in a political struggle or a process of social
transformation in co-operation with government, all these events can be seen as
various forms of social justice struggle. In any social justice struggle, the key to
civic actors being able to hold states and governments accountable for their
human rights obligations lies in civic actors making strategic choices.
Making strategic choices has various implications for civic actors, as this
study of realising refugee rights in South Africa has illustrated. First, civic actors
must appreciate the social, political and legal context in which they operate; this
historical appreciation reveals certain structural boundaries to realising rights that
are nearly always imposed by the state. Second, civic actors must critically assess
the structural boundaries that condition their behaviour, but also have the
potential for structural change or ‘elaboration’, through civic interaction with the
state in formal (and also informal) interventions. Third, civic actors must
appreciate the social distance that always exists between themselves and the
government, measured by divergences in meanings, interests and political
positions. Through a critical engagement in this ‘external’ relationship, it is
possible for civic actors to capitalise on these divergences in advocating a state’s
accountability for realising human rights. Whether the social distance ought to be
narrowed or broadened at a particular moment depends on (1) the context in
which this takes place, (2) the structural boundaries that exist, and (3) the desired
outcome.
A critical engagement with the government allows civic actors, including legal
advocates, to take advantage of that narrow, but significant space for achieving
structural change. In this social, political and legal space, the potential for
advocating the accountability of a state to promote, protect and fulfil human
rights can flourish.
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3CHAPTER THE BUDGET PROCESS ANDSTRATEGIC CIVICINTERVENTIONS
Frank S. Jenkins
1 INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing this chapter, negative reports continue to trickle in
regarding respect for and protection of the rights of refugees in South Africa. The
socio-economic effects of xenophobia, coupled with ineffective and weak
administrative procedures to determine applications for asylum, are well
documented.1 At the same time, the majority of people in South Africa live in
poverty;2 as Ajam notes, ‘[p]overty and inequality are among the major challenges
facing South African society, and the major thrust of policy in all spheres of
government.’3 Civil society’s engagement with the policy priorities of government
in respect of these issues forms the basis of this chapter. My hypothesis is that
civil society should be strengthened in order to participate in the processes of a
democratic government, as this deepens democracy.
1 See Landau and Segatti, Human Development Impacts of Migration: South Africa Case Study, Human
Development Research Paper 2009/05, UNDP; Doctors without Borders, No Refuge, Access
Denied: Medical and Humanitarian Needs of Zimbabweans in South Africa, June 2009; Handmaker, De
la Hunt and Klaaren (eds), Advancing Refugee Protection in South Africa, Human Rights in Context,
Volume 2, 2008; Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation – Consortium for
Refugees Proceedings of the Seminar: ‘Why do we fear and hate the “other”’? Understanding
xenophobia in the South African context and migrants in South Africa”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung,
26 May 2008.
2 ‘New estimates of poverty show that the proportion of people living in poverty in South Africa
has not changed significantly between 1996 and 2001. However, those households living in
poverty have sunk deeper into poverty and the gap between rich and poor has widened. The
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in collaboration with Mr Andrew Whiteford, a
South African economist, has generated these estimates. Approximately 57% of individuals in
South Africa were living below the poverty income line in 2001, unchanged from 1996.’ Craig
Schwabe, Fact Sheet: Poverty in South Africa, Human Sciences Research Council, 26 July 2004,
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000990/.  
3 Ajam, ‘Budget oversight and poverty alleviation: opportunities and challenges’, in Parliament, the
Budget and Poverty in South Africa: a Shift in Power, Len Verwey (ed.), 2009: 43. 41

  The budget process and strategic civic interventions    43This chapter is premised on the assumption that the budget reveals the true
priorities of the government, and reflects government’s choices and planning in
respect of revenue and expenditure. One cannot influence priorities – such as
those relevant to the protection of marginalised communities and poverty
reduction – without participating in the budget process. In the constitutional
structure of allocating state authority between the executive, legislature and
judiciary, civic interventions on the issue of refugee protection or poverty
reduction in South Africa must take cognisance of the different functions of the
three constituent parts of the state. Although the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (‘the constitution’) does not define ‘state’, it is certain that
parliament and the executive are constituent parts thereof.4 The constitutional
obligation or function of parliament is to provide a national forum for the public
consideration of issues when legislating, and to maintain oversight of the exercise
of national executive authority.5 Both the legislative and the oversight functions
are relevant in the parliamentary phase of the budget process.
This chapter focuses on public participation in the budget process before
parliament and the provincial legislatures. It analyses relevant procedures of
parliament and (to a lesser extent) the provincial legislatures; the right to
participate in these; and the opportunities for strategic civic interventions in order
to enhance state accountability for the protection, promotion and respecting of
refugee rights and the reduction of poverty in South Africa.
In writing this chapter I received much input suggesting that participation in
the processes of parliament and the provincial legislatures (together referred to
here as ‘legislatures’) yields few (if any) results that are reflected in legislation.
Considering this, it seems the major concern in presenting this chapter is the
creation of unrealistic expectations. The argument that civil society should use the
spaces created by the constitution, legislation and the legislatures themselves to
participate in the processes of the latter must therefore address the question
‘Why?’ – given that the results are not always tangible. I try to do this without
suggesting that the civic spaces for lawful organisation and protest action outside
the institutions of the state should be neglected in the process. 
This chapter analyses the constitutional right to participate in the processes
of parliament, which is framed as an obligation on each of the two Houses – the
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces – to facilitate public
involvement in their legislative and other processes and those of their
committees.6 The right to participate in the legislative processes has been
4 See Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the RSA and Others, 2009 (6) SA 94 (CC) para [19]:
‘These provisions suggest that ‘the state’ includes all those actors who derive their authority
from the Constitution, including Parliament, government at national, provincial and local levels,
state institutions supporting constitutional democracy created by Chapter 9 of the Constitution,
‘state departments and administrations’, as well as bodies created by statute.’
5 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, sections 42 & 55. 
6 The constitution provides that parliament consists of the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces, section 42(1). 
44    Chapter 3considered by a number of courts, and I discuss this in some detail.7 I also refer
to the parliamentary perspective on public participation, which was clarified
earlier this year when parliament resolved, through the adoption of its Oversight
and Accountability Model,8 that public participation is critical for the success of
its oversight function. 
Parliament has drafted, considered and passed the Money Bills Amendment
Procedure and Related Matters Bill.9 This chapter analyses the Money Bills
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act, 2009, which was signed and
promulgated on 16 April 2009.10 In addition to creating the necessary procedure
to amend money Bills, the Act also gives effect to the constitutional requirement
for public involvement, specifically in the parliamentary phase of the budget
process.11 Potentially, policy priorities (as articulated by government) are open
for scrutiny in parliament, and can result in amendments to the budget. Strategic
civic interventions should thus use the budget cycle as a way to bolster efforts to
protect, promote and respect constitutional rights in South Africa. 
Against this background, the chapter looks at specific opportunities for
interventions aimed at promoting the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees; and,
more broadly, at poverty reduction. In this context, the following two questions
are addressed: 
(1) What has been the role of civic interventions in enhancing state accountability
to protect, promote and respect refugee rights in South Africa? 
(2) How can these efforts be strengthened, and what does this teach us about the
potential of civic interventions in realising rights in general?
7 King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA);
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (12) BCLR 1399
(CC); and Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the RSA and Others 2007 (1) BCLR 47
(CC). See also Minister of Health and Another NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others
(Treatment Action Campaign and Another as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC); and Merafong
Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the RSA and Others 2008 (10) BCLR 968 (CC).
8 Parliament’s Oversight and Accountability Model, published in the Announcements, Tablings
and Committee Reports (ATC), 27 January 2009, 64, was approved by the National Assembly
on 17 February 2009, and by the National Council of Provinces on 19 March 2009. 
9 [B 75–2008] passed on 19 February 2009. 
10 Act No. 9 of 2009. Government Gazette, No. 32137, 16 April 2009 (Government Notice No. 426).
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure Act came into operation on this day. At the time of
writing, parliament was in the process of establishing the procedures and structures necessary
to give effect to the Act.
11 Sections 8(2), 9(5), 10(8), 11(4) and 13(2). Section 77(3) of the constitution requires that an Act
of Parliament must establish a procedure to amend money Bills. Prior to this Act, parliament
could only accept or reject money Bills. The concept of ‘money Bills’ is defined in section 77(1)
of the Constitution as follows: ‘A Bill is a money Bill if it:
(a) appropriates money;
(b) imposes national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges;
(c) abolishes or reduces, or grants exemptions from, any national taxes, levies, duties
or surcharges; or
(d) authorises direct charges against the National Revenue Fund, except a Bill
envisaged in section 214 authorising direct charges.’
The Appropriation Bill, which includes the budget votes of all government
departments, is a money Bill. In this regard, see the Public Finance Management Act,
1999 section 27. 
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From 2006 onwards, both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional
Court considered the right to participate in parliamentary processes. These
considerations placed this right within a rich historic and international context.
However, in determining the nature and purpose of the right, the courts focused
on the constitution.
One of the founding values of the Republic of South Africa, as set out in the
constitution, is a system of democratic government to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness.12 The Supreme Court of Appeal in King and Others
v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another13 found that the
abovementioned value is contained in the constitutional requirement that the
rules and orders of the National Assembly for the conduct of its business must
be made with due regard, not only for representative democracy, but also for
participatory democracy.14 Furthermore, the Court found that 
[i]t also finds expression in the National Assembly’s power to receive petitions,
representations or submissions from any interested persons or institutions,15 its duty
to facilitate public involvement in its legislative and other processes and of those of
its committees,16 its duty generally to conduct its business in an open manner and
hold its sittings and those of its committees in public,17 and its duty, generally, not to
exclude the public or the media from sittings of its committees.18 
The value of accountability, responsiveness and openness also finds expression
in the constitution in relation to the National Council of Provinces and provincial
legislatures, in much the same manner as set out above.19 Public participation
therefore includes the duty to facilitate public involvement in legislative and other
processes; the duty to conduct parliamentary business in an open manner, and to
hold plenary sittings and those of committees in public; and the duty not to
exclude the public or the media from sittings of the House or committees ‘unless
it is reasonable and justifiable to do so in an open and democratic society.’20
The content of the concept is less exact, as the Court found in the King
matter: 
‘Public involvement’ is necessarily an inexact concept, with many possible facets, and
the duty to ‘facilitate’ it can be fulfilled not in one, but in many different ways. Public
involvement might include public participation through the submission of
commentary and representations: but that is neither definitive nor exhaustive of its
12 Section 1.
13 See note 7 supra, at para [19].
14 Section 57(1)(b).
15 Section 56(d).
16 Section 59(1)(a).
17 Section 59(1)(b).
18 Section 59(2). At para [19].
19 Sections 70(1), 72(1)(a) and (b), and 72(2); and, 116(1), 118(1)(a) and (b), and 118(2).
20 Sections 59(2), 72(2) and 118(2).
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as much as by understanding and being informed of what it is doing as by
participating directly in those processes. It is plain that by imposing on Parliament
the obligation to facilitate public involvement in its processes the Constitution sets a
base standard, but then leaves Parliament significant leeway in fulfilling it. Whether
or not the National Assembly has fulfilled its obligation cannot be assessed by
examining only one aspect of ‘public involvement’ in isolation of others, as the
applicants have sought to do here. Nor are the various obligations section 59(1)
imposes to be viewed as if they are independent of one another, with the result that
the failure of one necessarily divests the National Assembly of its legislative
authority.21 
The concept of ‘public involvement’, as discussed by the Supreme Court of
Appeal, was followed by the Constitutional Court in Doctors for Life International v
Speaker of the National Assembly and Others and in Matatiele Municipality and Others v
President of the RSA and Others.22 Although these judgments specifically consider it
the duty of the National Council of Provinces to ‘facilitate public involvement in
its legislative and other processes of the Council and its committees’,23 it is
certainly of value for the entire legislative sector, as identical duties are imposed
on the Assembly and on the provincial legislatures.24
The Court in Doctors for Life found that the plain and ordinary meaning of the
words ‘public involvement’ or ‘public participation’ refer to the process by which
the public participates in something. ‘Facilitation of public involvement in the
legislative process, therefore, means taking steps to ensure that the public
participate in the legislative process. That is the plain meaning of section
72(1)(a).’25 In other words, the duty to facilitate public involvement in the
processes of a legislature envisages action on the part of the legislature that will
result in the public participating in the law-making and other processes:
‘Participation is the end to be achieved.’ 26 
The Court in Doctors for Life indicated that legislatures have ‘a significant
measure of discretion in determining how best to fulfil their duty to facilitate
public involvement’ in its processes.27 Furthermore, although the measures
required by the constitutional obligation may vary from case to case, a legislature
must act reasonably:28 ‘What is ultimately important is that a legislature has taken
21 At para. [22].
22 See note 7 supra. 
23 Section 72(1)(a).
24 Sections 59(1)(a) and 118(1)(a). The provisions of sections 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a)
clearly impose a distinct duty on the National Assembly, National Council of Provinces and the
provincial legislatures to facilitate public involvement in their respective legislative processes. In
other words, each legislature must comply with the applicable provision.
25 At p. 1443D. [not clear from here onwards whether p. refers to para. or page. If page, then
delete p. throughout.]
26 At p. 1449C. 
27 At p. 1444D.
28 At p. 1444E.
48    Chapter 3steps to afford the public a reasonable opportunity to participate effectively in the
law-making process.’29 
The standard of reasonableness in discharging the duty to facilitate public
involvement in the legislative processes of a legislature depends on a number of
factors, including:
• the nature and importance of the legislation, and the intensity of its impact on the
public; 
• practicalities such as time and expense, which relate to the efficiency of the law-
making process (although the saving of money and time in itself does not justify
inadequate opportunities for public involvement); and 
• what a legislature itself considers to be appropriate public involvement, in the
light of the legislation’s content, importance and urgency.30
The courts therefore expect a legislature, acting reasonably: 
• to provide meaningful opportunities for public participation; and
• to take measures to ensure that people have the ability or capacity to take
advantage of the opportunities provided.31
By analogy, in the context of oversight processes, a legislature is required to act
reasonably in effecting its duty to facilitate public involvement; and the factors
influencing this standard are the nature and importance of the specific action,
issues of time and costs, and what the legislature considers to be appropriate. It
is critical that the public is afforded a reasonable opportunity to participate
effectively. Effective participation implies that a legislature must take measures to
empower the public to make use of these opportunities.
The constitutional duty discussed above means that the public (including
civil society) has a right to attend the business of a legislature, unless the
circumstances envisaged in the constitution, justifying the exclusion of the public,
exist.32 Furthermore, civil society can expect proactive steps to be taken to
inform the public of the processes of legislatures, and has a right to participate
meaningfully in these processes. 
Be that as it may, in the circumstances in existence at the time, a legislature
may determine whether it is appropriate to facilitate public involvement through
written or oral proceedings.33 An affected person or group ‘would have to show
that it was clearly unreasonable for Parliament or a provincial legislature not to
29 At p. 1445D.
30 At p. 1445B. 
31 At p. 1445D-E.
32 See sections 59, 72 and 118.
33 The Court in Doctors for Life (at p. 1467G) said that ‘Where Parliament has held public hearings
but not admitted a person to make oral submissions on the ground that it does not consider it
necessary to hear oral submissions from that person, [the Constitutional] Court will be slow to
interfere with Parliament’s judgment as to whom it wishes to hear and whom not.’ 
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respect to parliament’s judgment on this issue. More often than not, if the public
has been given the opportunity to lodge written submissions, then parliament will
have acted reasonably in respect of its duty to facilitate public involvement,
whatever may happen subsequently at public hearings.
3 OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL 
During the first quarter of 2009 – i.e., at the end of the Third Democratic
Parliament, and just prior to the election of the Fourth Democratic Parliament –
parliament adopted its Oversight and Accountability Model.35 ‘The model’s
primary objective is to provide the framework that describes how Parliament
conducts oversight. It seeks to improve existing tools of parliamentary oversight,
streamline components of the new oversight model with existing components,
and enhance Parliament’s capacity to fulfil its oversight function in line with
Parliament’s new strategic direction.’36 Pertinent issues highlighted in the model
include the following: 
• tools for oversight and accountability;37
• facilitation of public involvement;38 and
• procedures to amend the national budget.39
The adoption of the model is a milestone in the organic development of
parliament’s fulfilment of its duty to maintain oversight of the exercise of national
executive authority. Specifically in the area of public participation in the oversight
processes, it states:
Two critical factors for ensuring the success of this model is [sic], firstly, the need to
integrate Parliament’s public participation function within its overall oversight
mechanism and, secondly, to provide the appropriate capacity, especially human
resources, to committees and members for its execution. It is vital that all public
participation processes become inputs to the work of appropriate committees.40 
It is thus clear that parliament considers public participation to be a key element
in fulfilling its oversight function. In fact, the model considers this aspect of
oversight important enough to suggest that a separate (but interlinked) public
participation model for parliament be developed, based on the Constitutional
Court judgments referred to above.41 Naturally this is consistent with the
constitutional obligation on the National Assembly and the National Council of
34 At p. 1468A.
35 See fn. 8. 
36 ATC, p. 68.
37 At p. 89.
38 At p. 95.
39 At p. 100.
40 At p. 108.
41 ATC p. 95.
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processes of the House and its committees.42 It is also appropriate in light of the
purpose of public participation, as espoused by the Constitutional Court: 
All parties interested in legislation should feel that they have been given a real
opportunity to have their say, that they are taken seriously as citizens and that their
views matter and will receive due consideration at the moments when they could
possibly influence decisions in a meaningful fashion. The objective is both
symbolical and practical: the persons concerned must be manifestly shown the
respect due to them as concerned citizens, and the legislators must have the benefit
of all inputs that will enable them to produce the best possible laws. An appropriate
degree of principled yet flexible give-and-take will therefore enrich the quality of our
democracy, help sustain its robust deliberative character and, by promoting a sense of
inclusion in the national polity, promote the achievement of the goals of
transformation.43
Public participation, as both a right and duty, applies to both the legislative and
oversight functions of parliament and provincial legislatures.
4 THE BUDGET PROCESS 
There is a multitude of processes in parliament and the provincial legislatures.
The budget process is central to these.44 Essentially about choices and planning
in respect of revenue and expenditure, the budget process ‘reveals the true
priorities of the Government.’45 It ‘encompasses government’s economic policy
priorities, macro-economic position, revenue intake and all appropriations of
public funds.’46 
As indicated above, public participation in the budget cycle is considered
critical to the successful implementation of the budget. Fubbs concludes that
ownership of the budget depends on ‘the right of participation of civil society’ in
all committee meetings relating to the budget process.47 In this respect, Verwey
writes that it is necessary to ‘demystify’ debates on the budget to encourage
broader participation in a way that is amenable to democratic discussion, as this
‘can play a decisive role in its impact on well-being and the alleviation of
poverty.’48 
42 Sections 59 and 72.
43 Judge Sachs in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others at p. 1473B-
D.
44 Fubbs, 1999, 10.
45 Parliament of South Africa, 2008, 10. See also Fubbs, 8.
46 Lefko-Everett and Zasmisa, ‘Public participation in budgeting: opportunities presented by new
amendment powers’, in Verwey, 2009, 79.
47 Fubbs, 8, 14 and 15.
48 Verwey, 2009, 12. 
52    Chapter 3The inherent budget cycle is founded on the concept of a multi-year budget
process.49 Since 1997, the Department of Finance has tabled a medium-term
budget policy statement (MTBPS) in parliament and the provincial legislatures,
which includes a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). The MTBPS
provides a framework for the upcoming budget and the following two so-called
‘outer’ years: ‘The MTBPS is an important medium-term policy statement that
sets out national economic policy priorities, responses to economic trends,
revenue forecasts and adjustments to spending priorities for the coming three
fiscal years.’50 The tabling of the MTBPS thus provides an opportunity for
parliament to prepare for the forthcoming budget, and to consider and influence
government spending plans over the medium term.
The parliamentary phase of the budget process starts with the introduction
of the MTBPS during October each year. The process in the provincial
legislatures is similar, and the MTBPS for the province is introduced a few weeks
after the MTBPS in parliament. Parliament and the provincial legislatures
scrutinise the future spending of government or medium-term expenditure
framework – as contained in the MTBPS – against the monthly reports of actual
revenue and expenditure published by the National Treasury in terms of the
Public Finance Management Act, 1999.51 The adoption of the reports on the
MTBPS by the legislatures serves as an indication of their views on the future
spending of government. 
The second part of the parliamentary phase of the budget process consists of
the annual tabling of the national and provincial budgets by way of the
introduction of the Division of Revenue Bill and the Appropriation Bill in the
National Assembly, and the various appropriation bills in the provincial
legislatures, as required in terms of the constitution52 and the Public Finance
Management Act.53 Together with the Division of Revenue and Appropriation
Bills, the Minister of Finance must submit an Estimates of National Expenditure
(ENE) report, which provides data and contextual information for each national
department, and a Budget Review Statement supplying consolidated analysis of
budget policy. In accordance with the recently introduced Performance
Information Framework, the ENE now includes quantifiable objectives and
performance indicators for each department. This is an important development,
as it will provide the foundation for results-based budgeting, and will thus
improve oversight. Treasury Regulations also stipulate that each department must
table a strategic plan, setting out the department’s objectives, at least ten days
prior to the debate of the particular department’s budget in parliament.54
49 Wehner, in Verwey, 2009, 31. 
50 Verwey and Lefko-Everett, 2007: 3–4.
51 Act No. 1 of 1999, section 32.
52 Section 214.
53 Section 27.
54 Treasury Regulations for departments, trading entities, constitutional institutions and public
entities, March 2005, as amended in February 2007, item 5.2, Government Gazette No. 29644, 20
February 2007. 
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oversight of the implementation of the budget. Government departments and
public entities are required to report monthly, quarterly and annually– either for
publication in the Government Gazette, or for tabling directly in parliament and the
relevant provincial legislatures – in terms of the Public Finance Management Act,
which effectively establishes a framework for ‘in-year’ reporting and
monitoring.55 This framework serves as an early warning system, and allows for
the tracking and management of government expenditure, revenue, cash flows
and movements in bank balances. These reports are utilised by legislatures to
maintain oversight of the implementation of the budget, and may be used to feed
into the scrutiny of the MTBPS. The former entails the preparation by
committees of oversight reports on the performance of government
departments, which the relevant Houses debate and adopt. Reports from the
Auditor-General on the financial statements of government departments are
specifically considered by the National Assembly’s Committee on Public
Accounts, or public accounts committees of the provincial legislatures.56 With
the commencement of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related
Matters Act, the various oversight reports are consolidated into a single report for
each government department. 
In fact, the Act creates a comprehensive framework for parliament to process
the budget, whether in an amended form or not. Understanding this framework
is critical to demystifying the budget process.
5 MONEY BILLS AMENDMENT PROCEDURE AND 
RELATED MATTERS ACT57
The Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act provides the
procedure for amending the fiscal framework underpinning the budget, as well as
the budget itself. Therefore the Act requires that the Minister of Finance submits
a multi-year fiscal framework, with the Bills giving effect to the budget.58 The
‘fiscal framework’, defined in the Act, is the relationship between revenue,
55 Section 32 requires that monthly and quarterly reports on revenue and expenditure across
government are published in the Government Gazette. Section 40, read with section 65, requires
that government departments submit an annual report to the National Assembly, which must
include audited financial statements and the audit report of the Auditor-General on those
statements. 
56 Also referred to as the Standing Committee on Public Accounts or SCOPA.
57 Section 16 of the Act, read with the Schedule to the Act, provides for norms and standards for
provincial legislatures, which, in terms of section 120(3) of the constitution, must pass
provincial legislation to set out a procedure to amend provincial money Bills. The norms and
standards will ensure that provincial legislation is aligned to parliament’s Act. However, as such
provincial legislation is not yet passed, this part of the chapter applies only to parliament. 
58 Section 7. Section 14 of the Act also provides for amendments to any money Bill proposed by
the Minister of Finance to a House or committee. Such proposals are limited to amendments in
order to make technical corrections to a money Bill. This provision was used for the
amendments to the Appropriation Bill [B5-2009]. This section of the Act is not relevant for the
purpose of this chapter. 
54    Chapter 3including borrowing, and expenditure, including cost of financing.59 The
budgetary Bills are mostly money Bills, and the annual Division of Revenue Bill
required for the equitable distribution of national revenue among the national,
provincial and local spheres of government,60 and those taxation bills that deal
with matters incidental to imposing taxes or creating revenue. A money Bill is
defined in the Constitution as a Bill which appropriates money; imposes national
taxes, levies, duties or surcharges; abolishes or reduces, or grants exemptions
from, any national taxes, levies, duties or surcharges; or authorises direct charges
against the National Revenue Fund.61 Current money bills are the annual
appropriation Bill and the revenue Bills, such the annual Taxation Laws
Amendment Bill. 
The procedure for amending the fiscal framework or the money Bills hinges
on the constitutional obligation of parliament to maintain oversight of the
exercise of national executive authority.62 Therefore, the annual assessment of
national departments by the National Assembly through its committees provides
the starting point for the procedure. In this respect, the Act requires committees
of the Assembly to submit annual budgetary review and recommendation reports
(BRRR), after the adoption of the Appropriation Bill and prior to the adoption of
the reports on the MTBPS.63 This period is usually between June and November.
The Minister of Finance and the relevant member of Cabinet are then informed
of the assessment. 
The purpose of a BRRR is to provide an assessment of the department’s
service delivery performance, given available resources; to assess the effectiveness
and efficiency of the department’s use and forward allocation of available
resources; and to allow an opportunity for the Assembly to make
recommendations on the forward use of resources.64 To do all this, the Act
requires that a BRRR must refer to:
• the medium-term estimates of expenditure of each national department, and its
strategic priorities and measurable objectives, as tabled in the National Assembly
with the national budget; 
• the prevailing strategic plans of the department;
59 Section 1 of the Act defines the fiscal framework to mean ‘the framework for a specific
financial year that gives effect to the national executive’s macro-economic policy and includes:
(a) estimates of all revenue, budgetary and extra-budgetary specified separately,
expected to be raised during that financial year;
(b) estimates of all expenditure, budgetary and extra-budgetary specified separately,
for that financial year;
(c) estimates of borrowing for that financial year;
(d) estimates of interest and debt servicing charges; and
(e) an indication of the contingency reserve necessary for an appropriate response to
emergencies or other temporary needs, and other factors based on similar objective
criteria’. 
60 Section 216 of the Constitution. 
61 Section 77.
62 See Preamble and section 2. 
63 Section 5. 
64 Section 5(3).
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Treasury in terms of section 32 of the Public Finance Management Act;
• the financial statements and annual report of the department;
• the reports of the Committee on Public Accounts relating to a department; and
• any other information requested by or presented to a House or parliament.65
The BRRR is thus a consolidated account of the view of the National Assembly
on the performance of government departments. 
Parliament’s reporting on the MTBPS is the next oversight element in the
procedure.66 The Act requires the Minister of Finance to submit the MTBPS to
parliament at least three months prior to the introduction of the national budget,
and sets out its required contents. These include a revised multi-year fiscal
framework, the spending priorities of national government for the next three
years, and a review of actual spending by each national department and each
provincial government between 1 April and 30 September of the current fiscal
year. 
The MTBPS is referred to the respective committees on finance and
committees on appropriations of the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces for consideration, before these bodies report back to the
respective Houses.67 The Houses may require their committees on finance or
appropriations to consult with any other committee in considering matters
referred to it. Committees must report within 30 days from the date of the tabling
of the MTBPS, and the reports may recommend amendments to the fiscal
framework or the division of revenue, should these remain materially unchanged
when submitted with the national budget. The reports from the committees on
finance and committees on appropriations must be submitted to the Minister of
Finance within seven days of their adoption by the respective Houses. 
The BRRR and the reports on the MTBPS serve as indicators as to whether
amendments might be proposed to the fiscal framework and the budget Bills
when these are introduced the following year. In fact, the Minister of Finance
must submit a report to parliament setting out how the Division of Revenue Bill
and the national budget give effect to (or the reasons for not taking into account)
the recommendations contained in the BRRR and the reports on the MTBPS
when the national annual budget is introduced in the National Assembly.68 The
65 Section 5(1).
66 Section 6.
67 Section 4 of the Act requires that each House establish a committee on finance and a
committee on appropriations, with all the powers and functions conferred by the Constitution,
legislation, the standing rules or a resolution of a House. Most of the functions of these
committees are set out in sections 4, 6 (MTBPS) and 15 (Parliamentary Budget Office). Section
6(3) requires that the revised fiscal framework and related documentation is referred to the
respective committees on finance, while section 6(8) requires that the spending priorities,
proposed division of revenue between spheres of government and substantial adjustments to
conditional grant allocations are referred to the respective committees on appropriations. The
referral of the review of actual spending remains within the discretion of the Houses in terms
of the respective rules.
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Revenue Bill, is now set. At this point it must be noted that the issue of public
participation (in this phase of the budget process before parliament) is left to the
constitutional provisions referred to above, and is not specifically provided for in
the Act. 
In addition to including the procedure established within the oversight
function of parliament, the Act requires parliament to follow a certain sequence
when passing the budget. Firstly, parliament must adopt the fiscal framework,
with or without amendments.69 Any amendments to the Division of Revenue
Bill, the Appropriation Bill or the revenue Bills must be consistent with the
adopted fiscal framework.70 Secondly, the Division of Revenue Bill must be
adopted. Any amendments to the Appropriation Bill must be consistent with the
adopted fiscal framework and the Division of Revenue Bill passed by
parliament.71 
The next phase of the budget process is the introduction in parliament of the
budget, including the fiscal framework, the Division of Revenue Bill, the
Appropriation Bill, and tax and other revenue proposals, during the first half of
February each year.72 The fiscal framework and revenue proposals are referred to
the committees on finance, who are required to hold joint public hearings.73
Although this provision entrenches the constitutional right to participate in the
budget process, the time-frame for such participation is particularly short in light
of the significance of the subject matter. The entire process of referral,
consideration, hearings, comments from the Minister (if amendments are
proposed to the fiscal framework), reporting and adoption by the respective
Houses must be done within 16 days of the introduction of the fiscal
framework.74 This highlights the fact that meaningful participation should focus
on the MTBPS process. 
After the adoption of the fiscal framework, the Division of Revenue Bill and
the Appropriation Bill are referred to the committees on appropriations of the
Assembly, to follow the legislative procedure as set out in the Constitution. In this
instance, the Act requires parliament to pass the Division of Revenue Bill ‘no later
than 35 days after the adoption of the fiscal framework’;75 and the Appropriation
68 Section 7(4). 
69 Section 8(4).
70 Sections 8(9) and 9(4). Section 2 also requires that the application of the Act must “take into
account the relevant fiscal framework submitted to and adopted by Parliament.”
71 Section 10(4). 
72 Section 7.
73 Section 8(2).
74 Sections 8(3) and 8(7). Section 8(6) provides that the Minister of Finance must be given at least
two days to respond to a committee report recommending amendments to the fiscal
framework, and such comments must be included in the report. 
75 Section 9(3).
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considering these Bills, the respective committees must conduct public hearings,
consult with other parliamentary committees, and allow affected members of
Cabinet, provinces and local governments to respond to the proposed
amendments, as provided for in the rules.77 The Act requires various items to be
included in the committee reports on the Division of Revenue Bill and the
Appropriation Bill, particularly in respect of service delivery.78 Again it is
significant that the Act entrenches the right of the public to participate, through
public hearings, in the processing of these two important Bills. 
Specifically in respect of the Appropriation Bill, the Act provides that
another committee may advise a committee on appropriations that a sub-division
of a main division within a vote should be appropriated conditionally; or that an
amount must be appropriated specifically and exclusively for a purpose
mentioned under a main division within a vote.79 In the case of a conditional
appropriation, the proposal must be aimed at ensuring that the money requested
for the main division will be spent effectively, efficiently and economically.
Strategic civic interventions could focus on these powers highlighted in the Act. 
Revenue Bills, such as taxation Bills, are referred to the committee on finance
of the National Assembly and, after approval, to the National Council of
Provinces, for consideration by its committee on finance.80 As is the case with the
other Bills giving effect to the budget, the Act requires that committees on
finance must hold public hearings on the revenue Bills – thereby entrenching the
public’s right to participate in such hearings – and consult with other
committees.81
The Act provides for the procedure to amend the adjustments budget, which
is introduced in the beginning of the second half of the financial year.82 The
adjustments budget aims to balance the annual budget based on the actual
revenue and expenditure of the first half of the financial year. In other words, it
is used to re-align the revenue and expenditure between departments. It also
provides an opportunity to appropriate funds for unavoidable and unforeseen
expenditure. The adjustments budget includes the adjustments appropriation Bill,
a revised fiscal framework if the adjustments budget effects changes to the fiscal
framework, and a division of revenue amendment Bill if the adjustments budget
76 Section 10(7). 
77 Sections 9(5) and 10(8). Specifically, the Minister of Finance must be given at least three days, in
the case of the Division of Revenue Bill, and at least ten days, in the case of the Appropriation
Bill, to respond. The responses from the members of Cabinet must be included in the
committee report; see sections 9(8) and 10(11).
78 Sections 9(6) and 10(10).
79 Sections 10(5) and (6). 
80 Sections 11(1) and (2).
81 Section 11(4). 
82 Section 12. 
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The referral of these instruments follows the same sequence as the budget
process; namely, the revised fiscal framework to a joint sitting of the committees
on finance; the division of revenue amendment Bill to a joint sitting of the
committees on appropriations after the adoption of the revised fiscal framework;
and, in the event of a revised fiscal framework, an adjustment appropriation Bill
to the committee on appropriations of the National Assembly, only after the
Division of Revenue Amendment Bill is passed by parliament. There is no
specific requirement for public hearings, as there is in the case of the main budget,
and the timeframes set out in the Act are particularly tight.84
The Act also provides for the procedure to consider amendments to money
Bills other than the Appropriation Bill, Revenue Bills, and the Adjustments
Appropriation Bill.85 These Bills must be referred to the respective committees
on appropriations, who are required to conduct public hearings on the Bill.86 
As indicated above, the Act entrenches the public’s right to participate
through public hearings. Civil society therefore has a legitimate expectation in this
respect, but must tailor any intervention to suit the principles of fiscal discipline
outlined in the Act. Failure to do so would render such interventions meaningless,
as parliament would be wasting time and resources considering submissions
outside the boundaries of the Act. 
These principles apply when parliament and its committees take any decision
in terms of the Act: in other words, any report pursuant to parliament’s oversight
function, report on the MTBPS, amendment to the fiscal framework, or
amendment to a money Bill or the Division of Revenue Bill.87 In this respect,
parliament and its committees must:
• ensure an appropriate balance between revenue, expenditure and borrowing; 
• ensure reasonable debt levels and debt interest cost; 
83 At the time of writing the practice is not to introduce a Division of Revenue Amendment Bill if
the adjustments budget requires this, but rather to effect changes to the schedules published by
Treasury in terms of the Division of Revenue Act. The latter Act provides for such mechanism,
which is tantamount to delegated or subordinate legislative authority. See section 101 of the
Constitution and section 24(2)(b) of the Division of Revenue Act, 2009 (Act No. 12 of 2009).
Section 12(4) of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act requires the
introduction of a division of revenue amendment Bill if the adjustments budget effects changes
to the Division of Revenue Act for the relevant financial year. 
84 The committees have nine days to report on either the revised fiscal framework or the Division
of Revenue Amendment Bill. If amendments are proposed, the Minister of Finance has two
days to respond to the proposed amendments to the fiscal framework and four days to
proposed amendments to the division of revenue. The reports must include the comments
from the Minister. The report on the adjustments budget must be submitted within 30 days
after the tabling of the national adjustments budget. This report must follow the same format
as the report on the Appropriation Bill set out in section 10(10). In the case of a report
recommending amendments to the Adjustment Appropriation Bill, the Minister of Finance
must be given at least four days to respond, which report must include the comments.
Provision is also made for consultation between committees.
85 Section 13. 
86 Section 13(2). 
87 Section 8(5).
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• ensure adequate provision for spending on infrastructural development, overall
capital spending and maintenance. 
• consider the short-, medium- and long-term implications of the fiscal framework,
division of revenue and national budget on the long-term growth potential of the
economy and the development of the country;
• take into account cyclical factors that may impact on the prevailing fiscal position;
and 
• take into account public revenue and expenditure, including extra-budgetary
funds, and contingent liabilities.
In addition to the general principles mentioned above, when considering
amending revenue Bills, parliament and its committees must:88
• ensure that the total amount of revenue raised is consistent with the approved
fiscal framework and the Division of Revenue Bill; 
• take into account the principles of equity, efficiency, certainty and ease of
collection;
• consider the impact of the proposed change on the composition of tax revenue,
with reference to the balance between direct and indirect taxes; 
• consider regional and international tax trends; and 
• consider the impact on development, investment, employment and economic
growth.
6 OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRATEGIC CIVIC 
INTERVENTIONS
The broad constitutional right of the public to participate in the legislative and
oversight processes of parliament referred to above is given specific meaning in
the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. As indicated
above, while the general right to participate applies to the annual assessment of
government departments by the committees of the National Assembly and to the
consideration of the MTBPS, the procedures prescribed in respect of the
consideration of the fiscal framework, Division of Revenue Bill, Appropriation
Bill, revenue Bills and other money Bills include peremptory public hearings.89 In
these instances, the meaning given by the Constitutional Court to the duty to
facilitate public participation – namely, that a legislature must act reasonably by
providing meaningful opportunities for public participation, and take measures to
ensure that people have the ability or capacity to take advantage of the
opportunities provided – must be understood in the context of public hearings.
In other words, the public hearings envisaged by the Money Bills Amendment
Procedure and Related Matters Act must be of such nature that a court would find
88 Section 11(3). 
89 Sections 8(2), 9(5)(b), 10(8)(a), 11(4)(a), and 13(2)(a).
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capacitating people to participate meaningfully in the hearings – must be
reasonable. The expected support from parliament is also an issue on which civil
society could engage parliament. 
The table below provides a brief overview of the opportunities for public
participation created by the procedures prescribed in the Money Bills
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. Where the Act is silent in
respect of public hearings, reference must be made to the constitution. 
Opportunities for civic interventions in accordance with the procedure 
in the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act
Empowering 
provision
Subject matter Responsibility Timeframe
Sections 59(1)(a) & 
72(1)(a) 
Constitution
Budgetary review 
and recommen-
dation report
Portfolio 
committees of the 
National Assembly
September – 
October 
Sections 59(1)(a) & 
72(1)(a) 
Constitution
MTBPS Committees on 
Finance and 
Committees on 
Appropriation of 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces; other 
committees of the 
National Assembly 
October – 
November 
Section  8(2) Fiscal framework 
and revenue 
proposals
Committees on 
Finance of both 
the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
First half of 
February
Section 9(5)(b) Division of 
Revenue Bill
Committees on 
Appropriations of 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
February – March
Section 10(8)(a) Appropriation Bill Committees on 
Appropriations of 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
February – June 
62    Chapter 3From the table above, it is evident that opportunities for strategic civic
interventions in the budget process bridge the oversight and the legislative
functions of parliament. Committee oversight processes present opportunities
for interventions during the consideration of a department’s annual report, in-
year expenditure reports – such as the monthly and quarterly reports – or area
specific reports on the implementation of legislation, as well as during the
consideration of the audit report on the financial statements of the department by
SCOPA. The aim of such interventions would be to influence the committee’s
budgetary review and recommendation report. 
The consideration of the MTBPS provides significant opportunities for
interventions in the oversight processes. The committees on finance and
committees on appropriation of both the National Assembly and the National
Council of Provinces consider the MTBPS. 
Parliament’s consideration of the fiscal framework, Division of Revenue Bill,
Appropriation Bill, revenue Bills and the Bills giving effect to the adjustments
budget present opportunities for strategic civic interventions in the budget
process vis-à-vis the legislative processes. 
With the exception of the procedure for the adjustments budget, the Money
Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act creates ‘dedicated avenues
for public participation’.90 As these dedicated avenues represent new
opportunities for interventions in the budget process before parliament, it is not
possible to do an evaluation at this time. Nevertheless, research suggests that
Section 11(4)(a) Revenue Bills Committees on 
Finance of both 
the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
June – July
Sections 59(1)(a) & 
72(1)(a) 
Constitution
Adjustment 
budget
Committees on 
Finance and 
Committees on 
Appropriation of 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
October – 
November 
Section 13(2)(a) Other money Bills Committees on 
Appropriations of 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
of Provinces
As programmed
90 Lefko-Everett and Zasmisa, 87–88.
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been taken up by civil society.
A recent study tracking ten years of public submissions made to the
Assembly’s finance committee indicates a significant number of submissions
made vis-à-vis the legislative processes of the budget process, despite the absence
of parliament’s amendment powers during this time.91 An analysis of the sources
of these submissions indicates that the majority come from industrial bodies,
professional/sector associations, and the private sector.92 The study concludes
that opportunities for public participation in the processes of the finance
committee were above average compared to other committees of parliament.
However, the use of these opportunities by non-governmental organisations and
community-based organisations (among others) was ‘often sporadic and
outnumbered.’ The study suggests that ‘civil society should actively use the
available channels of participation that private interests consistently use.’93
Participation in the MTBPS process was particularly limited.
7 STRENGTHENING STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Strengthening efforts to enhance state accountability for protecting, promoting
and respecting refugee rights and reducing poverty in South Africa begin with
participation in the prioritisation of policy reflected in the budget process.
Participation creates respect between all stakeholders – community and
government – and provides government with the ‘benefit of all inputs that will
enable them to produce the best possible laws.’94 These fruits of participation are
also referred to as ‘ownership’ and ‘credibility’ of economic policy.95 Bringing the
grassroots perspectives of marginalised communities to the attention of
legislators addresses the qualitative aspect of their disposition, as well as
empowering legislators to transform specific situations. 
Part of the intervention by civil society in 2003, during the consideration of
the Children’s Bill,96 took this form. The Children’s Institute initiated a project
called Dikwankwetla – Children in Action. The aim of the project was to facilitate the
participation of children in the process, which resulted in children making direct
input into the final provisions of the Children’s Bill.97 An evaluation of the
project indicated that the children perceived that they had made an important
contribution to the legislation through their submissions to parliament, and
91 Supra, 82–87.
92 Although the study indicates that the labour union, Fedusa, made the most submissions.
93 Lefko-Everett and Zasmisa, 87. 
94 Judge Sachs in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others at p. 1473B-
D.
95 Verwey, 23; and Lefko-Everett and Zasmisa, 87. 
96 [B 70-3003]. 
97 Mũkoma, 2007.
64    Chapter 3expressed ‘tremendous personal growth as a result of their participation in the
project’.98
As indicated above, the participation of civil society in the parliamentary
phase of the budget process is weak. This requires change. The opportunities
created by the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act
should be explored and used. The use of these opportunities requires capacity. In
this regard, it might be necessary to create dedicated funding models to ensure
that the necessary capacity to ask the right questions in respect of allocation of
public resources is institutionalised in civil society. However, linking funding to
the level of participation in the budget process – in other words, ensuring that all
the opportunities are explored – would not be enough. To evaluate the impact of
participation, one must measure the impact on grassroots communities.
Therefore, the relationship between civil society and marginalised communities
must facilitate direct communication of life experiences to legislators. If this does
not occur, it is difficult to understand how participation has the potential to
address the qualitative aspect of marginalisation. 
Lastly, legislatures must embody responsiveness – one of the founding values
of the constitution. Meaningful participation demands this. In the same manner
that one cannot expect marginalised communities to feel empowered if they are
not given direct access to legislators, so it would make little sense to anyone,
including well-capacitated civil society organisations, to participate in legislative
and other processes if legislatures do not respond to such submissions.
8 TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED MODEL FOR MAKING 
SUBMISSIONS TO THE BUDGET PROCESS 
Chapter 2 of the constitution contains the Bill of Rights, which is a cornerstone
of democracy in South Africa, and which requires the state to respect, protect,
promote and fulfil the rights contained therein.99 Included in the Bill of Rights
are justiciable socio-economic rights pertaining to housing, health care, food,
water, education and so on.100 According to the constitution, ‘The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.’101 The Constitutional
Court found in Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and
Others,102 firstly, that ‘[t]he question is ... not whether socio-economic rights are
98 Ibid. See also Child Rights in Focus, March 2007, http://www.ci.org.za/depts/ci/enews/
March2007/evaluating.htm.
99 Section 7 of the Constitution.
100 Sections 26 and 27. The Constitutional Court recognised that these rights are enforceable, at
least to some extent. The Court found that these rights can at the very minimum be negatively
protected from improper invasion. Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC)) at para 78. 
101 Sections 26(2) and 27(2).
102 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC).
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Secondly, the Court found that the rights in the Bill of Rights are inter-related and
mutually supporting, and that ‘human dignity, freedom and equality, the
foundation values of our society, are denied those who have no food, clothing or
shelter.’104 Lastly, although the issue of nationality was not before the Court, it
did make a comment that ‘[a]ffording socio-economic rights to all people ...
enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in Chapter 2.’105 The latter
comment is consistent with the constitution, which explicitly provides that socio-
economic rights accrue to everyone. 
In addition to the rights that asylum-seekers and refugees are entitled to in
terms of the Bill of Rights, the 1998 Refugees Act recognises further rights.106
Included in these rights are the right of non-refoulement,107 administrative justice in
determining the application for asylum,108 and the right to seek employment.109
The Act, consistent with the constitutional requirement to consider international
law,110 further requires interpretation and application with due regard to:
(a) the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN, 1951);
(b) the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN, 1967);
(c) the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in
Africa (OAU, 1969);
(d) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948); and
(e) any other relevant convention or international agreement to which the Republic
is or becomes a party.111
103 At para 20.
104 At para 23.
105 Ibid.
106 Act No. 130 of 1998. In respect of the Refugees Act, Klaaren et al document the various
consultative processes pertaining to the formulation of the policy and the drafting of the Act in
which civil society participated effectively. See Klaaren, Handmaker, De la Hunt, ‘Talking a
New Talk: Legislative History of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998’, in Advancing Refugee Protection in
South Africa, 47. They conclude that ‘the civil society involvement in the drafting of the
Refugees Act has provided refugee rights advocates with a number of legal and rhetorical
resources to use in these current and ongoing conflicts’, 56.
107 Section 2.
108 Section 24. 
109 Section 27. Chapter 5 of the Act provides for the rights and obligations of refugees. Section 27
also affirms the protection of refugee rights by the Bill of Rights. Certain sections of the Act
will be amended by the Refugees Amendment Act 33 of 2008, which was not yet in operation
at the time of writing. These amendments, among others, relate to the dissolution of the
Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs and the Refugee Appeal Board and the establishment
of the Refugee Appeals Authority, revision of procedures relating to refugee status
determination, and, importantly, provide for the rights and obligation of refugees and asylum-
seekers. A discussion of the amendments is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a discussion
on the Refugees Act, see Jenkins, 1999.
110 Section 39.
111 Section 6.
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Rights guarantees access to information; as well as administrative action that is
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.112 A submission to a committee of
parliament or a provincial legislature, attempting to assist the legislature to give
effect to its constitutional obligations, should use rights provided for in the
constitution and legislation as a basis. Below is a brief discussion on how such
submissions or interventions in the budget process may be compiled.
A submission or intervention focusing on the oversight processes could
compare the grassroots experience with the information in the annual report of a
department or the expenditure reports, as well as analysing the impact of the
spending patterns reflected in the monthly and quarterly reports. A submission
can also focus on the implementation of legislation or the audit report on the
financial statements, which is considered by SCOPA. The aim of such
interventions would be to influence the committee’s budgetary review and
recommendation report, which must be completed between September and
November each year. The main issue in these submissions is whether the
measures taken – in other words, the policy or programme and its
implementation – to give effect to the rights in the Bill of Rights, or to implement
legislation, are reasonable.113 
Interventions in the oversight processes could be supported during the
process of the MTBPS. The committees on finance and committees on
appropriation of both the National Assembly and the National Council of
Provinces all consider the MTBPS. Submissions to the committees on finance
would be more general, as these committees are tasked with considering the
overall fiscal framework and macro-economic projections. The respective
committees on appropriations consider, among other issues, the spending
priorities over the MTEF, the proposed division of revenue between spheres of
government, and the proposed conditional grant allocations. These issues are
more specific, and a submission could focus on areas of rights protection for
refugees and asylum-seekers, or on addressing issues of poverty. Even more
focused interventions could be made in respect of the review of actual spending
during the first six months of the financial year submitted with the MTBPS. 
Submissions on the fiscal framework require technical expertise of the long-
and short-term effects of different fiscal positions. The Money Bills Amendment
Procedure and Related Matters Act requires compliance with principles of fiscal
discipline.114 Depending on the scope of the submission, it might to necessary to
make this type of submission, although submissions on the specific budget votes
112 Sections 32 and 33. See also the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 (Act No. 2 of
2000) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of 2000).
113 The ‘reasonableness’ of a policy has been the subject of many cases before the Constitutional
Court. A good summary of these appears in the latest judgment of Mazibuko and Others v City of
Johannesburg and Others, (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28 (8 October 2009) http://www.saflii.org/
za/cases/ZACC/2009/28.html, paras [46]-[68]. 
114 Section 8(5).
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analysis. 
Submissions on the Division of Revenue Bill (which contains, among other
figures, the allocation of revenue collected nationally to individual provinces), as
well as those on the Appropriation Bill, and the Bills forming part of the
adjustment budget, require some form of budget analysis. The key issue in this
regard is to identify the programmes and sub-programmes within the vote that
are relevant to the specific subject matter of the submission.115 Cognisance must
be taken of the functional areas of concurrent national and provincial
competence.116 Issues pertaining to poverty reduction are transversal, and – to a
large extent – a concurrent function between national and provincial spheres of
government. Migrant and refugee matters are national competencies. A
submission focusing on a concurrent area (such as health, welfare or housing)
should therefore also analyse the provincial departments’ budgets to find the
relevant programme or sub-programme of the vote.117 Once the relevant
programme or sub-programme is identified, the question of whether the budget
allocation is appropriate must be considered, within the parameters of ‘available
resources’ and ‘progressive realisation’. Assuming the policy underpinning the
programme or sub-programme is reasonable, an appropriate budget allocation
should ensure effective and efficient implementation. Furthermore, the budget
allocation should show a progression over the medium term, in addition to
accommodating the rate of inflation. The submission may make recommen-
dations to appropriate certain funds conditionally or specifically for a purpose,
bearing in mind the principles of fiscal discipline.118 
Submissions on the Revenue Bills would require technical skills, especially in
light of the requirement to comply with the principles set out in the Money Bills
Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act.119
9 CONCLUSION
This chapter has argued that the efforts of civil society to enhance the protection
of the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers, as well as the challenge of poverty
reduction, can be strengthened through a strategy of participation in the oversight
and legislative processes of parliament and provincial legislatures pertaining to the
budget. The premise throughout is that the budget represents policy priorities
being implemented; and we cannot influence priorities without participating in
115 This part of my chapter is based on the work of Budlender and Proudlock, ‘Children’s Institute
analysis of the 2009/10 budget for the Gauteng Department of Social Development’, 2009; see
also Budlender and Proudlock, 2009, both available at www.ci.org.za. 
116 Schedule 4 of the Constitution. Constitution, sections 44 and 104, read with Schedules 4 and 5.
117 Section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act defines a ‘vote’ as one of the main segments
into which an appropriation Act is divided, and which specifies the total amount usually
appropriated per department in an appropriation Act; and is separately approved by parliament
or a provincial legislature. A programme is a main division of a vote. 
118 Section 8(5) of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act. 
119 Section 11(3). 
68    Chapter 3the budget process. Furthermore, by focusing on spending patterns, the
effectiveness of policy relating to the protection, promotion and fulfilment of
fundamental rights (including socio-economic rights) may be analysed. The issues
of poverty reduction, as well as the protection of vulnerable groups – such as
asylum-seekers and refugees – could be addressed by such strategic interventions. 
The efforts of civil society can be strengthened further by evaluating the level
of participation in the range of processes that present opportunities to make
strategic interventions. In this regard, my chapter proceeds from the viewpoint
that the aim of participation is to create ownership of policy. Tracking strategic
interventions in the budget processes in parliament and provincial legislatures
therefore provides a model for measuring the level of participation of civil society
organisations (in terms of consistency), as well as the responsiveness of
government.
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4CHAPTER CIVIC ACTION AND LEGALMOBILISATION: THE PHIRIWATER METERS CASE
Jackie Dugard1
In South Africa everyone will say that life is not fair for the poor. Even the rich will
say ... this when they are just finding more and more excuses to give more of the
country’s money to themselves to build all these very expensive things ... so they can
feel themselves to be ‘world class’. Meanwhile our children, who, like the children in
Haiti and Kenya and Zimbabwe are ... burning in shack fires and dying from
diarrhoea around the corner. One of the truths that people want to hide from is that
in this country where everything is done in the name of the suffering of the poor, life
is good for the masters of the poor but it is very unfair for the servants of the poor ...
But for the dawn of justice for all to come we must accept the truth that in our
country, a country where … the law gives everyone the right to gather and to speak,
in reality the poor have to make their choices from no choice. Business and politics ...
are all united in their demand for our silence ... [yet] everyday we are maturing in our
struggle. We were always many but every day we are more. The red river that carried
me will carry us all on and on through the shooting and the lies and the unfairness
and all the choices that we will have to make without choice. 
Excerpt from ‘When Choices Can No Longer Be Choices’ by S’bu Zikode, president
of Abahlali baseMjodolo.2
  
1 This chapter is based on a contribution submitted to Palgrave as a chapter for Social Movements
and/in the Postcolonial and builds on two previous articles by the author (Dugard, 2008; Dugard,
2009).
2 S’bu Zikode (28/02/2007) ‘When Choices Can No Longer Be Choices’: http://
www.abahlali.org/node/841. Zikode is president of Abahlali baseMjondolo (meaning: we who live
in the shacks, in isiZulu). Abahlali is one of the growing social movements in South Africa. Like
the Anti-Privatisation Forum – the social movement dealt with in this chapter – Abahlali is
skeptical about the overall function of law in shoring up privilege in South Africa. Yet Abahlali
has always seen a role for law as a tactic in their broader struggle. In contrast, for the Anti-
Privatisation Forum, the Mazibuko case was the first instance of proactively taking up litigation. 71
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In 1996 the South African post-apartheid legal order was consolidated with the
enactment of the final Constitution.3 Among the constitutionally guaranteed
rights is the right of access to sufficient water (section 27(1)(b) of the
Constitution). The insertion of socio-economic rights, including the right to water
(alongside other, more traditional civil and political rights), underscored the
understanding that apartheid was as much a system of socio-economic
subjugation as of civil and political tyranny. Part of this recognition was an
acknowledgment of the need to redistribute water resources and services more
equitably. To this end, there is a progressive legislative framework for water
services that includes a national Free Basic Water (FBW) policy aimed at ensuring
a lifeline amount of water per property per month,4 as well as a range of laws
advancing a rights-based approach. However, notwithstanding such recognition
and intention, when it comes to implementation, contemporary water service
delivery is fraught with problems of non-participation, non-connection,
disconnection and restriction. One of the main reasons for the disjuncture
between frameworks and reality is the ascendency of a neo-liberal thrust towards
cost-recovery, in terms of which national government has devolved responsibility
for water services to municipalities, and has steadily decreased its financial and
technical support for such services. As a result, municipalities are under
considerable fiscal pressure to maximise profits from water services, resulting in
a preoccupation with recovering service-related costs from all areas, including
poor communities. At the same time, there is no national regulation to enforce
basic water standards or to ensure the protection and fulfilment of water-related
rights, which adds to the perverse incentives for municipalities to view water
more as a commodity than a public service. 
Thus, in 2001, the City of Johannesburg formulated a project to limit water
consumption in Soweto by means of the mass installation of prepayment water
meters (PPMs). Called Operation Gcin’Amanzi (meaning ‘conserve water’ in
isiZulu), the project was premised on the mass rollout of PPMs across Soweto,
starting with a pilot in one of the poorest suburbs – Phiri. Unlike the conventional
meters available throughout Johannesburg’s richer suburbs, which provide water
on credit with numerous procedural protections against disconnection, PPMs
3 During the period of multiparty negotiations, South Africa had an interim constitution, the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. It was finalised as the Republic
of South Africa Constitution Act 108 of 1996 (constitution).
4 According to national FBW policy, each household – or at least, each poor household – should
receive 6 kilolitres (6 000 litres) of free water per month. This figure is based on a calculation of
25 litres per person per day in a household of eight people. Space does not allow me to deal
with all the problems of this FBW policy, save to mention two. First, there is no national
regulation or enforcement of the policy, and there are many municipalities that do not provide
FBW at all. Second, for those municipalities that do provide FBW, such as Johannesburg, the
allocation is often insufficient to cover the basic needs of low-income households. This is
particularly the case in poor township areas such as Phiri, where there are multi-dwelling
households (one main house and several backyard shacks) on one property, but only one water
connection. On such properties, everyone has to share the same 6 kilolitre monthly FBW
allocation, which means that each person receives a woefully inadequate amount. 
74    Chapter 4automatically disconnect once the (largely inadequate) FBW supply is exhausted,
unless additional water credit is loaded. PPMs therefore fundamentally
compromise low-income households’ rights of access to water and equality
(because PPMs are only installed in poor areas), contradicting the promises of the
post-apartheid state and undermining the hopes of the residents of Phiri to
become full participants in the socio-economic order. The contrast between the
right to water in the constitution and the limitation of that access by means of a
PPM could hardly be starker, especially in the context of the hedonistic water
consumption in Johannesburg’s richer, swimming-pooled (and predominantly
white) suburbs. For the residents of Phiri, this apparent betrayal was too much,
and, as the first trenches were being dug for the installation of the PPM
infrastructure in August 2003, they embarked on a resistance campaign against
PPMs. From the outset, their resistance was supported by the Anti-Privatisation
Forum (APF), a socialist social movement. 
In Phiri, the struggle first took the form of direct protest rather than ‘legal
mobilisation’ (defined by Frances Zemans as the point at which ‘a desire or want
is translated into a demand as an assertion of one’s rights’.5 This was not
surprising, given the influence of the APF and the political left’s historical
antagonism to the law and rights as legitimising privilege. However, as detailed
below, such resistance only managed to delay the installation of PPMs. But, at the
lowest moment, when it looked as though community resistance had failed, the
APF took a strategic decision to turn to rights-based litigation, despite its
ideological aversion to rights and the law. Nevertheless, not much hope was
vested in the litigation process, which was viewed as a last resort. Yet, following
victory in the first stage of the legal battle – the Johannesburg High Court,
declared PPMs unlawful and unconstitutional on 30 April 2008 – there has been
a remarkable demonstration of support for the law from the APF and others
traditionally sceptical of the legal process. This is in spite of the fact that (pending
the outcome of the appeals process), the order against PPMs has been suspended,
suggesting that there might be more value to even contingent legal mobilisation
than de facto outcomes alone. As Michael McCann concluded in his seminal
study of the 1980s wage equity campaign in the United States, ‘litigation provided
movement activists an important resource for advancing their cause’.6 I suggest
the same is true for the Phiri campaign against PPMs, in which the uptake of
rights-based litigation has empowered water activists in ways that I suspect will
continue to reverberate and shape struggles for water in Phiri and beyond. 
In this vein (and in the same year that the City of Johannesburg formulated
its plan to install PPMs in Phiri), Daria Roithmayr wrote an article entitled ‘Left
Over Rights’, responding to Duncan Kennedy’s articulation of a ‘post-rights’
position. Roithmayr’s article advances the argument (in line with Critical Race
Theory, itself an offshoot of Critical Legal Studies) that rights can be
pragmatically useful ‘for particular communities of colour at particular moments
5 Zemans, 1983: 700.
6 McCann, 1994: 4.
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be useful to the left, regardless of the ultimate outcome of litigation per se.
Advocating a pragmatic approach to rights, I suggest that in contemporary South
Africa, with its extreme socio-economic and racial inequalities, while in the
normal course of events the law does indeed serve the interests of elites, rights-
based legal mobilisation can have a predominantly positive impact on social
movements representing disempowered groups, including the poor. I conclude,
as Roithmayr did, that, if strategically used, rights-based legal mobilisation may in
certain circumstances offer the left an additional tactic in a broader political
struggle. In some instances the additional tactic might be a last resort, but it
remains a useful one. Indeed, in Phiri, rights provided what S’bu Zikode has
referred to as ‘choice from no choice’. Nevertheless, even where litigation
emerges as a tactic of desperation rather than hope, ‘since rights carry with them
the connotations of entitlement, a declaration of rights tends to politicise needs
by changing the way people think about their discontents’, legitimating claims,
thereby contributing to political mobilisation and, ultimately, to political change.8
This chapter documents and analyses the struggle against PPMs in Phiri,
focusing particularly on the uptake and utility of rights-based legal mobilisation
by the APF as an ordinarily rights-adverse social movement, manifesting in the
Mazibuko water rights case.9 At the time of writing, the Mazibuko appeal had just
been heard in the Constitutional Court. The judgment was handed down on 8
October 2009. In a shock decision, which overturned the findings of two
previous courts, the Constitutional Court ruled against the applicants, finding
PPMs to be lawful. However, notwithstanding the final judgment, the Phiri water
campaign provides an interesting case study of an impoverished community’s
struggle against neo-liberal policies, which has involved, but has never been
dominated by, the uptake of litigation based on a human rights framework.
2 COMMERCIALISATION AND CORPORATISATION
When the post-apartheid government was swept into power by the vast majority
of South Africans in 1994, its political mandate involved righting historical
wrongs. One of these was the legacy of vastly unequal basic services, particularly
water. As recognised by the African National Congress (ANC)’s first,
expansionist economic development strategy, the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP), in 1994 an estimated 12 million South Africans
7 Roithmayr, 2001: 113.
8 Scheingold, 1974: 95, 131, 132, 147.
9 The Mazibuko case was heard in the Johannesburg High Court between 3 and 5 December
2007; in the Supreme Court of Appeal between 23 and 25 February 2009; and in the
Constitutional Court on 2 September 2009. For the sake of ease of reference, unless otherwise
indicated, I refer to the case in the cumulative sense, as Mazibuko. The citation of the High
Court case is Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (4) All SA 471 (W); in the
Supreme Court of Appeal it is City of Johannesburg and Others v Mazibuko and Others 2009 (3) SA
592 (SCA); the Constitutional Case is Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others CCT
0039/09.

  Civic action and legal mobilitsation: the Phiri water meters case    77(approximately a quarter of the population) did not have access to piped water.10
There was an expectation that equalising water services would be prioritised, and
that water would be recognised ‘as a public good whose commodification would
inherently discriminate against the majority poor’.11 
Undoubtedly, commendable progress has been made in connecting
previously unconnected households to the water grid.12 However, in recent years
such gains have been fundamentally eroded by a growing neo-liberal
preoccupation with cost-recovery, which results in poor households being
disconnected for inability to pay for water services. The catalyst for the increasing
focus on cost-recovery and the concomitant escalation of water disconnections
was the consolidation of the local government sphere of government in the 2000
municipal elections. The arrangement of three spheres of autonomous
government – national, provincial and local – was itself a product of political
compromise – a concession by the ANC to the other main parties (notably the
Inkatha Freedom Party, with its support base in KwaZulu/Natal, and the then-
Democratic Party, with its support base in Cape Town) to afford them some zone
of political dominance. Part of this devolution was a constitutionally entrenched
division of functions, in which water services became a local government
mandate (Schedule 4B of the constitution). 
Within this arrangement, national government has always exerted relatively
tight fiscal control over municipalities. In particular, municipalities are under
pressure to become financially self-sufficient, and they are precluded from any
deficits on their operating budgets (Section 18(1)(c) of the Local Government:
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003). At the same time, national
government has steadily withdrawn central financial support and, following the
advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, decreased grants
and subsidies to local government.13 The effect has been directly felt on
municipal services. Because basic services are one of the main sources of revenue
for municipalities – electricity and water services together account for
approximately 50% of aggregated municipal revenue14 – municipalities are driven
to pursue a commercialised approach to water services, in which water is viewed
as a source of revenue rather than a public service. 
Proper implementation of the RDP mandate would have required ‘a national
redistributive water pricing policy with higher unit amounts for higher-volume
water consumers, especially large firms, mines and (white) farms’, as well as
intervention in the ‘functioning and autonomy of local government to ensure
equitable tariffs, including regulation of appropriate cross-subsidies between rich
and poor consumers within a municipality’.15 Instead, social equity regulation has
10 ANC, 1994: para. 2.6.1.
11 McKinley, 2005: 181.
12 In the decade after 1994, 3.37 million households were connected to water services (South
African Institute of Race Relations, 2006: 385, 422).
13 McKinley, 2005: 182.
14 Seidman, 2006: 8.
15 Bond and Dugard, 2008b: 6–7.
78    Chapter 4been sacrificed on the altar of neo-liberal cost-recovery and decentralised
government autonomy. While the commercialisation of water services gained
momentum in the wake of the consolidation of local government (2000–2001),
there were ominous signs of a more neoliberal approach to water services as early
as 1994: the 1994 Water Supply and Sanitation White Paper stipulated ‘where
poor communities are not able to afford basic services, government may subsidise
the cost of construction of basic minimum services but not the operating, maintenance
or replacement costs’ (emphasis added).16 Similarly, the 1997 White Paper on a
National Water Policy for South Africa stated: ‘to promote the efficient use of
water, the policy will be to charge users for the full financial costs of providing
access to water, including infrastructure, development and catchment
management activities’.17 
In the South African context, the commercialisation of water has entailed
highlighting its role mainly as an economic good and attempting to reduce price
distortions, while pursuing a limited form of obligatory means-tested subsidy –
the FBW allocation.18 Crucially, it has also involved harsh enforcement of credit
control (aimed at curtailing water revenue losses in poor communities), including
by means of water disconnection and restriction through physical mechanisms
such as flow restrictors and PPMs. At the municipal level, this has meant that
almost as fast as poor households are connected to the grid in terms of the
extension of infrastructure, they are disconnected because they cannot pay their
monthly water bills.19 
16 DWAF, 1994: 19.
17 DWAF, 1997: 4.
18 Bond and Dugard, 2008a: 5. Most municipalities pursue a means-tested approach to FBW
allocation, using a registration process known as indigency registration, in terms of which poor
households must prove their poverty in order to receive FBW. Initial research indicates that
such indigency registers typically capture only about a fifth of formally qualifying low-income
households (Tissington et al, 2008: 34–39).
19 Beyond direct observance of this phenomenon, as well as feedback from affected communities,
it is hard to quantify the scale of water disconnections. This is because most municipalities,
along with national government, do not keep data on disconnections or are reluctant to share
such information. Furthermore, in those municipalities that have installed PPMs in poorer
residential areas, any disconnection is ‘outsourced’ as a private disconnection in the person’s
own home, and not part of the municipality’s administrative record (such disconnections are
referred to by community-based organisations as ‘silent disconnections’). Nevertheless, some
authors have managed to track water disconnections for specific periods. For example, in
Smith’s 2005 study of the Cape Town and Tygerberg administrations, 159 886 households had
their water disconnected for reasons of non-payment between 1999 and 2001; most of these
households were in poor areas where people struggle to pay water bills. And, using national
household data and data collected in a 2001 national survey, McDonald (2002) estimated that
between the years 2000 and 2001, 7.5 million people experienced both water and electricity
disconnections. Such data suggest that ‘the introduction of free water and electricity policies in
2001 in urban South Africa had little impact on the affordability of services for many
households’ (McInnes, 2005: 21). Finally, former DWAF Director General Mike Muller
conceded that in 2003 alone, 275 000 households were disconnected at least once from water
services due to an inability to pay (Muller, 2004), which, based on a national average of around
five or six people per household, amounts to approximately 1.5 million people – and this
number excludes prepayment water meter disconnections for the reasons outlined above (Bond
and Dugard, 2008a). 
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services has not entirely echoed the global trend of privatisation per se, as pointed
out by Bakker,20 it is possible to commercialise water services without privatising
them. This has certainly been the case in South Africa, where most water services
remain publicly owned, but where water is viewed primarily (and even ideally) as
an economic good. In some instances, this commercialisation of water services
has also entailed their corporatisation. In 2001 in the City of Johannesburg, for
example, water services were corporatised under the auspices of Johannesburg
Water (Pty) Ltd. (Johannesburg Water), which is a ring-fenced corporation whose
only shareholder is the City of Johannesburg. 
Furthermore, although there are very few outright private water concessions
– mainly due to popular resistance after initial attempts at private water
concessions21 – many of the global agents of privatised water services have played
pivotal roles in South Africa. For example, the French multinational (and one of
the world’s largest privatised water management firms), Suez (now called GDF
Suez), was awarded a five-year management contract in 2001 – the first year of
the corporatisation of Johannesburg’s water services – under the Johannesburg
Water (Pty) Ltd. management subsidiary, Johannesburg Water Management
(Jowam). The result was a regressive interpretation of social equity standards,
including the structure of the rising block water tariff.22 In 2003, instead of
choosing the ideal structure (which would have a convex curve, starting with low-
priced tariff blocks and rising very steeply at the luxury end of consumption) that
would have better served lower-income households, the City adopted a relatively
steep-rising concave tariff curve for water. In addition:
In 2003, the second tier of the [rising] block tariff (7 to 10 kilolitres/ household/
month) was raised by 32%, while the third tier (11–15 kilolitres/ household/ month)
was lowered by 2% (during a period of roughly 10% inflation, which was the amount
by which higher tier tariffs increased) ... Moreover, the marginal tariff price for
industrial/ commercial users of water, while higher than residential, actually declines
after large-volume consumption is reached.23
In such domestic water tariff structures, where the lower block tariffs are
dramatically increased, this impacts negatively on low-income households,
making water bills unaffordable, escalating municipal debt and resulting in
20 Bakker, 2007.
21 Bond and Dugard, 2008b: 9.
22 Although set at the local level, municipal water tariffs are meant to comply with national
regulations – set out in the Norms and Standards in Respect of Tariffs for Water Services:
Regulations under section 10 of the Water Services Act 108 of 1997 (20 July 2001). One of the
prescribed requirements is that tariffs for metered water connections must reflect a rising block
structure with three or more tariff blocks ‘with the tariff increasing for the higher consumption
blocks’ (section 6(2)(a)). A rising block tariff structure, particularly one with a convex curve
with low prices at the low levels of consumption and very high prices at the luxury end of
consumption, is meant to promote social equity by cross-subsidising between the high
consumption of wealthy households and the relatively lower consumption of low-income
households.
23 Bond and Dugard, 2008: 7.
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consumption spectrum, luxury residential water consumption is not overly
penalised, because such an environmental and social justice rationale might
irritate wealthy users into consuming less water, thereby reducing municipal
revenue. Indeed, the head of Jowam between 2001 and 2005, Jean Pierre Mas, has
indicated that it would be foolish for Johannesburg Water to raise the price at the
top end in an attempt to pursue more progressive cross-subsidies and ‘to promote
water conservation’ among affluent households ‘who pay their water bills’, as this
might reduce the company’s revenue.25
Within this corporate model, water services are managed largely along
commercial lines, albeit with some nationally legislated (though rarely enforced)
concessions to social equity (such as the FBW allocation). Indeed, across South
Africa and gaining ground particularly in bigger metropolitan areas, water has
become more of an economic product and less of a public health-related service.26
In many respects, the City of Johannesburg has led this trend, not least in its use
of PPMs to limit access to water in poor households, starting with Phiri.
3 THE CITY OF JOHANNESBURG
Johannesburg has been characterised by infrastructural inequalities almost since
its birth. In the early days of the gold rush, wealthy Rand-lords and the mining
middle classes lived in leafy suburbs to the north of the city, and the budgets of
the fledgling municipality were largely channelled towards these residents.27 By
the 1970s, these northern areas were well serviced and residents enjoyed lifestyles
similar to those of the wealthy in many of the world’s richest countries. In stark
contrast, hidden behind the mine dumps or to the south-west of the City, were
townships such as Soweto (the name deriving from South Western Township).
Such areas were under-serviced and predominantly poor, and essentially
functioned as labour camps to service mines and industry with cheap black
labour, which became part of the apartheid project from 1948, resulting in the
expansion of Soweto during the 1950s and 1960s. 
By the 1970s the large numbers of oppressed people in Soweto had formed
an explosive mix, which was set alight by the Black Consciousness movement and
the student uprisings of 1976. In an attempt to co-opt and pacify rising militancy,
the city extended municipal services infrastructure to Soweto households, albeit
using inferior water piping and low-amperage electricity. For water, a ‘deemed
consumption’ system was operated, which meant that households were not
charged according to consumption, but were rather billed a flat rate regardless of
24 Bond and Dugard, 2008b: 9.
25 Quoted in Smith, 2006: 29. In fact, the evidence indicates that South African luxury water users
are not very responsive to price changes, suggesting that water tariffs at the top-end could be
significantly raised in order to better cross-subsidise low-end usage, without resulting in rich
households drastically cutting their consumption. 
26 Hemson, 2008: 30.
27 Beavon, 2000.
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perspective, the deemed consumption system held the benefit of not requiring
municipal officials to undertake monthly readings, which might expose officials
to politically motivated reprisals. Moreover, despite widespread non-payment of
water bills, the city rarely disconnected water supplies, fearing this would stoke
militancy. Because neither credit control nor water disconnection was practiced,
household arrears mounted, until by 2000, most households were deeply in debt.
When Johannesburg’s first non-racial municipality – the Greater
Johannesburg Metropolitan Transitional Council – was established in 1995, it
almost immediately faced a fiscal crisis, related in the first instance to the
enormous challenge of incorporating township and informal settlement areas into
the city’s administrative system, and equalising services across the city. Moreover,
from 1996, residents in the rich northern suburbs (notably Sandton) had
organised a rates boycott because they were ‘resistant to redistributive policies
which meant that wealthy areas would subsidise poorer parts of the City’.28 By
1997, these financial pressures had culminated in a looming ‘fiscal crisis’,29 which
prompted a shift in municipal governance towards a more commercial cost-
recovery oriented model, in line with the broader trend outlined above. Beall et al
have argued that in fact the 1997 ‘fiscal crisis’ was ‘talked up’ as a way of justifying
metropolitan restructuring to suit market-driven demands.30 
Regardless of the motivation, the ultimate result was a corporate model of
governance manifested in ‘iGoli 2002’ (launched in December 1999),31 a
turnaround strategy for municipal financial recovery that involved the
corporatisation of municipal services. In line with this strategy, and along with
Johannesburg Water, City Power (Pty) Ltd. was established in 2001 as the City’s
electricity service provider, and Pikitup (Pty) Ltd. became the City’s waste
management and refuse service provider, all under the newly named City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality. The new corporate governance
paradigm entrenched a technocratic attitude towards municipal management, in
terms of which class (still commonly overlapping with race) became the dominant
determinant of marginalisation.32
From the city’s perspective, it was essential to minimise inefficiencies and
revenue losses in municipal services. One of the main areas identified for
attention was Soweto. Yet at the same time, the city was aware of the national
FBW policy. So, while households in the rich suburbs continued to access as
much water as they liked – for their gardens, swimming pools and so forth –
without any direct pressure to conserve, in mid-2001 the city devised its plan to
physically restrict water consumption in Soweto to the obligatory FBW allocation,
28 Wafer, Dugard, Ngwenya and Sibanda, 2007: 14.
29 Tomlinson, 1999: 1–39.
30 Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002: 94.
31 iGoli is a colloquial word for Johannesburg (meaning place of gold in Sesotho). For an overview
of the iGoli 2002 policy, see www.joburg.org.za/content/view/92/58 or www.joburg-
archive.co.za/city-vision/AnnualReport02Ch3.pdf.
32 Bond, 2000.
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The high-density suburb of Phiri, one of the poorest in Soweto, with high
unemployment and multi-dwelling properties (a small house and several backyard
shacks per property), was chosen as the pilot project for Operation
Gcin’Amanzi.33
4 PREPAYMENT WATER METERS AND PHIRI 
According to an undated Operation Gcin’Amanzi Report included in the minutes
of Meeting of the Operations and Procurement Committee of Johannesburg
Water (27 November 2002),34 Operation Gcin’Amanzi comprised an ‘immediate,
intensive and comprehensive intervention on a number of fronts’ that sought to
remedy the problems of ‘over-supply’, lack of ‘ownership’ of water consumption
by residents and a ‘non-payment paradigm amongst consumers’ in Soweto
(Johannesburg Water, undated: 1). Whereas other municipalities had remedied
deemed consumption through conventional metering, Johannesburg was
determined that Soweto residents would not access more water than the FBW
amount without first paying for it. According to the same undated Operation
Gcin’Amanzi report, the City was ‘intent on adopting prepayment water metering
as the preferred service delivery option to be implemented in deemed
consumption areas of supply’ because ‘prepayment can be considered to be a
water management tool’.35 
Such demand management was perceived by the city to be critical to the
objective of promoting ‘savings in water purchases by Johannesburg Water’,36
and to the broader goal of improving the ‘financial positions’ of the city and
Johannesburg Water.37 Seeking to ‘reduce demand’ for water among Phiri
residents, as well as to improve the city’s financial position, Johannesburg Water
began the bulk infrastructure construction work for the installation of PPMs in
Phiri on 11 August 2003. The first phase of individual house connections began
in Phiri Block B in February 2004. 
Lindiwe Mazibuko (the first applicant), an unemployed single mother living
on a small property with 20 people, first became aware of Operation Gcin’Amanzi
on 17 March 2004, when a Johannesburg Water employee came to her house to
tell her that her water supply system was old and rusty and needed replacing. The
employee gave Mazibuko a letter entitled ‘Decommissioning of the old secondary
mid-block water supply system’, which made no mention of PPMs. Later that day,
Johannesburg Water workers started digging trenches in the pavement outside
33 In fact, Phiri was not the first poor residential area in Johannesburg to receive prepayment
water meters. Prior to Phiri, PPMs had been installed in Orange Farm informal settlement. 
34 This report formed part of the Mazibuko record, found at Bundle B vol 2 pages 439–82 of the
court files, which are available at CALS.
35 Johannesburg Water, undated: 3.
36 Ibid.
37 First and Second Respondents’ Heads of Argument, 16 November 2007: para 17.8, Mazibuko
High Court case.
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Mazibuko that they were digging trenches to install PPMs. She had heard about
PPMs from activists, and told the employees that she would never accept such a
method of water delivery. At the end of March 2004, without any further
notification or warning, the Mazibuko household’s water supply was abruptly
disconnected. It remained disconnected until October 2004, when she capitulated
and asked for a PPM. Many other Phiri residents experienced a similar process
around the same time, although some households were given a choice between a
PPM and a standpipe (a cold water yard tap, which is not connected to the
household water and sanitation supply).38
From the outset, PPMs compromised Phiri residents’ access to water in very
tangible ways. With a an average number of 13 or more people living across multi-
dwelling households,39 the standard FBW allocation (6 kilolitres per property per
month) has always been insufficient to meet the basic needs of Phiri residents.
This means that in the context of high unemployment and endemic poverty, Phiri
residents are forced to make undignified and unhealthy choices. For example,
people living with HIV/AIDS must choose between bathing or washing their
soiled sheets, and parents must choose between washing their children before
they go to school, or flushing the toilet. Even so, households such as Lindiwe
Mazibuko’s regularly go without water for days at a time because the FBW supply
usually only lasts until mid-month, and there is often insufficient money to buy
additional water credit:
The free 6 kilolitres of water per month has never lasted the entire month, since it
was installed on 11 October 2004. It usually finishes any time between the 12th and
15th of each month. We can often not afford to buy further water. This means that
our household is without any water for more than half of every month.40
For the many large households in Phiri that exhaust their FBW supply before the
end of the month, and are too poor to afford additional water credit, the ultimate
38 For example, when her deemed-consumption water supply was discontinued, Grace Munyai
(the third applicant in the Mazibuko case) accepted a standpipe rather than a prepayment water
meter because she wanted to ensure that she would always have access to water, even if it was
outside. However, with a standpipe, whenever household members need water (including for
flushing the toilet – Phiri toilets are designed to be part of a waterborne sewerage system), they
have to fill buckets and carry them inside. Moreover, if a household violates the conditions of a
standpipe, which includes not connecting the tap to a hose, the standpipe is removed and a
prepayment water meter is installed. As Grace attests, the authorities conduct regular surprise
checks to ensure that she does not ‘misuse’ her standpipe (affidavit of Grace Munyai, 28 June
2006: http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/D3CF86E1-961F-4216-A346-70A93059A005/0/
Munyai20affi.pdf).
39 Typical Phiri properties have a main brick house, which has one room, a living room, a kitchen
and usually an outside toilet – title to these small ‘matchbox houses’ was transferred to the
occupiers in the post-1994 period. Most Phiri properties also have backyard shacks, for which
low monthly rentals are levied. Such shacks are generally cramped. Because the backyard shacks
are not formally recognised by the city, they are not allocated separate FBW allocations. This
means that all people on one property must share the one FBW allocation of 6 kilolitres per
month.
40 Founding affidavit of Lindiwe Mazibuko, 3 July 2006 para. 101: http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/
rdonlyres/789545BC-025F-4046-8B82-69A63E7497D2/0/MAZIBUKO_Founding_affidavit
_Final.pdf. 
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households by surprise. The continuous infringements to dignity and health are
serious, and a direct risk to life is posed in the event of fire. This was tragically
demonstrated in a shack fire on the property of Vusimuzi Paki (the fifth applicant
in the Mazibuko case), on 27 March 2005, which resulted in the death of two small
children when there was insufficient water to put out the fire.41 More routinely,
PPMs exacerbate already difficult lives by adding the stress of trying to manage
with insufficient water for basic household and hygiene needs. PPMs represent
the ultimate technicist solution to poverty, delegating the administrative burden
of access to water to the individual household, thereby individualising ‘the
relationship of people to the resources necessary for life’.42 And yet, despite the
potential for PPMs to individualise struggle, in Phiri, this blatant attempt to
ghettoise poor households served to collectivise resistance, at least initially.
5 RESISTANCE AND RIGHTS
In delineating between resistance and rights, I do not mean to suggest that there
was either a linear chronology or a separation between the two. From the onset
of the legal campaign, there was a continuous dialectical relationship between the
two tactical endeavours.43 The legal campaign did not suspend the resistance
campaign. On the contrary, one of the points of this chapter is to demonstrate
that the legal campaign and the resistance campaign were always intertwined; far
from detracting from each other, they served to reinforce and reinvigorate each
other. I have written the sub-sections separately only because my point of entry
and lens is the legal campaign, and it is difficult to merge the narratives. However,
for the sub-section on rights – where I have relied on personal retrospective
narratives (including my own, as part of the legal team from the outset of the legal
campaign) – I have attempted to interweave my narrative with that of the APF’s.
The APF voice is that of Dale McKinley, and was documented in the course of a
series of discussions during early July 2009, and a focused interview on 10 July
2009 (five years after taking a Phiri water rights case forward was first
contemplated).
41 Two-year old Katleho Tamane and nine-year old Dimpho Tamane, who died in the blaze, had
been left sleeping in the shack by their mother who had to work a night-shiftand was unable to
get anyone to look after her children.
42 Naidoo, 2007: 62.
43 My ability to research the impact of the Mazibuko legal mobilisation on the APF was
significantly limited by the fact that one of my two long-term APF interlocutors (P) – was
suspended from the APF in the wake of a rape charge during early 2009. He remained
suspended for the duration of my research. In discussions with other APF members, I decided
not to try to pursue any research questions with P. This meant that I had to rely on written
statements of the APF, as well as interviews with Dale McKinley (my other long-term
intermediary), to document the APF’s perspective of the Mazibuko journey. Fortunately, as a
founding member, treasurer and de facto figurehead of the APF, McKinley was an excellent
source of critical analysis. However, this limitation means that the activist perspective is not as
rich as it should have been. Particularly in view of the disappointing Constitutional Court
judgment, this suggests the need for further research that delves deeper into the activists’
accounts and perspectives. 

  Civic action and legal mobilitsation: the Phiri water meters case    87For Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars such as Mark Tushnet, Peter Gabel
and Duncan Kennedy, rights are part of the machinery of law that reflects and
reinforces the exercise of power by elites.44 Consequently, the law works to
domesticate poverty and need,45 while leaving class and racial structures in place.
Yet, as appreciated even within the CLS critique of law, rights have radical as well
as conservative potential.46 In Stuart Scheingold’s words, ‘rights, like the law
itself, do cut both ways – serving at some times and under some circumstances to
reinforce privilege and at other times to provide the cutting edge of change’.47 So,
while law ‘in the aggregate surely tends to support hierarchical power relations’, it
also provides ‘the opportunity or space for creative challenge’.48 It is not
necessary – as the CLS school might suggest – that law (and legal ideology) ‘either
straightjackets citizen imagination or disarms critical understanding’.49 Indeed, as
played out in Phiri’s struggle against PPMs, reform-oriented rights mobilisation
can build on and yet ‘remain relatively independent of, or even defiant toward, the
official, state-sanctioned legal order’.50 
Resistance
In August 2003, even before the first PPMs were installed, the initial digging of
trenches for the bulk construction work met with widespread resistance.
Residents such as Lindiwe Mazibuko had heard about PPM problems from
residents of Orange Farm informal settlement, where such meters had recently
been installed (many of which were subsequently destroyed by activists). As it
became clear that the City was determined to roll PPMs out in Phiri, opposition
mounted, and gained momentum through support from the APF. Established in
2000, the APF is a left-wing social movement alliance comprising affiliated
community-based organisations, activists and movements, the latter group
including the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC). It was formed during
the struggles against the City’s commercialisation and corporatisation agenda, and
brought together political activists and nascent community movements
committed to the de-commodification of all basic needs. Among the APF’s core
objectives are: ‘a halt to all privatisation of public sector entities and return of
public control and ownership; the co-ordination and intensification of anti-
privatisation struggles in communities’.51 The APF’s stated modus comprises:
various forms of mass, direct action at local, provincial and national levels; regular
mass community meetings; alliance-building and solidarity activities with community
organisations outside of Gauteng as well as with organised labour; door-to-door
campaigning in communities; submission of memoranda of demands and policy
44 Tushnet, 1984; Gabel, 1984; Kennedy, 1986.
45 Brand, 2007.
46 See especially Tushnet, 1984.
47 Scheingold, 1989:76.
48 McCann, 1994: 9.
49 Ibid, 12.
50 Ibid.
51 McKinley, unpublished draft: 3.
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meetings.52 
Deeply rooted in community struggles against the commercialisation and
corporatisation of public services such as water, the APF was well placed to take
up the struggle and become the vehicle for community resistance against PPMs
in Phiri. Indeed, an APF-affiliate, the SECC (which had already campaigned
against electricity prepayment meters elsewhere in Soweto), played a pivotal role
in mobilising resistance. In the early months of the resistance campaign,
increasing numbers of residents joined the struggle, swelling the numbers at
APF/SECC meetings in Phiri and at the APF’s office in Johannesburg’s inner
city, and participating in mass marches to city and Johannesburg Water offices. In
addition, direct resistance involved attempting to physically prevent
Johannesburg Water employees from digging trenches. Under the auspices of the
APF/SECC, spontaneous protests morphed into mass action, with residents
refusing to allow Johannesburg Water to continue its work. As described by
activist and APF member Prishani Naidoo: 
Residents came together to physically prevent the work of Johannesburg Water. They
were supported in their actions by members of the Soweto Electricity Crisis
Committee and the Anti-Privatisation Forum. Several altercations ensued between
the police and private security hired by Johannesburg Water, and the residents.53
Such altercations held the potential to derail the entire project, and, in a drastic
response to the rising number of incidents of direct action, the city and
Johannesburg Water successfully applied to the Johannesburg High Court for an
interdict, which was granted on 22 August 2003. In terms of the interdict, any
interference with Operation Gcin’Amanzi was banned, and activists (as well as all
members of the APF and SECC) were interdicted from coming within 50 metres
of any physical work undertaken by the project. The interdict also authorised the
sheriff of the court to engage the services of a private security company to assist
with any violations of the terms of the interdict. The APF responded in early
September 2003 by establishing a Coalition Against Water Privatisation (CAWP),
to re-focus activism against PPMs under a newly configured affiliation. However,
the city followed up the interdict with a concerted effort to crush any opposition
to PPMs, including arresting and harassing activists. By the end of September
2003, 14 residents of Phiri and activists supporting them had been charged with
‘public violence’, ‘malicious damage to property’ and ‘incitement’ for handing out
flyers. The APF and its affiliate organisations, especially the SECC and CAWP,
had to divert much energy and funding to securing bail and defending those
charged. In the end, almost all charges were dropped, but battling against state
repression took a heavy toll on the organisation, and effectively undermined its
ability to halt the City’s operations in Phiri. In turn, this failure to stop the rollout
of PPMs fundamentally weakened the overall campaign. 
52 Ibid.
53 Naidoo, 2008: 58.
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their properties, without further disruption of the Operation Gcin’Amanzi
operations the structural work went forward, and the first PPMs were installed in
February 2004. For those households that refused to accept PPMs, the city
deployed a new weapon: total water disconnection, which left households such as
Lindiwe Mazibuko’s without water for months until they capitulated. Having
tried to live without direct access to water, and enduring intimidation by the city,
by the end of 2004 most households in Phiri had been forced to accept either
PPMs or standpipes. All were forced to relinquish their previously unlimited
water supply, which was discontinued. By 2005, the last remaining households
had given in, ‘choosing’ PPMs or standpipes over no water at all. 
The ultimate failure to stop the installation of PPMs was perceived by the
APF/SECC/CAWP alliance to mark a low point in the resistance campaign.
According to a research report by the APF and CAWP:
While large numbers of families came together to physically resist the installation of
the meters in the early days of [Operation Gcin’Amanzi] ... over time, arrests, fines,
intimidation and threats have resulted in a decline in resistance. They very threat of
being cut off from water completely for refusing to sign onto the system led to many
residents signing onto the system begrudgingly ... Today, activists bemoan the fact
that it is difficult to call a successful mass meeting in Phiri.54
At the time, the interdict, arrests, intimidation and water disconnections clearly
struck a near-fatal blow to the campaign. Yet in retrospect, it is apparent that by
cutting off one line of activism, the interdict sowed the seeds for the uptake of
another line – that of rights-based litigation. 
Rights
On a dreary mid-winter day in July 2004, Hameda Deedat (an activist researcher)
phoned former CALS colleague Mike Nefale55 to tell him that in the course of
her research into municipal services in Soweto, she had encountered households
whose water supply had been disconnected because they had refused to accept
PPMs. Mike and I immediately drove to Phiri, where we met some of the future
Mazibuko applicants. Over subsequent weeks, Mike and I went back to Phiri
several times to document household stories. It soon became apparent that there
was a legal case to be made. We tentatively raised this possibility with our Phiri
householders, who turned out to be very keen to pursue litigation. Aware that the
APF was active in Phiri, we then contacted APF co-founder Dale McKinley to
discuss the litigation option. In line with APF policy, Dale took the issue back to
the APF for deliberation. Recent interviews with McKinley have clarified that
around this time, the APF had been contemplating defensive litigation to try to
overturn the interdict. Nevertheless, according to McKinley, the idea of proactive
54 APF and CAWP, 2006: 21.
55 Mike was killed in a motor vehicle accident on 19 April 2009.
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is because, in line with CLS critiques, the APF viewed the law as entrenching
inequality and protecting privilege. Until that point, the APF’s only engagement
with the law had been through the arrest of members and their defence against
criminal charges, as well as the banning of marches. 
When the question of proactive use of the law was put to the APF, several
options emerged. First was an outright rejection of the legal route, accompanied
by a proposal to escalate the resistance to ‘all-out war’. However, when it was
pointed out that many of the proponents of this option did not live in Phiri and
were less likely to be exposed to the full brunt of the ramifications, this option
was collectively abandoned. The second option was to continue a low-intensity
resistance campaign, which in discussion appeared to be compatible with the
third option, litigation. The consensus position was a strategic decision to pursue
litigation, but not to suspend other forms of resistance: in other words, to utilise
rights as one tactic within the broader struggle against PPMs (and more broadly,
against the commercialisation and corporatisation of water services). This
position was put to the residents of Phiri at a mass meeting in September 2004,
at which it was agreed to pursue a case.56 
The conscious resort to litigation as ‘another terrain of struggle’ is evident in
the language of the APF and CAWP’s 2006 research report, which explains how
the APF and CAWP ‘prepare for another terrain of struggle in this war against
water privatisation, that of the courts ... As activists look to the court case as a
means to revive struggle at the local level’.57 Similarly, APF and CAWP member
Prishani Naidoo writes: ‘Earlier this year, the Coalition Against Water
Privatisation launched a constitutional case against the Johannesburg City
Council, challenging its rollout of prepaid water meters in Phiri, in the hope that
some of the losses made in struggle could be won through courts’.58 Clearly, the
decision to take forward the litigation was not taken lightly. According to
McKinley:
[t]he battle of Phiri marked another new watershed in post-1994 water struggles. It
served to not only further focus South African and international (critical) attention
on the practical character and consequence of the ANC government’s neo-liberal
(water) policy onslaught, but also opened the door to testing the stated water service
delivery commitments of relevant state policies/legislation and South Africa’s
constitution. For left/anti-capitalist activists, it is never an easy thing to adopt tactics
that do not appear to fit into pre-configured, historically located understandings and
56 On the legal side of things, we appealed to and were very fortunate to secure – on a
contingency basis (meaning that legal fees would only be paid to counsel in the event of us
ultimately winning and advocates’ costs being awarded in our favour) – two outstanding
advocates for the duration of the litigation, Wim Trengove, SC and Nadine Fourie. In the initial
stage, when we were building the case, the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) were the
attorneys of record for the applicants and CALS provided the socio-legal research. As such,
FXI launched the case in the Johannesburg High Court in July 2006. However, from March
2007 onwards, CALS took over as the attorneys of record.
57 APF and CAWP, 2006: 4.
58 Naidoo, 2007: 34.
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trepidation and initial half-heartedness, that the APF and CAWP (with the assistance
first, of the Freedom of Expression Institute and subsequently, the Centre for
Applied Legal Studies) entered into the institutional-legal terrain of class struggle,
assisting five representative Phiri residents to prepare and file a case in the
Johannesburg High Court challenging the legality and constitutionality of Operation
Gcin’amanzi’s limitation of the free basic supply of water and the installation of pre-
paid water meters. The case was seen as a tactic, part of a larger, long-term strategy
seeking to use all means available to ensure that water itself is seen and treated as a
public resource, that water service providers remain publicly owned, managed and
run and that water service delivery provides adequate, accessible and quality water to
all.59
The tactical resort to rights-based litigation indicates recognition by the social
movements of the contingency of law. Evidently, the failure of traditional forms
of mobilisation in Phiri hastened the APF’s decision to take up a legal campaign
– undoubtedly, as did the fortuitous advent of human rights lawyers from the
Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) and CALS.60 What is perhaps more
surprising than the recognition of the contingency of law among legal sceptics, is
the celebration of law by such actors since the legal victory in the High Court. For
example, referring to the judgment as ‘historic and groundbreaking’, McKinley
writes:
The judgment ranks as one of post-apartheid South Africa’s most important legal
victories for poor communities and all those who have been struggling against
unilateral and profit-driven neo-liberal basic service policies ... Judge Tsoka, however,
went beyond the legal points, recognising the racial, class, administrative and gender-
based discrimination underlying the City of Johannesburg’s water policy. The judge
explicitly rejected the arguments for restricting the water usage of poor communities:
‘to expect the applicants to restrict their water usage, to compromise their health, by
limiting the number of toilet flushes in order to save water, is to deny them the rights
to health and to lead a dignified lifestyle.’ The judge labelled the so-called
‘consultation’ with the Phiri community as ‘more of a publicity stunt than
consultation’ and criticised the City’s ‘big brother approach’.61
There was further endorsement following a public condemnation by
Johannesburg Mayor Amos Masondo, in which Masondo criticised the Mazibuko
judgment at a Johannesburg press conference, attacking Judge Tsoka as follows:
‘Judges are not above the law ... We cannot have a situation where a judge wants
to take over the role of government. Judges must limit their role to what they are
supposed to do. If they want to run the country they must join political parties
and contest elections. In that way they can assume responsibilities beyond their
  
59 McKinley, 2008.
60 The role of lawyers in advocating the legal mobilisation course should not be ignored.
Nevertheless, throughout the years, the Mazibuko legal team has attempted to ensure that legal
mobilisation is driven by the clients and their support movements, rather than by ourselves.
61 McKinley, 2008.
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May 2008, the international anarchist website anarkismo.net62 carried a press
release by CAWP (entitled ‘Attack on High Court judgment and Judge Tsoka is
unwarranted, dangerous and betrays a complete ignorance of how democracy
works: This is not Zimbabwe, Mr Masondo, and you are not Robert Mugabe’) in
which Masondo’s attacks on the judiciary were described as ‘unprecedented’,
‘vicious’, ‘unwarranted’ and ‘dangerous’. The press release continued:
Mr. Masondo – unless you made your statements while dreaming that you were in a
country like Zimbabwe where there is no meaningful democracy, where the judiciary
is treated with contempt and where the government thinks that it is the law, then you
would know that a democratically elected government (at whatever level) like we
have in South Africa has no power beyond that given to it by the people themselves.
No one has given the government the right to unilaterally interpret and determine
any right contained in the Constitution. No one has given the government the right
to unilaterally pronounce that any law it passes is sacrosanct. 
Yes Mr. Masondo, we still have a functioning democracy in our country (as weak as it
might be at times). One of the benefits of that democracy, underpinned by the
Constitution, is that laws and government action can be challenged through the
courts by any individual citizen or collection of citizens and, if such a challenge is
successful, those laws and action can be reviewed and changed. That is one of the
key essences of the democratic principle of the limitation of powers.
Mr. Masondo, your right to appeal Judge Tsoka’s ruling is a component of that
limitation process but you can claim no unilateral right to limit Judge Tsoka’s ruling
simply because you are an elected politician. The ruling might, or might not be
overturned/changed, but any outcome is for the Constitutional Court to decide, not
you or the government you claim to represent. You show your contempt for our
hard-won democracy, Mr. Masondo, when you make dangerous claims that you and
your government are above it.63 
Finally, in an apparent new-found endorsement of litigation as a tactic, and a
surprising optimism regarding its potential to affect socio-economic change,
McKinley concludes:
While the judgment has already been appealed by the respondents, and will most
probably go all the way to the Constitutional Court, this does not detract from the
political and social significance of this victory. It is a case which does not only have
applicability to South Africa but which, by its very character, enjoins the attention
and direct interest of billions of poor people around the world who are suffering
under neo-liberally inspired water policies, alongside the governments that are
implementing such policies and their corporate allies who seek to turn water into
nothing less than another profit-making stock market option. 
62 Anarakismo.net describes itself on the website as follows: ‘We identify ourselves as anarchists
and with the ‘platformist’, anarchist-communist or especifista tradition of anarchism.’ In terms
of its objectives, according to the website, ‘Anarchism will be created by the class struggle
between the vast majority of society (the working class) and the tiny minority that currently
rule. A successful revolution will require that anarchist ideas become the leading ideas within
the working class’: http://www.anarkismo.net/about.
63 CAWP, 16 May 2008.
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and that water provision will now no longer be delivered in a discriminatory,
patronising and inhumane manner.64
6 CONCLUSION
Although it is not possible yet to assess the full impact of the Mazibuko legal
mobilisation, it is clear that in Phiri, the tactical resort to rights-based litigation
was premised on recognition of the contingency of law. The APF decision to
mobilise legally following the failure of traditional forms of leftist resistance is
consistent with Scheingold’s proposition that rights are ‘less established political
facts’ than potentially ‘political resources’ (Scheingold, 1974: 84). Given this
proposition, the uptake of litigation should not be isolated and compared in zero-
sum terms, but should be considered in a dialectical and potentially cumulative
relationship with other tactics in the political struggle (McCann, 1994: 292). 
On this basis, it is possible that the rights-based legal mobilisation has already
impacted the movement activists and their fight against the commercialisation of
water, through dramatising the issues and energising the struggle. While further
research is necessary to properly evaluate this proposition – particularly in the
light of the ultimate judgment – it seems to be supported by the APF’s own
analysis. According to McKinley, the APF is currently considering further
proactive litigation. In his words, Mazibuko provided ‘something to organise
around; hope and recognition after having been fucked over by the police – it
became the centre of mobilisation and reinvigorated the struggle, as well as
catalysing political discussions and refining strategy’.65 
Indeed, it is apparent that the case has played a fundamental role in
reinvigorating water-related struggles around the country. For example, during
May 2008, the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (SAMWU) used the
High Court judgment to mobilise against the City of Cape Town’s attempts to
install a different kind of water-limiting meter.66 It has also provided erstwhile
sceptics with a platform for viewing at least some manifestations of the law as
potentially progressive. Indeed, Mazibuko has quickly achieved almost mythical
status, and the High Court judgment reverberates in unanticipated and overtly
political ways. For example, on 19 July, the Mail & Guardian online carried a story
by Matuma Letsoalo entitled ‘Masondo Next to be Axed?’, in which the author
suggested that Amos Masondo may be the next mayor to be fired (following the
‘abrupt departure of Ekurhuleni mayor Duma Nkosi’). According to the author,
64 McKinley, 2008.
65 Interview with McKinley, 10 July 2009. When asked to list the drawbacks of the legal route,
McKinley noted the length and complexity of the process, as well as the potential to alienate
activists (there is no doubt that over the five years it has taken to mount the case and to get a
final hearing in the Constitutional Court, many activists have withdrawn their initial interest).
McKinley and I agree that if we could relive the process, we would try to spend more time
communicating with the residents of Phiri and allied activists to keep them informed about
each step of the legal process.
66 Foster, 12 May 2008
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from the regional ANC that Masondo ‘undermin[es] the region when taking
important decisions’, specifically ‘for failing to inform the regional leadership of
his decision to challenge a Johannesburg High Court ruling on pre-paid water
meters’.67
While cautioning that legal mobilisation is not a linear or predictable process,
McCann notes that it can ‘matter for building a movement, generating public
support for new rights claims, and providing leverage to supplement other
political tactics’ (McCann, 1994: 10). As understood by Karl Marx, consciousness
develops out of, rather than precedes, mobilisation, if it develops at all (McCann,
1994: 307). Given this theory, even if rights-based litigation represents a ‘choice
from no choice’ for impoverished communities and associated social movements
– or perhaps precisely because it does – it has the potential to contribute tangibly
to the broader struggle for socio-economic emancipation by the left.
7 POSTSCRIPT: THE MAZIBUKO JUDGEMENT FROM 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
On 8 October 2009, in a profoundly conservative judgment, the South African
Constitutional Court overruled the findings of the High Court and the Supreme
Court of Appeal and ruled against the Mazibuko applicants, finding the city’s
policies reasonable and PPMs lawful.68 Clearly it is too soon to assess the effect
of the judgment on the APF, but initial feedback suggests that the judicial defeat
has neither deterred the campaign nor discouraged further uptake of proactive
litigation by the APF.69 Moreover, as tentatively concluded in this chapter, the
Mazibuko rights-based mobilisation has already indirectly impacted, and continues
to impact, broader struggles in South Africa. The full extent of this impact can
only be determined by future research.
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5CHAPTER RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION:POLICING PROTEST INPOST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA
Marcelle C. Dawson1
1 INTRODUCTION
The policing of dissent has captured the attention of social movement scholars in
the global North for well over a decade, but this area of enquiry remains relatively
under-researched in the south. This chapter attempts to shed light on this issue in
the South African context. It addresses the policing of protest primarily from the
viewpoint of demonstrators.2 In order to understand how the relationship
between police and demonstrators plays itself out in a South African context, it is
necessary to take a step back and examine the content of the actual
demonstrations. Empirically, this chapter examines two themes: the nature of
popular protest in democratic South Africa; and experiences of the control of
dissent. To address these issues, the chapter provides a brief discussion on the
struggles faced by an array of communities, concentrating on the issues of service
delivery and participation. The discussion then considers protest action, paying
particular attention to the Regulation of Gatherings Act (No. 205 of 1993), the
techniques used by the police to squash dissent, and experiences of repression
from the viewpoint of local activists. 
To contextualise these themes, the chapter begins with an account of post-
apartheid restructuring as far as local government and the South African Police
Service are concerned. The purpose of this part of the discussion is to question
the nature and extent of democratic practices within these two state bodies. The
chapter then addresses the issue of the repression of resistance as discussed in the
1 Gathering the data for this research would not have been possible without the assistance of
Tendayi Sithole (Freedom of Expression Institute), Kgopotso Khumalo (University of
Johannesburg), Ole Maboya (University of Johannesburg), Bongane Xeswi (community
activist) and Morgan Thaba (University of Johannesburg).
2 At the outset of this project, the intention was to interview police as well as demonstrators, but
gaining access to the police proved unsuccessful. The research proposal was turned down by
the legal department of the SAPS in Johannesburg. At the time of concluding the project, the
proposal was being considered by the Management of the Gauteng Provincial Head Office. As
result, the original material in this paper is drawn only from interviews with community
activists. 101
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Africa. In closing, the chapter returns to the discussion on democracy, reflecting
on oft-repeated claims by community activists that democracy does not exist in
South Africa. The limitations of representative democracy are highlighted, and
the possibilities of what a participatory democracy would entail are examined. 
The empirical material cited in this chapter is derived largely from original
field research conducted between August and October 2009 with community
activists in Gauteng, Limpopo, the Western Cape and the Eastern Cape. Data
from a previous study in Johannesburg (conducted between April 2006 and
March 2007) have also been incorporated where necessary to substantiate certain
claims. In fact, some of the data from the earlier study informed some of the
questions that were posed in this investigation. Observations of community
meetings have also helped to frame the argument. 
The data-gathering process relied largely on qualitative techniques such as in-
depth interviews and focus groups, which allowed interviewers a certain amount
of flexibility in probing responses more thoroughly and seeking clarification on
issues that were not adequately explained. Moreover, this method allowed
respondents to digress, raising issues that were important to them and their
struggles, and which may not have been apparent to the interviewers at the outset
of the project. In this investigation, one focus group and eight in-depth interviews
were carried out in the Eastern Cape in and around East London (Vincent,
Scenery Park, King William’s Town, Mdantsane, Ginsberg and Amalinda). In
Gauteng, one focus group and 13 in-depth interviews were conducted in
Diepsloot, Kensington, Khutsong and Soweto. In the Western Cape, one focus
group and six in-depth interviews were carried out in Athlone, Khayelitsha,
Gugulethu, Kuilsrivier, Hout Bay and Mowbray. Finally, six focus groups and five
in-depth interviews took place in Makopane in Limpopo, in the villages of
Sekhuruwe, Chokoe, Ga Pila, Armoede, Ga Chaba and Skimming. Thus in this
investigation, 32 in-depth interviews and nine focus groups were conducted with
community activists.
2 POST-APARTHEID RESTRUCTURING: LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT AND THE SAPS
When the ANC came to power in 1994. it sought to centralise the political
system,3 aiming to integrate local and metropolitan governments, which had been
left racially and geographically fragmented by the National Party; this was
accompanied by a restructuring of the South African Police Services (SAPS). This
move was in stark contrast to what was happening internationally, as the decade
between the 1980s and 1990s was characterised by ‘a marked trend ... towards
decentralisation’.4 Governments of the south – excluding South Africa, but
3 Beall et al, 2002: 17.
4 Devas, 1999: 3.
104    Chapter 5including several other countries in the rest of Africa, Asia and Latin America –
were gripped by ‘decentralisation fever’.5 
The Local Government Transition Act (LGTA), passed in 1993, laid the
foundation for the creation of a new, centralised system of local government and
for consolidating the tax base. Many of the fundamental premises in the LGTA
were later captured in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP),
which championed meeting basic needs as a priority of the newly elected ANC
government. The document spelled out numerous ways of improving
infrastructure and services, including a more progressive form of local taxation,
cross-subsidisation, and granting lifeline supplies of water and electricity to the
poor.6 Importantly, the RDP envisaged that the state would play a leading role in
transformation and development. 
In 1996, however, in a shift away from its plan for state-led socio-economic
reform as embodied in the RDP, the ANC adopted Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) as its new macro-economic policy, which emphasised
(among other things) ‘public sector asset restructuring; the sale of other state
assets and the creation of public-private partnerships’.7 Inherent in GEAR’s
formulations was the notion that the state would no longer play a leading role in
development; instead, it would facilitate the necessary conditions that would
enable other parties (such as the private sector) to promote economic growth.8
As a consequence of the adoption of GEAR, local government was no longer ‘the
arms and legs of the Reconstruction and Development Programme’,9 and service
delivery came to be facilitated through cost recovery strategies and adherence to
market principles.10
Despite not succumbing to rampant decentralisation, policymaking in South
Africa at the level of local government has had similar outcomes compared to
countries in which decentralisation has occurred. As Beall et al pointed out, ‘With
or without an explicit decentralisation policy, deracialised and democratic local
government in South Africa has had to take on a dramatically expanded role,
albeit on terms that are driven by national legislation, regulations and funding.’11
For a country such as South Africa, which is characterised by high levels of
uneven development, local government has the potential to play a key
developmental role. 
However, it is possible for central government to destroy this potential by
offloading its responsibilities onto local government.12 As Lemon cogently
argued, ‘The central state may attempt to pass on the costs of providing public
5 Beall, 2000: 2.
6 RSA, 1994.
7 RSA, 1996.
8 Ibid.
9 RSA, 1994.
10 Parnell and Pieterse, 2002: 82.
11 Beall et al, 2002: 18. See also Oldfield, 2001.
12 Lemon, 2002: 18.
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state transfers to local level or the revenue-raising powers of local government.’13
In the absence of sufficient financial resources and adequately trained personnel,
several municipalities across South Africa have not been able to meet the
demands of local residents.
Such deficiencies at the level of local government have serious consequences
for state-civil society relations. For Zuern, conflict between civil society and the
state ‘is most acute at the local level due to the clear shortcomings of municipal
government as well as the demands placed upon this level of government by
citizens and community organisations that argue for their right to participate in
decision-making processes, along the lines idealised during the anti-apartheid
struggle.’14 Hence, in the post-apartheid period, it is not uncommon to hear local
government structures being criticised variably as incompetent, ineffective,
undemocratic, unresponsive and corrupt.15 
Equally disparaging remarks have been directed at the South African Police
Service (SAPS). More recently, the SAPS has been criticised for its use of
excessive force, and police officers have been labelled as ‘trigger-happy’, savage
and brutal. What has changed within the police service to bring South African
citizens to the point of referring to police as ‘criminals in police uniforms’?16 
In the 1970s, when political violence against the apartheid state was on the
rise, Riot Units were established to suppress dissent. By the 1980s, South Africa
boasted a fully-fledged riot squad that was capable of controlling and dispersing
crowds. However, as political opposition increased in the early 1990s, the state
put harsher measures in place to quell dissent. The Internal Stability Division
(ISD), established in 1992, was tasked mainly with the policing of political unrest.
It operated in a paramilitary fashion and ‘was implicated in cases around the abuse
of power (through the use of discretionary powers), misconduct and intimidation
of the members of communities’.17 
With the demise of apartheid came a new approach to policing, and
restructuring efforts were directed at transforming the police force into a
service.18 Along with the shift from the Ministry of Law and Order to the
Ministry of Safety and Security, and under the newly named SAPS, other
terminological changes occurred. Crowd control became crowd management, and the
term ‘riots’ made way for ‘protests’. In 1995, the ISD and the Riot Control Units
merged under the SAPS, and in the following year, in line with international
policing standards, Public Order Police (POP) Units were established to take over
13 Ibid: 21.
14 Zuern, 2002: 80.
15 See also Ibid: 78–79.
16 Own notes, CSR workshop, 30 October 2009.
17 Ngubeni and Rakgoadi, 1995.
18 See Shaw, 2002 for a detailed examination of police transformation in post-apartheid South
Africa, particularly as far as the policing of crime is concerned.
106    Chapter 5the responsibility of crowd management.19 In response to the decreased levels of
protest action – between 2001 and 2002 the number of ‘crowd management
incidents’ dropped from 7,913 to 6,75720 – and the increased incidence of
criminal activity, the early part of the new millennium saw yet another change
being introduced in this arena of policing. Area Crime Combating Units (ACCUs)
took over from the POP units in 2002 to ‘deal with bank robberies, cash-in-transit
heists and the hijacking of vehicles, as well as taxi and gang violence’.21 
With crime control rather than crowd management as their central activity,22
the ability for ACCUs to respond effectively to public disorder was diminished.
Omar points to two examples in which ACCUs bungled.23 In 2002, 43 soccer
fans were killed and about 160 injured at the Ellis Park stadium when a fight
broke out between supporters of the opposing teams, Kaiser Chiefs and Orlando
Pirates. The report from the commission of inquiry set up to look into the disaster
identified the slow response of the ACCUs and the use of teargas, which
exacerbated the situation, as two of the reasons why the situation descended into
chaos and ended in tragedy. In another incident, during a service delivery protest
in Intabazwe near Harrismith in 2004, Teboho Mkonza (a 17-year-old
demonstrator) was killed by the police and about 20 youths were injured by
birdshot when the police opened fire and continued shooting as the protestors
fled the scene. 
From 2002 onwards, popular protest was once again on the rise, particularly
in Gauteng. Based on data from the SAPS Operational Response Services, Omar
reports an increase of 50 per cent in crowd management incidents between 2002
(6,757 incidents) and 2005, when a total of 10,162 were recorded.24 These
numbers account for all ‘gatherings’, while data from the Incident Registration
Information System, Business Intelligence System (IRIS-BIS, or IRIS) breaks the
data down into ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest-related’. Most (92 per cent to 93 per cent)
of the crowd management incidents captured in the 2001 to 2008 IRIS statistics
were ‘peaceful’, i.e., not requiring the involvement of POP units or ACCUs. The
remaining 7 to 8 per cent of these incidents were identified as ‘unrest-related’, and
required police intervention.25 Among these unrest-related events, many required
minimal action from the police to restore order, but some of the incidents
included ‘taxi violence, gang violence, ideologically, ethnically and racially
motivated violence, revenge attacks and damage to property by small groups of
persons. These incidents usually involve ... actions such as shooting, the
detonation of explosive devices, stone-throwing, petrol-bomb attacks, arson, and
19 Omar, 2006: 9; Omar, 2007: 5.
20 Omar, 2007: 18.
21 Nqakula, 2002.
22 Omar, 2006: 8.
23 Ibid: 11.
24 Omar, 2007: 17.
25 Bruce, 2007: 30.
  Resistance and repression: policing protest in post-apartheid South Africa    107malicious damage to property’.26 Such actions were witnessed in some of the
occurrences of community and labour unrest since 2004.27 
In spite of the increase in social unrest, and despite early warning signs that
‘relying too heavily on ordinary police officials for public order policing’28 was
not an effective way of managing crowds, in 2006 ACCUs were transformed into
Crime Combating Units (CCUs). This change was indicative of the centralisation
of the crowd management function. As Omar points out, ‘[a]lthough reduced in
size in comparison to the ACCUs, and operating from a smaller number of more
centralised locations, the CCUs were still required to service the same population
and overall geographical area.’29 Moreover, as Duncan and Vally argue, the
additional burden placed on the police as a result of the 2006 phase of
restructuring had implications for the recording of incidents.30 IRIS yearly
statistics show a marked drop in peaceful gatherings, from 8,486 for the
2006–2007 financial year to 6,364 for 2007–2008, and a marginal increase in
unrest-related incidents, from 680 to 699 for the same years. Commenting on the
reliability of IRIS data, the head of the Visible Policing Unit, Director Chipu,
admitted, ‘If it comes to exact numbers it might be misleading. Sometimes we
didn’t have control over crowd management [POP] units so we didn’t record
everything’.31
In 2009, Jacob Zuma threw his weight behind proposed amendments to
Section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which would effectively allow the
police more leeway regarding the use of firearms. Prior to the amendments, police
were not allowed to shoot at fleeing criminals. The changes – purportedly part of
the government’s tougher stance on crime – have been dubbed a shoot-to-kill
campaign by the media, and have been criticised as ‘a return to apartheid-era
brutality’.32 While Zuma and Police Commissioner Bheki Cele insist that the
changes to the act do not mean ‘a licence to kill for trigger-happy officers’,33 the
reality on the ground suggests otherwise. 
Kgothatso Ndobe, a 21-year old resident of Atteridgeville (Pretoria) was
gunned down by police on 1 November 2009. He was at his home, relaxing with
friends, smoking marijuana and polishing his shoes. When he saw the police, he
fled. ‘The only reason he ran away was because he was smoking dagga,’ said his
friend. He was shot in the back of the head. Another friend asked the policeman
whether he had attempted to fire a warning shot or whether he had intentionally
fired at the boy. The inspector allegedly replied that he ‘did not care, because
that’s how they were told to operate’.34 Countless similar incidents and concerns
26 SAPS, 2003: 56, SAPS, 2004: 35.
27 Bruce, 2007: 30.
28 Omar, 2005: 11.
29 Omar, 2007: 8.
30 Duncan and Vally, 2009: 8–9.
31 Quoted in Ibid: 13.
32 Brown, 2009: 3.
33 Mkhulisi, 2009: 4.
34 Motsepe, 2009: 2.
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media over the past few months.35 
This latest shift towards a zero-tolerance approach to policing suggests a
return to a police force, as opposed to a police service. While increasing the capacity
of the SAPS36 may be a necessary step, the concomitant increase in police powers
in the absence of specialised training for crowd management does not bode well
for ordinary citizens who – in their quest to claim their democratic right to engage
in protest – are being confronted by the same policing units that are being
encouraged to use maximum force in the fight against crime, and are being dealt
with in a brutal (sometimes inhumane) manner. This chapter returns to the issue
of police harassment and brutality, supplying original evidence to support its
claims. Before addressing this matter, the chapter turns to a discussion of the
kinds of social unrest in which the respondents in this study are engaging.
3 COMMUNITY STRUGGLES IN DEMOCRATIC SOUTH 
AFRICA: SERVICE DELIVERY OR PARTICIPATION?
Across the four provinces where this research took place, community struggles
ostensibly centred on bread-and-butter issues, such as unemployment and access
to basic services, housing, healthcare and land. Such struggles have been well-
documented in an array of post-apartheid writings.37 Much has also been penned
on participation in development in South Africa.38 As many of these authors
note, people’s frustration – with lack of services, and with limited or ineffective
means to influence the decisions that directly affect their daily lives – tends to be
targeted at the level of local government.
The popular media have tended to dwell on service delivery as the issue,
while some scholars and political analysts have urged for community resistance
efforts, which appear to be about resources, to be understood as a struggle for the
right of community residents to participate in decision-making about the kinds of
resources and services that are appropriate to their needs. The evidence in this
chapter suggests that an over-exaggeration of the service delivery element of
popular resistance runs the risk of solving the problem with piecemeal or ‘band-
35 See, for example, Barron, 2009: 13; Foss, 2009: 1; Hlatshwayo, 2009: 5; Kotolo, 2009: 4; Majova,
2009: 8; Matlala, 2009: 4; Motsepe and Masombuka, 2009: 2; Ndlovu, 2009a: 6; Ndlovu, 2009b:
7.
36 See Brown, 2009: 3.
37 Ballard et al, 2006; Benjamin, N., 2004; Benjamin. S., 2004, CAWP, 2004; CAWP and APF, 2006;
Dawson, 2008; Desai, 2002a, 2002b; Gibson, 2006; McKinley, 2003, 2006a; McKinley and
Veriava, 2005; Naidoo and Veriava, 2005; Sinwell, 2009; see also special issue of Development
Update 2004, 5(2).
38 Ballard, 2008; Benit-Gbaffou, 2008; Harrison et al, 2003; Khosa, 2003; Lyons et al, 2001; Mirjam
et al, 2008; Mohone and Edigheji, 2003; Parnell et al, 2002; Pillay et al, 2006; Staniland, 2008;
Zuern, 2002. These lists are not exhaustive. They merely represent a sample of the scholarly
work that has been done on the respective issues of social movements and participation in
development in post-apartheid South Africa. 
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result, stop-gap measures are interpreted as evidence of development. 
However, too narrow a focus on the right to participate ignores the urgency
of the struggles. For the most part, these local actors are people who do not know
where their next meal will come from, or cannot be certain that they will have a
roof over their heads tomorrow. In dwelling on the desire to influence and
participate in local government decision-making, there is an underlying
assumption that community residents will stop taking to the streets if they are
given the chance to be heard, or are informed of government plans – regardless
of whether certain exigencies that are linked to appalling socio-economic
conditions are met as a matter of urgency. 
Thus, exclusive focus on either service delivery or limited participation
obscures key aspects in the debate on the nature of popular protest in democratic
South Africa. The service delivery bias, on one hand, assumes that democratic
channels exist and that people can and must use these avenues (including the right
to peaceful protest) to gain access to basic services. Participation-dominated
debates, on the other hand, suggest that the actions of community residents are
being informed by higher-order needs that exist at a more abstract level than the
basic requirements of life. 
This chapter argues that the myriad post-apartheid popular struggles, which
tend to be lumped together uncomfortably (and perhaps inappropriately) as
‘service delivery protests’ are being waged at different levels. On one level, people
are making demands for material things. People do not only want to talk about
the kind of sanitation that suits their requirements – they urgently need a place to
relieve themselves. At another level, however, people are saying that they do not
want prepaid water meters or the bucket system, and that they cannot be expected
to sign a delivery note for goods and services they did not order. The quest for
more participatory forms of democratic engagement is thus mounted alongside
struggles for basic services. Thus, in trying to understand and explain the roots of
popular protest, the right to basic services is just as crucial as ‘democratic voice’;
i.e., the ability of people to articulate their own needs, directly influence policies
and actively participate in the practices through which these needs can be satisfied
– or, in Saul’s words, ‘genuine empowerment of the entire mass of the population
from the bottom up’.39 
The demand for basic services
For the most part, the people who participate in the kinds of community
resistance struggles that are discussed in this chapter are the same people who
lacked access to municipal services (or were recipients of substandard services)
under apartheid, and who continue to be marginalised under democratic rule.
When probed about the kinds of changes they had witnessed since the end of
39 Saul, 2009: passim.
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macro-level political changes. Without being primed by the interviewers,
responses centred on local concerns: living conditions in immediate
surroundings, which for most community residents had not changed very much
since the end of apartheid. Granted, their responses were probably influenced by
the current social context; at the time of conducting the interviews, popular
protests (mostly around the issue of service delivery) in several townships across
South Africa were making headline news. Perhaps South Africa’s political
transition 15 years ago was a distant memory; or perhaps it was so surreal for
many of the respondents that it did not enter their consciousness as a meaningful
turning point in their lives. 
In July 2009, violent protests in Diepsloot made headline news.40 The
sprawling township, located approximately halfway between Johannesburg and
Pretoria, comprises bond housing, RDP houses and informal settlements.
Residents of Extension 1 were told that some of them would have to move to
make way for the laying of sewerage pipes. Expecting that they would be
relocated to RDP houses, they attended a public meeting on service and housing
upgrades to find out more. The councillor, Jan Mahlangu, allegedly informed
residents that there were no plans for relocation to RDP houses at that time.
Urgently seeking clarity on the situation, residents sought the assistance of other
local leaders, and were told by SANCO leaders that they would have to move to
Brits in North West. Extension 1 descended into chaos. Angry residents went on
the rampage, demanding services and better living conditions. They also
complained about the poor communication between the councillor and local
residents. While the protests were restricted to Extension 1, conditions in
Extension 2 were no better.
Eric Mashamplani, an elderly shack-dweller in Extension 2, claimed very little
had changed for him and his family since they moved from Alexandra to
Diepsloot in 1996:
There are no services here. The only service we have is the one by Pikitup,41 and
they are the ones who try to help us. As you can see [pointing to and counting the
number of toilets next to the shacks] there are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,
eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve. There are only twelve toilets used by all of these
people [pointing to the surrounding shacks].42
Violet, a middle-aged community development worker in Extension 2, whose
shack was located about 500 metres away from Eric’s, commented on the
situation in Extension 1: 
40 Ndaba and Tromp, 2009: 1.
41 Privately managed company responsible for providing refuse-collection services. 
42 Interview, 27 July 2009, translated from Sesotho. Violet, interview, 27 July 2009, another
resident of Diepsloot Extension 2, estimated that three or four families, or about 15 to 20
people, are expected to use one toilet. 
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people. And that side down there [pointing to an area in Extension 1], they only have
pit toilets, which are not safe for one, and it is also unhealthy. When it rains the
toilets sink in, which is not safe.43
Residents from informal settlements elsewhere in Gauteng expressed similar
concerns. Moses Thebula, a 25-year old activist in the Landless People’s
Movement, who has been living in Protea South (Soweto) for five years,
complained:
The place that we live in does not make us happy, we live in shacks and the shacks
that we live in are not in good condition. We have no electricity, no services like
water. We steal water from the old houses because the old houses had water and the
electricity. We steal from those who have it, like those who live in the bond houses.
The conditions that we live under are very bad, especially when you live in a shack. 
We expect [Zuma] to serve people without wasting of time. With that he must stand
for what people want, like houses, electricity, basic services. That is what we expect
from President Zuma.44
Mans van Viek, who has lived in Protea South for about 20 years, also struck a
comparison between the experiences of those in formal housing and those in
informal settlements. While families living in bond houses in Protea South would
not necessarily be classified as rich, this is certainly the perception of those living
in informal settlements. According to Van Viek, 
[t]here is only development for the rich people who are owning those houses ... That
is the kind of development we are seeing, but from the side of the council
themselves, we don’t see any development. Infrastructure is supposed to be done for
all the community of Protea [South], but it’s like the only development is for the
people with houses, those bond houses. Water, sanitation, lights and flushing toilets.
You can walk around there; they have everything there and we have nothing. No
lights here in the informal settlements; there is no development.45
Expressing his frustration with the cost-recovery approach to the provision of
services, Van Viek continued: 
We expect the government to deliver things like water. There is a basic need for
water. You have to wake up in the morning and you must wash clothes. You need
water to drink ... We need to get water free. They can’t come and sell water to us
because it is a natural resource ... The roads are not proper ... and even though my
family visits, it is difficult for them to come to my house. They must leave their cars
by the roadside far away from me ... We don’t have lights ... [and] sometimes you
don’t even have money to buy a candle or paraffin.46
43 Violet, interview, 27 July 2009, translated from Sepedi.
44 Moses, interview, 14 August 2009.
45 Van Viek, interview, 16 August 2009.
46 Ibid.
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in dire need of basic services, and that they expect the government to make these
services available. However, there are certain limitations to explanations that
grant service delivery primacy. The service delivery approach ‘seek[s] to produce
things that address the problems that people face because of their poverty ... such
as piped water, houses or improved sanitation, or non-physical things, such as
knowledge of rights or improved skills’.47 The emphasis on ‘outputs’ tends to be
‘profoundly disempowering for communities’, because even when they are
consulted about their needs, the planning and implementation is carried out by
‘professionals’.48 The miscommunication that occurs between the poor and
professionals is often the result of a lack of understanding of each other’s frames
of reference.49 Evidence of the ‘broken telephone’ between community residents
and local authorities was painfully apparent in comments made by respondents.
Demanding to Hear and be Heard: Consultation and Participation 
at the Local Level
While delivery of services was indeed an important matter for respondents, a
more significant theme that emerged during the research process centred on the
issue of participation. Not only are people demanding services, they are also
fighting for the right to be included in the decisions that affect their daily
existence. These sentiments were clear in the following comments by Mzonke
Poni, a community activist in Khayelitsha who was involved in the Western Cape
Anti-Eviction Campaign and more recently in the shack-dwellers’ movement,
Abahlali BaseMjondolo (Western Cape):
In as much as you [the government] need to deliver services, you cannot do that
without engagement, or direct engagement. You know that’s the term that they like
to use a lot ... If people were engaged and consulted about development, then people
become a vital tool in their own development and such developments will also be
owned at a community level, you know? And there would be some kind of
partnership, as people will be able to take part in their own development. And people
will be able to protect their services that they are given. But because of the
arrogance, and in Khayelitsha for example, there are no services, and the only toilets
that are available are being vandalised. In some places toilets have been brought to
the people but people still destroy them, because of the ways in which they have
been brought to the people.50 
The democratic state has facilitated the creation of several institutionalised
spaces, sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘invited spaces’,51 which are
intended to be used by community residents to enter into discussions with state
representatives on a range of issues that affect them. These spaces (at least,
47 Baumann et al, 2004: 208, emphasis added.
48 Ibid.
49 Valla, 1999.
50 Poni, interview, 10 September 2009.
51 Cornwall, 2004: passim.
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participate in the decision-making process. However, community activists have
not viewed these arenas for participation in a favourable light. For APF activist
John Appolis, imbizos represent an ‘[attempt] to generate that kind of image of
democracy and participation of the people, consultation with the people’.52
Appolis regarded these efforts as an important cornerstone of the façade created
by the government to generate faith in democratic institutions among the people,
thereby maintaining legitimacy and hegemony:
They [the people] maybe believe that there is hope in these processes that the
government is setting up. They think that maybe these institutions of democracy can
assist us in dealing with our problems. Those are important ideological and political
devices to ensure that your rule continues and that there is general support for your
rule, particularly if your rule is based on democracy.53
These sentiments were shared by Thabang Maseko, a community activist in
Mdantsane (East London), who argued that while imbizos may be good in theory,
the practice of these meetings leaves much to be desired:
Imbizo is a right channel. It’s a right and good channel, but the people who are
conducting the imbizos are not doing it properly ... One thing that people are looking
at is the questions of accountability, is a question of informing the public [of] the full
information ... These people are lacking, especially the councillors ... So the imbizo is
correct, but the councillors are not doing it, in terms of addressing the masses and in
terms of giving information to the masses [and] in terms of  ... trying to
accommodate what the society is saying ... These processes [imbizos] normally take
place ... annually. There is an IDP [Integrated Development Plan] that they [present]
to the people and tell them how does it work, and other things. But you find when
you go to these meetings you don’t get the conducive information ... I’m no longer
attending the imbizo because they don’t address what people are looking for, you
see?54 
Similarly, Poni criticised the imbizos as ‘some kind of window-dressing exercise’
He heatedly voiced his dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the imbizos:
I have participated in these imbizos you know? And ... even the comments that we
make in these imbizos are not taken into consideration ... They are doing it for the
media so that they can go back and say that they have consulted with the people and
this was the outcome. But in reality ... you find that the decision-making process
takes place behind closed doors and the decisions that are taken [go] against the will
of the people.55
Much of the disdain for the government’s attempts to invite participation was
directed at local councillors. Brenda Ngwenya, a resident of Protea South who
lives in a household of eight people in which no-one is employed, expressed her
52 Appolis, interview, 30 March 2007.
53 Ibid. For an extensive critique of ‘invited spaces’ in Alexandra, see Sinwell, 2009.
54 Maseko, interview, 17 August 2009.
55 Poni, interview, 10 September 2009.
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good. They are not doing their jobs, and eating the money and lying to people.’56
Moses Thebula, echoing some of Poni’s views, was equally disenchanted with the
councillor:
[H]e does not give the community a chance to participate in ... development. When
he comes he has already made the decisions, like the one that they took for relocating
people to Doornkop.57 Other people come up with the suggestion that they would
rather go somewhere than there, but he does not respect those views. At the time he
would tell us that whether we like it or not we are going to Doornkop.58
Martha, a resident of the village of Sekuruwe in Mokopane (Limpopo), and a
member of the Sekhuruwe Development Forum, had this to say about her
councillor:
He had never wanted to hear out the community of Sekuruwe. I believe a councillor
has to hold community meetings for him to understand the needs of the community,
but he has never done that. I do not know how he gets to know about community
needs, since he does not make consultation with them.59
Another bone of contention regarding councillors, and one that is clearly related
to councillors being unfamiliar with the needs of their constituencies, had to do
with the fact that many councillors, once elected, physically moved out of their
wards. For Alfred Mululeki Mangca, a seasoned activist based in Mdantsane, the
relocation into more developed areas ‘create[d] a gap between the councillors and
the people’. He legitimately asked the legitimate question, ‘How can he [the
councillor] have the vigour to solve the problems of this area while he is not
affected by the same problems?’60 Fellow activist Nkosohlana ‘Nko’ Mkhondlo
agreed: ‘It’s a challenge, and I can vouch that our councillor has never visited this
area ... so it’s a question of being far removed. Now people start developing
perceptions, and that creates problems.’61 
Moreover, many community activists were in agreement that councillors
abused their positions of power. Some experienced this maltreatment in the form
of being sidelined in community meetings, excluded from them altogether, or
being victimised by councillors. For instance, LPM activist Thebula, who likened
his councillor to a ‘dictator’, revealed that:
the councillor is able to identify us because he knows which movements we affiliate
[with]. He is not able to open his organisation [so] that everybody should participate
... so now we [LPM activists] think that it’s useless for us to go to meetings, because
we are not allowed to participate in the development ... The councillor said as social
movements, especially me, that I should not attend his meetings ... He says I’m
56 Ngwenya, interview, 14 August 2009.
57 Area south-west of Johannesburg, close to Krugersdorp on the far West Rand. 
58 Quoted in Poni, interview, 14 August 2009.
59 Martha, interview, 27 September 2009, translated from Pedi.
60 Mangka, interview, 18 August 2009.
61 Mkhondlo, interview, 18 August 2009.
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community ... If you ask the councillor some question, the same people who live in
this community, they turn against you, and they say you are being negative and that
you are against the government, so you create an enemy in the area that you live in.62
Maseko had experienced a similar backlash in a meeting called by the councillor
of his ward:
All councillors are defending themselves in terms of their position. They are there
for themselves, not in terms of serving the community ... You sometimes confront
the councillor who is in charge, and they turn back and say, ‘This person is a
problem.’ They will come to you and say, ‘We have a problem with you.’ They are
doing this because they don’t want people to listen to you in the meeting situation.63
Comparable problems were raised by Freedom Park Concerned Residents
activist, Funi Gogo: 
We are not having a good relationship with the councillor. Our councillors don’t
respect us and they ignore our ideas. They don’t have proper consultation with us,
and when we attend their meetings they are always identifying us as problems to
make the community see us as problematic people, and that is why we don’t have a
good relationship with him.64
Andile M’Afrika, a local activist in Ginsberg in King William’s Town (Eastern
Cape) compared the power wielded by his local councillor to that exercised in a
monarchy. ‘[H]is understanding of power,’ remarked M’Afrika, ‘is that he can do
anything, and the most thing [sic] that he is capable of doing is to abuse.’65
Interestingly, the power relations at the local level played out quite differently in
the rural villages of Mokopane, where traditional authorities played a significant
role in decision-making. Chiefs and their headmen exert a considerable amount
of control over elected ward councillors and their associates.66 According to
Sekgale Maake, an activist in Skimming in Mokopane:
The councillor’s CDWs [community development workers] ward committee
members, even though we have tried to engage them, we are not fully satisfied on
how they respond to our engagement because these people are marginalised. They
are working on the traditional authority’s land. Everything that they are supposed to
do, they must report to the traditional authority or the chief.67
Complicating matters even further was the influence of the Anglo-Platinum
mines that are in operation in Mokopane. Mining undertakings in the area have
fragmented the community and have robbed people of their ploughing fields –
the only source of livelihood for many. Scores of residents are suffering severe
62 Thebula, interview, 14 August 2009.
63 Maseko, interview, 17 August 2009.
64 Gogo, interview, 18 September 2009.
65 M’Afrika, interview, 19 August 2009.
66 The issue of the relationship between traditional authorities and local government councillors is
too complex to be explored here. 
67 Maake, interview, 26 September 2009, translated from Sepedi.
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activities. Communities and their heritage have been destroyed, as a result of
forced relocations and the obliteration of graves brought on by the expansion of
the mines.68 Martha (from Sekhuruwe) admitted that the traditional authorities
had been bought off by the mines and that the community had lost faith in them
because of their ‘imbalanced loyalty to the community’. The disappointment was
clear in Martha’s voice: ‘The mine knows very well that if they win the trust of the
tribal authority, they will have things done their way. That is why even our
councillors had joined hands with mine.’69 Maake’s comments are equally
unsettling: 
The local government is also depending on the money from the mine ... Ninety per
cent of the IDP budget comes from the mine. Now it is a very serious problem we
are encountering. They are claiming to be representing the community, but
practically, they are failing to deliver. There is no dog that can bite its feeder.70
From the discussions, it was clear that the respondents wanted more responsive
councillors who listened to them and who did not disregard their concerns. For
Brenda Ngwenya, being a good councillor meant having a ‘working relationship
with people, and call[ing] meetings and hear[ing] what we as the community want,
and not tell us what to do but listen to what we want’.71 For other activists, like
Freedom Park’s Nthando, the frustrations with local councillors ran unbearably
deep: 
Respondent: ‘I don’t have working relationship with the councillor.’
Interviewer: ‘Why?’
Respondent: ‘That is more sensitive. It involves emotions and bad memories [that] I
will wish not to talk about here.’72
Considering the intolerable conditions under which scores of residents of
informal settlements and impoverished villages are forced to live, coupled with
unapproachable, dismissive and sometimes self-interested councillors, whom
local actors expect to be able to turn to as a first port of call to raise issues about
unsatisfactory living conditions, it is unsurprising that community residents have
taken their struggles to the street. For many demonstrators, involvement in
popular protest – a vehicle for the expression of democratic voice – has met with
heavy-handed responses from the police. The control of dissent is the focus of
the next section, which begins with an assessment of the key theoretical
contributions in this regard. The discussion draws on empirical evidence from the
South African context to challenge and contribute to debates on the policing of
protest. In the final sections, the chapter explores some of the implications of the
68 It is impossible to do justice here to the hardships faced by the mining communities in
Mokopane. The dynamics of the struggles in these communities require further investigation in
order to historicise, contextualise and analyse the key issues. 
69 Martha, interview, 27 September 2009, translated from Sepedi.
70 Maake, interview, 26 September 2009, translated from Sepedi.
71 Ngwenya, interview, 14 August 2009.
72 Nthando (not his real name), interview, 10 October 2009. 
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experienced by local actors in post-apartheid South Africa.
4 TAKING TO THE STREETS: RESISTANCE AND 
REPRESSION 
Much has been written about the relationship between resistance and repression.
Early research on collective action73 – and certainly the approach of certain states
– suggests that increased repression deters mobilisation. In some cases, the fear
of being arrested or beaten is enough to discourage people from engaging in
protest action. Maureen Mnisi, chairperson of the Landless People’s Movement
(LPM), was well aware of the deterrent effect of repression on resistance: ‘Some
people are scared of prison ... When they think of the repression of the police they
just decide to stay at home with their poverty.’74
Other authors propose that heightened repression leads to a concomitant
ratcheting up of protest action.75 For example, Ondetti shows how the massacre
of Movimento Sem Terra activists in Brazil on two separate occasions in the mid-
1990s, which was most certainly aimed at squashing dissent, in fact served to
inflame mobilisation and land occupation. He explains that ‘[t]hese two episodes
outraged domestic and international public opinion, mobilised civil society, and
focused attention and concern on the land issue; they thereby obligated Brazilian
authorities to accelerate the pace of reform and exercise greater caution in
repressing the movement’.76 
In one of the very few pieces of writing on resistance and repression in post-
apartheid South Africa, McKinley and Veriava discuss the brutality that
supporters of some of the social movements have faced at the hands of the police.
In relation to the repressive measures applied to the Orange Farm Water Crisis
Committee (OWCC), they note that:
[r]ather than quieten the OWCC, such attacks spurred the organisation to intensify
and broaden its community activism and strengthen its view that the politics of the
ANC, its local representative and the policies flowing from the state institutions it
controls had become the main ‘enemy’ of the community.77
Commenting on police response to their mobilisation efforts, the OWCC
proclaimed that ‘the actions of the police are only working to strengthen the
resolve of residents to fight on’.78 
73 Hardin, 1982; Oliver, 1980; Olson, 1965.
74 Mnisi, interview, 16 August 2009.
75 Fransisco, 2005; Granovetter, 1978; Gurr, 1970; McAdam, 1982; Oberschall, 1994; Olivier,
1991; Ondetti, 2006; Goldstone and Tilly, 2001.
76 Ondetti, 2006: 62.
77 McKinley and Veriava, 2005: 41–42.
78 Indymedia South Africa, 2006; OWCC, 2006.
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state may have wished, it seems to have encouraged demonstrators to keep up the
struggle. Histories of resistance – in South Africa and elsewhere – are replete with
examples of this trend. The results of a ‘rapid response’ investigation by the
Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Johannesburg into the spate
of service delivery protests that swept across South Africa in the middle of the
year (and which continue to simmer in townships across the country) show that
police brutality provoked violent and destructive behaviour by the
demonstrators.79 In other words, peaceful protests turned violent when the
police used excessive force during incidents that required crowd management. 
Studies in other contexts, however, have shown that the relationship between
resistance and repression is far more complex than a linear correlation, whether
positive or negative. Several scholars have suggested that there is a threshold, or
tipping point, at which the relationship between the two variables is reversed. If
one were to plot this relationship on a graph, an inverted U-shaped curve would
result. Opp and Roehl, whose work endorses the inverted U curve, point out that
the key question regarding this relationship is not about whether repression
increases or decreases resistance. Instead, they suggest that research should take
cognisance of the conditions under which repression either halts or escalates
mobilisation. Importantly for this study, Opp and Roehl asserted that repression
is likely to fuel resistance when it is regarded as ‘illegitimate’, that is, when there
are attempts by the state to shut down legal protest.80
In the South African context, the issues of the legality of protest and illegality
of repression are tied in closely with the Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA).
This piece of legislation stipulates that ‘every person has the right to assemble
with other persons and to express his views on any matter freely in public and to
enjoy the protection of the State while doing so’ insofar as ‘the exercise of such
right ... take[s] place peacefully and with due regard to the rights of others’.81 It
goes on to say that the organiser of the march or protest rally must give notice of
the gathering to an officer of the relevant metropolitan police department at least
seven days prior to the planned event, unless prevented from doing so for a valid
reason, but not less than two days before the event. The officer responsible then
has 24 hours to call a meeting (Section 4 meeting) with the organiser to discuss
the gathering or inform him or her that the gathering has been banned, clearly
outlining the reasons for the banning. The organiser then has the opportunity to
make an appeal to the magistrate’s court for permission to go ahead with the
gathering. Many of the respondents in this study felt that the authorities abused
their powers by manipulating the RGA, or disregarding it completely. According
to Mapotha, a young activist in the Merafong Demarcation Forum in Khutsong
(Gauteng):
79 CSR, 2009.
80 Opp and Roehl, 1990: 527.
81 RSA, 1993.
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knowledge regarding the Gatherings Act, and there would be intimidation to stop
you by involving police within those section 4 meetings, whereby the police play that
role of intimidation. ‘As the organisers, do you know ... if one, two, three happens we
are going to hold you responsible for the whole damages?’ Such things, such tactics,
they always use them to intimidate you, and that’s how those tactics are used to
suppress you from exercising your rights.82
Through her involvement with the Freedom Park Concerned Residents, Lindiwe
Dubaza learned about the stipulations of the RGA:
When we arrive in Pretoria83 the number of people was smaller than the number of
police that were there. They came to us and told us that we must go back; our march
is not allowed. Our leaders had a private discussion with them. While our leaders
were talking to them the people started to sing, going towards the police. It then
created a big argument between our leaders and the police. Our leader kept on
saying, ‘It is our right to protest! The Gatherings Act says if you did not reply to us
within 48 hours we should assume that our march has been approved.’84
Among other things, these remarks serve to strengthen Opp and Roehl’s claim
that resistance will be stepped up if activists consider the repressive activity of the
police to be illegitimate. These authors also argued that illegitimate repression is
likely to cause outrage, and set in motion ‘micromobilisation’ processes among
activists aimed at garnering more support for their movement, which can
potentially ‘neutralise’ repression.85 Emery supports the idea of
micromobilisation processes and, using the Anti-Apartheid Movement as a lens
through which to study the relationship between resistance and repression,
stresses that influencing international opinion is a critical factor in shifting the
balance of power in the favour of the movement:
To increase MM [micromobilisation], movements increasingly framed their goals in
terms of international norms of ‘non-racial democracy’ that had become universal in
the context of growing decolonisation and deracialisation. Successful MM and frame
alignment shifted the balance of (domestic and international) state-versus-movement
legitimacy in favor of the movement.86
Moreover, Opp and Roehl made the assertion that illegitimate repression causes
‘system alienation’, by which they mean that demonstrators are likely to become
sceptical of how the political system operates.87 Mobilisation efforts may then be
expanded beyond the issue or cause that brought a group of protestors together
in the first place. Donatella della Porta – arguably the most renowned author on
the policing of protest in Europe – emphasises the importance of moving beyond
the protest issue, and argues that a shift in focus to the very right to protest goes
82 Mapotha, interview, 13 August 2009.
83 Freedom Park Concerned Residents had organised a march to the Union Buildings in Pretoria
in mid-May 2007. 
84 Dubaza, interview, 18 September 2009.
85 Opp and Roehl, 1990: 541.
86 Emery, 2005: 213.
87 Opp and Roehl, 1990: 527.
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chairperson of the Landless People’s Movement, it is clear that when repressive
behaviour is not exercised within the bounds of the law, in this case the RGA,
community movements begin to question the democratic system:
[Approaching] the Metro police ... does not mean you are asking for permission. We
got our permission when we voted in 1994, when voting for the black government,
but when you go there they will turn down your application and tell you that you
don’t have permission and you would not know the reason it was turned down ... At
that time you would be very frustrated and at the end you will end up marching and
the police will come with guns and shoot at you and come with pepper spray and
they will tell you your march is not legal, so we fail to understand what has changed
in the apartheid and democratic government, if we still need to get permission to
march. The law says we should march and demonstrate [for] our demands as long as
the march will be peaceful. The only thing that makes us to apply with the Metro
police is because of the roads that we will be using.89 
Some authors have addressed regime type as an important variable in the
relationship between resistance and repression.90 Challenging previous research
that indicates a negative correlation between democracy and repression, Regan
and Henderson argue that an inverted U relationship exists between democracy
and repression. They also claim that the perceived or actual level of threat is a
stronger indicator of the likelihood of repression than regime type. Where the
demands of the opposing group do not fit in with the broader ideological-political
framework within which the ruling party exists, it becomes more difficult to
negotiate and reach a compromise; and it is more likely that the ruling party will
not give into the demands, which could then result in resistance, which is
sometimes dealt with in a repressive fashion.91 The post-apartheid state,
regardless of its formal democratic content, ‘is primarily the guardian and
protector of [the] dominant economic interests [of the political elite] and the
guarantor of capitalist property relations’,92 and it will do whatever it takes to
secure these interests.
Like Brazil’s MST, South Africa’s Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) is no
stranger to state repression. Resistance to the ANC government’s policy on land
redistribution has been harshly dealt with by the state. On 21 August 2002,
around the time of the World Summit for Sustainable Development, a group of
about 3,000 supporters of the LPM marched to the office of then-Gauteng
premier, Mbazhima Shilowa, to present him with a memorandum calling for an
end to forced evictions and to ‘end the brutal campaign of terror being waged by
... the police against poor and landless people in the province’.93 In a display of
their support for the government’s commitment to ‘a zero-tolerance approach to
88 Donatella della Porta, 1999.
89 Mnisi, interview, 16 August 2009.
90 Davenport, 1995, 1999; Poe and Tate, 1994; Regan and Henderson, 2002.
91 Regan and Henderson, 2002: 122.
92 Vally, 2002: 23.
93 LPM statement cited by Environment News Service, 2002.
124    Chapter 5protest activity appearing to be related to the WSSD’,94 police arrested 72 LPM
supporters and leaders.95 Similarly, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign,
which claims to have a distinctly anti-capitalist stance96 has been subjected to
extremely harsh measures of repression. The movement’s chairperson, Ashraf
Cassiem, had his teeth kicked in by the police.97 Martin Legassick, an elderly
activist-intellectual and ardent supporter of the Western Cape AEC, was arrested
by the police for taking photographs of the brutal actions of the police during a
land occupation at Macassar Village (near Cape Town). ‘I wasn’t charged,’ said
Legassick, ‘maybe because I’m old ... but I had bruises for a couple of weeks’.98
Several other LPM and AEC activists shared their stories of police brutality. 
On the issue of regime type, Regan and Henderson (2002) concur with Fein
(1995) that countries with intermediate levels of democracy often exhibit the
highest levels of repression. By and large, fully-fledged, well-established
democracies boast effective channels above and beyond the electoral system,
which act as safety valves to relieve frustration and as mechanisms through which
citizens can make their voices heard.99 Under such conditions, the policing styles
would probably follow a pattern of ‘negotiated management’.100 In autocracies,
these channels do not exist; and any attempt to challenge the state is dealt with
disproportionately. Under these circumstances, the threat of repression deters
resistance.101 
In semi-democracies, however, ‘the institutional infrastructure is usually not
sufficiently developed to efficiently channel the demands of the opposition into
the political arena’.102 Moreover, demands on the state are perceived as a threat
to its ‘fragile legitimacy’ and, in the absence of channels with which to deal
effectively with the demands, it is likely that the state will respond harshly to avoid
‘political usurpation’.103 Under this type of regime it could be argued that the
policing of dissent conforms to a model of ‘escalated force’, meaning that police
adopt a zero-tolerance approach to disruption and that they display little or no
regard for the rights of the protestors. Under such circumstances, the channels of
communication between the police and protestors are unclear; seemingly
innocuous actions have the potential to trigger public disorder and violence; and
mass arrests and the use of excessive force are not uncommon.104
Does the South African state fit this mould? Almost a decade after the first
democratic elections, Southall commented that:
94 Mail & Guardian, 27 August 2002.
95  Parker, 2002; Environment News Service, 2002.
96 Legassick, interview, 15 September 2009.
97 Cassiem, interview, 12 September 2009.
98 Legassick, interview, 15 September 2009.
99 Regan and Henderson, 2002: 123; see also Carey, 2006: 4.
100 McCarthy and McPhail, 1998; McPhail et al, 1998; Schweingruber,  2000.
101 Regan and Henderson, 2002: 123; Carey, 2006: 4.
102 Regan and Henderson, 2002: 124; see also Carey, 2006: 9.
103 Regan and Henderson, 2002: 124.
104 Schweingruber, 2000; Waddington et al, 1989.
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democracy. This implies that the formal requirements of democracy are met, yet
under conditions of decreasing competition and declining popular participation.
ANC domination of the political arena is being extended increasingly, challenges to
its rule being steadily overwhelmed, and its own internal democracy eroded.105
Activist-intellectual Dale McKinley has also used the adjectives ‘low-intensity’
and ‘truncated’ to describe the nature of democracy in post-apartheid South
Africa.106 Beall et al argue that since the dawn of democracy in South Africa a
certain measure of stability had been achieved. However, this claim is qualified in
their assertion that South Africa is characterised by a ‘fragile stability’, meaning
that ‘society is stable in that the non-racial regime is fully accepted as legitimate,
but the immense social problems which were apartheid’s legacy remain a threat
to social order’.107 The source of fragility is located in persistent problems in the
areas of HIV/AIDS, poverty and inequality, land reform, unemployment, and
indeed service delivery, which are indicative of a weak connection between state
and society. 
Stability, on the other hand, is brought about by the fact that ‘the social forces
and political organisations needed to move the society to a different position –
either crisis or thoroughgoing consolidation – have not yet emerged’.108 I argue
in this chapter that the mobilisation efforts of grassroots organisations to expand
rights and freedoms to marginalised communities constitutes a particular social
force, one with the potential to fundamentally alter state-civil society relationships
in post-apartheid South Africa, and to deepen and strengthen the quality of the
country’s democracy.
In addition to the societal problems mentioned above, crime is regarded by
many as one of the key areas for concern in South Africa. The Zuma
administration has made crime control one of its priorities and, as discussed
earlier, it has addressed the issue by legitimising the use of increased violence by
the police. Moreover, police restructuring has resulted in a situation in which the
‘do whatever it takes approach’ to crime control has spilled over into the arena of
crowd management. A central argument in this chapter, then, is that the clamping
down on community resistance and political protest cannot be examined in a
vacuum. Connections must be drawn between the control of ‘ordinary’ crime and
the repression of dissent. In so doing, research would begin to address the
literature gap that exists currently in social movement studies. 
Oliver (2008) points out that as a consequence of the study of collective
behaviour and social movements becoming a sub-field within the discipline of
sociology, the study of dissent has been distinguished from scholarly inquiry into
crime. As a result, social movement scholars miss the links between repression
and crime control, and fail to show how the crackdown on criminal activity serves
105 Southall, 2003: 74–75, emphasis added.
106 McKinley, 2001: 185, McKinley, 2006b.
107 Beall et al, 2005: 681.
108 Ibid: 681.
126    Chapter 5to repress political resistance. Nowhere is the relationship between these two
phenomena more clear than in Kuilsrivier (Western Cape), where a Rasta
community is fighting for their right to practice their religion. Drawing on
literature and original field material, the next section examines specific forms and
experiences of repression, linking these issues back to the weakness of democracy
in South Africa.
Much of the work on the policing of protest in the global North deals with
the concept of repression.109 Some of the research focuses on hard-line models
of policing, which involve arrests, beatings, torture, shooting and so on, which are
characteristic of the escalated force model mentioned earlier. 
Several of the community activists interviewed in this study had experienced
this kind style of policing. During a discussion with LPM activist Brenda
Ngwenya about a road blockade organised by the LPM, it emerged that ‘the police
came shooting with rubber bullets, and other people got shot and some ran, but
some others stood there, whether the police would shoot or not they are not
going anywhere, and so they stood there, because when the community has
decided to do something they do it. The police kept on shooting and there was
huge fight between the police and the community.’110 Commenting on her
experience of resistance and repression, Maureen Mnisi, chairperson of the LPM,
claimed:
We are exposing that we are living in bad conditions [but] the police are on the
government’s side. They are not on the poor people’s side, so at the end you end up
facing rubber bullets and being tortured by police. They take you and arrest you and
when you get there they torture you and do all the hurting things and that makes
people, when they are released, they come back having lost all hope in the struggle.
It’s just a punishment the state is giving poor people because the state does not
protect the poor but only the rich.111
Similar stories were relayed by AEC activists. Comparing the apartheid period to
contemporary experiences of police action against political dissent, Professor
Martin Legassick claimed that there has been very little change:
They’re about the same in terms of police action. For example, I was there when the
Joe Slovo112 people occupied the N2 [highway]. The police were around the N2,
telling people to get off the N2. People eventually got off [and] then for no apparent
reason police just opened fire with rubber bullets, and a lot people were wounded
there. When people who occupied the N2 gateway houses in Delft were evicted,
police all of a sudden opened fire. For example, there was a three-year-old child who
was hit with three rubber bullets, so the police are very indiscriminate with their
actions.113
109 See for example Della Porta, 1999; Earl, 2003; Earl et al, 2003.
110 Ngwenya, interview, 14 August 2009.
111 Mnisi, interview, 16 August 2009.
112 Informal settlement in Langa Township in Cape Town.
113 Legassick, interview, 15 September 2009.
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handedness of the police. According to members of the community, their
demands to have their own church or piece of land on which they can build a
church and practise their religion have been brutally dealt with by the police.
Residents argue that the police use the seizure of marijuana as a pretext for meting
out rough treatment.114 Sarah Fabie, a feisty and well-known activist in the area,
recounted a very disturbing story of police brutality in the name of crime
prevention. For Sarah and her fellow Rastas, their way of life is not harmful, and
their struggles were waged around the right to practise their religion:
They will come where we are staying, they will watch what we do and even when we
as Rastas come together to give our Saturday prayers, they will come there, they will
bulldoze everything. They will come and break everything and destroy the wires [of
the music system]. Two weeks ago they searched my daughter. They were searching
for my husband, but my husband was not around ... By the time I returned to the
house, I found my daughter only in her bra and her panties because they were
searching her. They were looking for ganja in her panties and she doesn’t even smoke.
She’s pregnant and they were scratching in her vagina looking for ganja.115 
Similar harrowing tales were heard across the country where the research was
conducted. Faced with these realities, we cannot ignore hard-line forms of social
control, even though they are sometimes viewed as remnants from a bygone era,
especially in democracies. In a study on social control and the anti-globalisation
movement, Fernandez argues that hard- and soft-line forms of social control co-
exist.116 For him, the latter includes ‘more indirect forms of oppression, such as
the control of dissent through legal regulation, negotiation of protest, and self-
monitoring’.117 Earlier it was shown how the manipulation of legislation – in the
form of the RGA – is perceived by activists as a means of oppression. It was also
pointed out that the fear of being imprisoned or hurt by the police, which stems
from the increased militarisation of the police, is sufficient to keep people from
taking to the streets. 
In an account of the day-to-day work of street-level police in South Africa,
Altbeker (2005) explains that the police are criticised from all corners, either for
being too aggressive or not being tough enough. He points out the work of the
police is not exclusively about combating crime or apprehending criminals; much
of what they do entails resolving instances of social disturbance, and crime
prevention is just one aspect of this job. He suggests that doing a society’s ‘dirty
work’, particularly in a country like South Africa, sometimes requires an
aggressive and confrontational approach, as part of which the threat or use of
coercive force is necessary. His research with police officers reveals a very human
side to the officers who risk their lives on a daily basis to ensure greater levels of
safety in the country. However, as this research has shown, this is a side that is
rarely (if ever) revealed to demonstrators, whose efforts arguably also aim at
114 Focus group, 10 September 2009.
115 Fabie, interview, 10 September 2009.
116 Fernandez, 2008: 15–16.
117 Ibid: 9.
128    Chapter 5bringing about a better quality of life. A key recommendation from this research
is that greater efforts must be made to speak to police officers who are called in
to restore public order, and to understand the policing of protest from their point
of view.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: ‘THIS IS NOT 
DEMOCRACY! THIS IS DEMOCRAZY!’118
The topic of repression of resistance has been used in this study as a looking-glass
to reflect and understand the meaning and content of democracy in post-
apartheid South Africa. For most of the community activists interviewed,
democracy is experienced as very shallow, or non-existent. Attempts at
democratic restructuring within the police and local government have not been
successful at a practical level, because these changes have occurred within the
confines of liberal democracy. This study has shown that what communities really
want is more participatory forms of democracy, in which they can play a
meaningful role in the decisions that affect their lives.
Talking about the repression of protest in narrow terms that only focus on
the modes of repression (or the consequences thereof for mobilisation) does very
little to insert this issue into public opinion. However, linking the issue to crime
control, and to democracy more generally, broadens the scope for debate and
analysis. While formal democracy exists in South Africa, it is the everyday
experience of democracy that really matters to people. This study is replete with
examples of low levels of participation at local level as a result of ineffective
government initiatives, and dismissive councillors who distance themselves from
communities. Many activists felt that there was no space for their voices to be
heard, and that the use of other channels – protest, in this case – would be
squashed by heavy-handed police. These are signs of ‘truncated’, ‘low-intensity’
democracy. 
Moreover, by focusing on crime reduction as one of its priorities, the Zuma-
led government has deflected attention away from other factors that gnaw at an
already fragile democracy, such as unemployment and stark socio-economic
inequality. Amendments to the Criminal Procedures Act have placed an
enormous burden on the police. As the title of Antony Altbeker’s book suggests,
the police have been tasked with doing ‘the dirty work of democracy’ (2005).
When firing indiscriminately at crowds or at the backs of those fleeing the scene,
the police are ‘just doing their jobs’. 
Finally, while reporting on a service delivery protest here and a strike there is
an important task for any scholar working on the issue of social unrest and
resistance, the reach of such contributions is limited, in that it does very little to
118 Themba Mooko, a soldier who was interviewed (7 September 2009) shortly after violent clashes
between soldiers and the police in August 2009.
  Resistance and repression: policing protest in post-apartheid South Africa    129draw the attention of a critical mass or shift international opinion. What this study
has tried to do is to highlight the links between resistance efforts, and relate these
struggles more broadly to the failure of real, lived democracy in South Africa. This
is not necessarily anything new, but by saying it again, and again, each time with
new and more convincing evidence, we might tip the scales in favour of those
community organisations fighting for social justice. 
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6CHAPTER MIGRANT MOBILISATION:STRUCTURE AND STRATEGIESFOR CLAIMING RIGHTS INSOUTH AFRICA AND KENYA
Zaheera Jinnah with Rio Holaday1
1 INTRODUCTION
The ability of migrants to successfully move, work, and seek protection depends
on their ability to access rights, and the strategies they adopt. This study
documents and explains migrants’ individual and collective efforts in mobilising
for their rights, and the attempts of organisations to do so on their behalf, in three
cities in South Africa, and in Nairobi, Kenya. 
This chapter is comprised of six sections. After a short introduction, section
two describes the methodology and scope of this study, and section three reviews
the literature on migrant mobilisation. Access to resources, social networks and
political opportunities all play a key role in migrant mobilisation. In South Africa,
there appear to be benefits in not mobilising, which include avoiding deportation
and not having to assume the reciprocal responsibilities that come with rights.
Although South Africa has an active civil society sector, migrant issues do not
occupy a visible part of the national agenda, with the exception of a number of
litigation cases on behalf of refugees. Furthermore, there is a key gap in advocacy-
oriented organisations at national level. The fourth section presents the findings
regarding individual mobilisation among migrants in South Africa. Migrants
generally do not mobilise for rights, citing lack of documentation, discrimination,
and language barriers as key obstacles to claiming rights. Migrants also have
minimal interaction with state institutions, NGOs and migrant-led organisations. 
The fifth section discusses collective mobilisation in South Africa. Most
organisations may be placed into one of four broad categories: international
agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs); national South African-
led NGOs; smaller, migrant-led NGOs; and community-based organisations
1 Fieldwork was undertaken by Teresa Le, Rio Holaday and Zaheera Jinnah in South Africa, and
Leonida Odongo in Nairobi. Aurelia Kazadi Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Tara Polzer are thanked for
their comments and contributions to this study. Finally, thanks to the individuals and
organisations who participated in this study.137
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target groups and mandates. Almost none of these organisations have a clear
mobilisation strategy or target, citing limited funding for migrant-related work,
language problems, lack of resources, and insufficient platforms for mobilising as
key reasons for not mobilising. Collaboration in the migrant sector is limited; a
lack of trust between stakeholders and the unclear role of the state and
international agencies have created a fragile and fragmented sector. 
The sixth section presents selected findings of individual and collective
mobilisations in Nairobi. Similarly to the migrants in the South African study,
most migrants in Nairobi have minimal trust in and reliance on institutions and
organisations. Collectively, most organisations have a different understanding of
mobilisation from each other, and have limited resources to mobilise. Most of the
organisations’ work is limited to refugee camps, hindering the integration of
migrants’ rights within a broader discourse on development and human rights. 
2 METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE
This study, by the Forced Migration Studies Programme, looks at the structures
and strategies for claiming migrant rights in Southern Africa. It is a regional study,
focusing on three South African cities (Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town)
and Nairobi, all urban centres with significant non-national populations. The
study attempts to document and explain migrants’ individual and collective
mobilisation for rights, and the attempts of other groups to mobilise on their
behalf. 
This study covers the following main research questions:
Migrant mobilisation:
• How do migrants mobilise?
• What are the aims of and strategies adopted by migrants in mobilising?
• How do migrants access rights and services?
• What informal ways of accessing rights can be identified?
• What is the relationship between migrants and organisations working on their
behalf ?
• Why are migrants not mobilising?
The role of civil society:
• What role do organisations play in enabling migrants to access rights and
services?
• What types of organisations are working with which groups of non-nationals in
each city, and to what end? 
• What is the capacity of these organisations?
• What services are they providing?
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• Why are migrant organisations not visible and active?
• How do the organisations working on migrants’ behalf understand mobilisation
and migrants’ rights?
• What are the gaps in the sector?
• What is the level of collaboration between organisations?
This study is based on interviews with organisations, run by migrants and those
working on their behalf, in Durban, Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Nairobi,
conducted between July and October 2009; individual, open-ended interviews
with a small group of migrants in Johannesburg; and an analysis of two existing
Forced Migration Studies Programme data sets, which are the African Cities
Dataset (ACD) and the Vulnerability Study (VS). The bias toward the South
African context is recognised.
3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
This section reviews the relevant literature on migrant mobilisation. It comprises
three parts: first, a review of migrant mobilisation theory and action in South
Africa, Kenya and elsewhere, which examines the nature, form and target of
migrant mobilisation; thereafter an analysis of the nature of the civil society sector
in South Africa and Nairobi, including gaps and challenges; and lastly, an
institutional analysis which identifies who allocates rights in the South African
context, and how the main state and non-state actors relate to each other.
The nature and target of migrant mobilisation: theory and 
experiences from South Africa, Kenya and elsewhere 
Social movement theory identifies four key factors in individual and collective
action: resource availability, political opportunities, collective identity and social
inequalities (Chazan, 2006: 9). Looking specifically at migrant mobilisation,
Odmalm (2004) identifies four similar factors that affect migrant mobilisation:
resources, national and institutional opportunities, modes of incorporation by
institutions, and migrants’ socio-economic class. These analyses provide a
convenient starting point for a discussion on mobilisation literature, as they
demonstrate that similar and overlapping factors play a role in different types of
mobilisation. Much of the reviewed literature focuses on four similar themes:
resources, political opportunity, social and ethnic networks, and social, economic
and political inequalities as targets of mobilisation. The following section will
address these four areas, along with the benefits of inaction. 
Resources
Resources play a key role in individual and collective action. As Tilly (1978) notes,
migrant mobilisation – which is defined as collective action to promote or protect
142    Chapter 6a group’s interests – is dependent on resources and relationships. The group’s
effectiveness is impacted by its ability to acquire, manipulate and use resources;
the relationships it creates with those around it; and the context within which it
functions (Tilly, 1978). Resources include people, money and legitimacy
(McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996).
Resource mobilisation theory emphasises the relationship between the
amount and type of resources available, and the success of collective action (Cress
and Snow, 1996 and Jenkins, 1983). Resource mobilisation is a key influence on
the emergence, growth, impact and form of movements (McCarthy and Wolfson,
1996: 1071). In particular, agency, strategy and organisation affect the success of
mobilisation. Agency is defined as the volume of effort; strategy as the choice of
action or inaction within the three key spheres of public education, direct services
and structural change; and organisation as the form of leadership and work
undertaken (McCarthy and Wolfson, 1996).
Political opportunity
Migrant mobilisation may also be affected by the political context within which it
occurs. Koopman (2004) demonstrates that migrants are more likely to claim
rights from their host countries in environments with high rates of naturalisation
and integration; conversely, migrants remain involved with homeland politics
when there are fewer opportunities for naturalisation and integration.
Additionally, a political opportunity approach to collective action asserts that
political mobilisation can occur in three areas: participation in public debates on
issues of migration; involvement in politics of home countries; and claims for
rights in host countries (Koopman, 2004).
Favourable political environments are those in which migrants are
considered a powerful stakeholder. In Southern Europe, for example, the reliance
of the national economy on migrant labour has favoured migrants in their
demands, as industries have placed their weight behind migrants’ calls (Poros,
2008: 16-20).
Social networks
Social networks are central to migrant mobilisation. Massey et al. (1998) define
migrant networks as “sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former
migrants and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of kinship,
friendship and shared community of origin” (42). These ties serve as a rallying
point for migrants to organise and claim rights. Networks are also useful because
they often rely on non-formal sources for functioning (McCarthy and Wolfson,
1996: 9), meaning that they are often more flexible than traditional channels of
organisation. 
Studies have shown that migrants organise informally along kinship and
ethnic lines, and that such networks and contacts are useful sources of
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organisations in South Africa looked at Congolese associations (Amisi, 2006).
This study found that Congolese organisations have formed along ethnic and
tribal lines which replicate the political and ethnic ideologies back home, and are
largely concerned with political affairs at home rather than with issues of rights
and integration in South Africa. As with Congolese associations in Durban,
migrants in Europe have organised along ethnic lines. 
Although ethnicity is used initially in forming associations, the future of such
collaborations is uncertain. On one hand, collective action and political
mobilisation tend to have broader notions of inclusion. In Spain, for example,
Moroccan workers formed an Immigrant Workers Union that included both
interpersonal and ethnic ties. On the other hand, a shared ethnicity does not
necessarily make for shared goals. Though British Asians have mobilised for
migrant rights largely along ethnic lines, Statham (1996) found that the lack of a
common political interest and opportunity among different migrant groups could
have a negative impact on long-term mobilising. More information is needed on
how this may be done, and to what extent it is successful. 
In some cases, migrant communities are too fractured to organise along
ethnic lines. Hopkins (2006) found that despite there being a large Somali
community in London, collective mobilisation has been limited, primarily
because of tension between different clans. Although there are numerous Somali
organisations in the city, some Somalis distrust and avoid them because these
organisations prioritise clan and political interests over service delivery and care
(Hopkins, 2006).
Targets of migrant mobilisation
Studies have shown that mobilisation tends to focus on inequalities in the host
country. Socio-economic self-sufficiency and political protection are primary
targets of migrant mobilisation. In a study on Somali organisation and livelihoods
in Nairobi, Campbell (2006) found that Somali migrants organised specifically to
protect their economic interests and to ensure that their livelihoods were secure,
using social networks as a strategy for support. In her work on the experiences of
urban refugees, Jacobsen (2006) emphasises the action that urban refugees and
economic migrants take in order to create spaces for work. She (2006) also argues
that the state needs to foster the self-integration of migrants by facilitating access
to documentation and protection. Finally, a study on Somali organisation in
London and Toronto suggests that migrants organise as a defence mechanism
against the state (Hopkins, 2006). This finding challenges the perception that
Somalis only go to Somali organisations for help, raises the issue of political
dynamics and divisions within migrant organisations, and questions how these
fissures lead to mistrust and a weakening of the collective voice (Hopkins, 2006:
370).
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Finally, there are benefits to a lack of mobilisation. First, self-exclusion from the
political arena can benefit migrants who wish to fly under the radar of
immigration officials. If migrants do not visibly organise, they avoid skirmishes
with state agents over documentation and deportation (Amisi, 2006; also see
Landau and Haupt, 2007: 12, and Landau and Monson, 2008: 315). Second, with
rights come responsibilities. By not claiming rights, migrants avoid being
obligated to their host countries. Both Amisi and Ballard (2005) and Landau and
Haupt (2007) suggest that in South Africa, migrant organisation tends to be
strategic and purposeful rather than committed to obligations and responsibility.
Dynamics of civil society in South Africa
The 2006 Hopkins report indicates that the post-apartheid civil society sector in
South Africa is both large and active. The report shows that there are some 58
000 organisations in the country, of which 32 000 or 55% are informal and
voluntary CBOs. Formal NGOs account for just 17% of the sector. The study
did not specify migrant organisations. Despite its active presence and
participation, however, the civil society sector is fragmented. Uncertainty over the
exact role of civil society vis-à-vis a democratic government, competition for
funding (given that many foreign donors have either pulled out of South Africa
or opted for bilateral agreements with the government), and a shortage of skills
and resources have all contributed to the fractured state of civil society. The
migrant-focused organisations operate under similar constraints (Amisi and
Ballard, 2005: 2).
In South Africa, social movements have mobilised to claim rights with
varying degrees of success, through targeted lobbying, protests and litigation
(Amisi and Ballard, 2005: 2). The Treatment Action Campaign has perhaps been
the most successful in this regard, in claiming the right to health care for people
who are HIV-positive (see Greenstein, 2003). It is difficult to understand why this
has not happened in the migrant sector. Three propositions are put forward:
firstly the lack of a single unifying body under which the diverse migrant groups
can organise; secondly, the lack of awareness of rights, and changes in policy
which have made claims difficult; and thirdly, the reciprocal responsibilities which
these rights can give rise to have been embraced by all.
Over the past decade, there have been a number of strategic litigation cases
with and on behalf of refugees in South Africa, by national NGOs such as
Lawyers for Human Rights, the Wits Law Project and others. These cases have
focused on issues of arrest, detention and deportation, refugee status
determination and socio-economic rights.
Apart from litigation, mobilisation for migrants’ rights has remained largely
absent from the national agenda. Palmary (2006) identifies two main gaps in the
migrant sector: a lack of a focus on advocacy, and migrants’ access to socio-
146    Chapter 6economic issues. Furthermore, there are a relatively small number of
organisations working for, with or on behalf of migrants. Amisi and Ballard
(2005: 25) identify different types of NGOs that work with migrants in South
Africa, including: service providers; refugee forums, networks and co-ordinating
bodies; and small civil society organisations and political parties that are self-run
and formed on ethnic lines.
One exception to the lack of representation of migrant groups in the civil
society sector is the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
(CoRMSA), a consortium of migrants’ organisations tasked with promoting and
defending the rights of migrants in South Africa. There are currently 18 members,
including FBOs, legal firms, research units and NGOs.2 Two of the members
(Tutumike and Durban Refugee Service Providers) are, in turn, networks of
refugee service providers in Cape Town and Durban, and have 11 and four
members respectively.
Institutional analysis: who allocates rights in the South African 
context
Only 10 to 15% of the one million non-nationals in South Africa seek protection
from the state because of violence, oppression or persecution (Palmary, 2006: 10).
In a country that has seen violent instances of xenophobic attacks, the absence of
state protection is significant. How do the majority of migrants protect and
defend themselves? Similar arguments can be made for nationals, but issues of
documentation and discrimination further impede access to formal protection for
non-nationals.
Civil society organisations do not appear to be the answer. The African Cities
Survey by FMSP shows that NGOs play a small role in migrants’ lives in
Johannesburg and Nairobi. Most migrants do not go to the police in the event of
a crime, and many feel that there is no recourse. FBOs seem to be providing
immediate services and care to migrants – this occurred particularly in the
aftermath of the May 2008 attacks – but their role, resources and mandate are not
clear.
There is a notion that citizenship enables an individual to make claims from the
state. However, this reasoning is somewhat idealistic, as the state has failed in
basic service delivery, such as the provision of housing, water and health care, to
both South African citizens and migrants. The situation is similar in Kenya. In a
context in which the state has not protected migrants within its borders, what
does citizenship mean, and is it desirable for migrants? Although documentation
is important in order to access services, and the power of the Departments of
Home Affairs (DHA) and Refugee Affairs – who are responsible for issuing such
documents in South Africa and Kenya respectively – remains strong, studies in
2 CoRMSA: www.cormsa.org.za
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conditions for migrants or refugees (Jacobsen, 2006). 
Despite the lack of service delivery, the state remains an important player in
migrant affairs. At a national level, immigration policy determines the type of
documentation a migrant can obtain, and the level of services he or she may
receive from the state. Consistent and clear migration policy is needed at national
level, to manage migration better and to ensure that migrants’ rights as outlined
in the Constitution and international treaties are protected. 
However, it is at a local level that migrants, the state and other actors interact
within and outside policy to obtain such documentation and claim other social
and economic rights. In South Africa, local-level relations between the state, civil
society and migrants are key in any discourse on migrant rights. Although the
national DHA regulates migration, local municipalities exercise power over the
everyday lives of migrants. The strategies adopted by migrants in negotiating with
these gatekeepers of power are important in understanding how rights are
claimed. The local power dynamics, levels of knowledge about rights and degree
of protection that migrants feel in local communities affect their ability to claim
rights from local-level institutions and structures. Evidence from Tanzania shows
that Burundian refugees drew on their common ethnic identity to identify and
integrate with their Tanzanian hosts (Malkki, 1995). Mozambiquans who settled
in Shona-speaking regions of South Africa similarly used their common ethnic
and language identity to settle, integrate and eventually claim some sort of
protection (Polzer, 2008). Drawing on kinship, ethnic or religious ties can thus be
a means to negotiate access to spaces where rights can be claimed. 
Local power dynamics influence how migrants access services (Polzer, 2008).
In her paper promoting local integration of refugees, Polzer argues that refugees
claim rights through a multitude of identities including ethnic, kinship and
political ties, and that those claims are rooted in a local context of power. It is at
a local level that this is most profound and contested. Some assert that local-level
identities are more easily adopted by migrants than national identities (Koopman,
2004). Polzer (2008: 9–12) identifies key local actors as those who have an active
presence in the area, and who can influence the local conditions in which refugees
live (2008: 10), which includes the state and international organisations. 
The relationship between state and migrant organisations rests on the
presence of an active civil society sector to raise and promote the rights of
excluded groups. This is particularly relevant in the context of xenophobic and
ethnic violence, which has plagued South Africa and Kenya recently. However,
the level of autonomy, authority and legitimacy that civil society has and claims
affects its ability to perform these tasks. 
Another key player in the civil society sector is the donor. Access to adequate
funding and negotiating the conditions that this imposes is critical in shaping the
effect of civil society. In Sweden, the Chilean Victor Jara Association and (to a
lesser extent) the Iranian-Swedish Association are migrant-led, but the direct
148    Chapter 6funding provided by the state allows the government to influence the agendas of
these associations. The role of donors and the relationships between donors and
civil society need more attention.
Preliminary conclusion
Migrant mobilisation is referred to as collective action to protect and promote a
group’s interest. Globally, migrants have mobilised along ethnic and national
lines, using social networks as a means to reach and organise more people. In
South Africa, migrants have not mobilised significantly to claim rights. The
different levels and branches of state and donors shape the context within which
migrants move.
4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS: INTERVIEWS WITH 
MIGRANTS IN JOHANNESBURG
This section is based on five group interviews with 20 migrants in Johannesburg
(the interview guide appears in Appendix A), an analysis of the African Cities
Survey data set (which surveyed 867 migrants and locals in Johannesburg, in
2006) and an analysis of the Vulnerability Study. It is important to note that all
interviews were held at a specific institution, referred to in the study as the
“Centre”, which biased the findings to an extent as there were more opportunities
for interaction with service providers, given the high levels of activity at the
Centre. Nevertheless, the perceptions of mobilising and reflections on the
relationships with organisations provide interesting material.
Target of mobilisation
Interviews show that migrants define mobilisation in two ways. On the one hand,
mobilisation can be seen as unifying migrants and providing channels of support
for each other, in which case it is viewed favourably. One respondent described
the benefits of mobilisation as follows: 
if they [migrants who have mobilised] get problems, they quickly help each other or
they quickly not fight each other ... because you have an organisation. [If] I get in
trouble, I know that I can quickly phone to somebody so that that group can come
and help me.3
On the other hand, mobilisation can also be seen as an aggressive or political act,
in which case it is viewed unfavourably. As one respondent explained, migrants
are seeking peace, not conflict, in South Africa: ‘The idea of coming to South
Africa is not for war, but for refugee’ [sic].4
3 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
4 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 28 September 2009.
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them in South Africa, while aggressive mobilisation may make a precarious
situation even more so.
Despite favourable attitudes towards mobilisation, migrants have not
initiated or engaged in acts of mobilisation. According to interviews, there are
three main challenges to migrant mobilisation. The first challenge is time;
migrants are forced to prioritise employment over mobilisation. As one
respondent noted:
People don’t spend their time searching for help, they spend their time searching for
jobs, searching for money instead. So there could be some help outside there, but
unfortunately, people, they don’t have that time to look for that help.5
Another challenge is that undocumented migrants face the risk of deportation.
One respondent explained that the fear of deportation leads some to accept,
rather than protest, rights infringements: ‘So because of that fear, we tend to just
keep quiet and say like, okay, I can just let this pass.’6This finding supports Amisi
and Ballard’s argument that refugees tend not to mobilise, for fear of deportation. 
The third challenge to mobilisation is that many migrants believe that ‘The
only way to solve problems is to go home.’7
Considering that very few migrants have mobilised, this defeatist attitude
does not seem to stem from negative experiences with mobilisation as a problem-
solving tool. Instead, it seems to be an ingrained attitude that is in direct contrast
to – and a direct challenge to – the positive view most respondents have of
mobilisation. This might be seen as a ‘discourse of self-exclusion’ professed by
urban migrants (Landau and Monson, 2008). 
When asked what they would mobilise around, hypothetically, respondents
listed issues such as police harassment and lack of knowledge of the laws or their
rights, suggesting that access to protection and basic services are the key issues
facing migrants in South Africa today.
Means to achieve objectives
Migrants interviewed tend to access rights through organisations that either have
an established presence at or make regular visits to the Centre where they stay.
For example, respondents have access to free shelter, primary education provided
by the local school, and health care provided by a mobile clinic run by an
international NGO. Furthermore, respondents noted that there are organisations
that come to the Centre and distribute items such as blankets, food, toiletries and
clothing. It is important to note, however, that access to services is not equivalent
5 Interview with a Zambian migrant, Johannesburg, 28 September 2009.
6 Interview with a Zimbabwean female migrant, Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
7 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 28 September 2009.
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unsanitary conditions at the Centre, the inability to pay for school uniforms, and
discrimination faced when referred by an international NGO to larger hospitals,
based on nationality and documentation status. 
Organisations that respondents mentioned are listed below, in alphabetical
order. It is important to note that the majority of respondents were unable to
recall the names of organisations from which they had received help. Several
mentioned that in addition to the organisations listed below, help had also come
from churches, a soup kitchen, and locals who owned shops nearby.
• Coalition Against Xenophobia
• First National Bank
• International Organisation for Migration
• Jesuit Refugee Services
• Médecins Sans Frontières
• Methodist Church
• Refugee Fellowship
• Sangoco
• Sawema
• Solidarity Peace Trust
• United Nations Children’s Fund 
• United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Respondents identified five main disadvantages to their methods of accessing
rights. First, money is a large factor in accessing rights such as housing outside of
the Centre and schooling. For example, although children can attend school
without paying, respondents explained that they still needed items such as
uniforms: ‘They could go to school without uniforms but then you will feel like a
fish out of water if you don’t have uniforms.’8
Second, documentation is necessary for housing, schooling, opening a bank
account, employment, medicine and more. But even with documentation, it is
easy to be harassed. As one respondent explained, ‘Even if you do have papers,
you can still be arrested. Whereas if you have 200 rand, you won’t be arrested. So
papers help sometimes and don’t help other times.’9
A third disadvantage is that response time is very long. According to
respondents, five or six months can pass before an organisation provides aid to
an applicant. This also affects employment; many migrants end up taking jobs for
which they are overqualified because it takes government a long time to assess
their qualifications. A fourth disadvantage is discrimination based on
documentation status and nationality, especially in hospitals. For example, many
respondents explained that if they called for an ambulance in English or gave the
Centre’s location, then the ambulance would take three or four hours to arrive.
8 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 28 September 2009.
9 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 29 September 2009.
  Migrant mobilisation: structure and strategies for claiming rights South Africa and Kenya    151Thus, some migrants have taken to calling for an ambulance on a different street,
or enlisting a Zulu-speaker to call for them. Finally, respondents said that a lack
of awareness of rights is a large challenge to accessing rights. As one respondent
explains, ‘Three-quarters of the people, they don’t know their rights, they don’t
know where to run when they have problems. So all of us, in fact, three-quarters
of the people, they tend to accept each and every thing that comes towards their
way.’10
It is interesting that respondents identified issues outside of their control as
disadvantages to their methods of accessing rights. From an outside perspective,
one of the most dangerous shortcomings is over-dependence on the Centre, its
Head and the organisations that actively seek out migrants. Many respondents
stated that the Head and the Centre were their first and last lines of defence
against rights infringement: ‘[My protection] is him only. If I have some big
problem, if whatever, I go to the [Head].’11
Furthermore, respondents seem to have accepted that their contact with
organisations is in the form of organisations visiting the Centre; migrants do not
seem to initiate contact with organisations that exist outside of the Centre. As one
respondent says, ‘Myself, I haven’t received any enlightenment as to who I should
approach if I need help.’12
Furthermore, few respondents could name the organisations that visited the
Centre and provided items, as mentioned above. This implies that a lasting
relationship between such organisations and the migrants at the Centre has not
been created.
Collaboration and mobilisation
According to respondents, collaboration in the migrant sector does not exist,
whether between migrants and South Africans or between migrants and other
migrants. The majority of respondents attributed the lack of collaboration to a
lack of trust, based on both economic and safety reasons. Some respondents
claimed that South Africans took advantage of migrant workers, while others said
that the police beat migrants for no reason. Citing the 2008 xenophobic attacks,
one respondent said, ‘We trusted them, they betrayed our trust.’13 
Others believe that South Africans are not inclined to collaborate with
migrants because other South Africans will be angered if it seems as though
migrants are receiving more assistance than South Africans. It is also important
to note that some migrants refused to make a blanket statement about whether
or not they trusted South Africans. One respondent cited the humanitarian
response from some South Africans during the 2008 xenophobic attacks: ‘Not all
10 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 29 September 2009.
11 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
12 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
13 Interview with a Zambian migrant, Johannesburg, 30 September 2009.
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Because if you see like that time of xenophobia, other people they bring us food
here and clothes, so I – what can I say, it’s only half-half.’14
As for other migrants and other Zimbabweans, the lack of trust seems to be
based solely on a competition for money. One respondent describes the attitude
among migrants as ‘I’m here to look for money for my family, leave me alone.’15 
As another respondent explains: 
It’s getting to be so difficult to trust anybody. From what I’ve seen happening to
other guys and, like I was saying, I have seen Zimbabweans robbing other
Zimbabweans, Zimbabweans stealing [from] other Zimbabweans, and I’ve seen
some encounters between South Africans and Zimbabweans. So it’s just not easy to
trust anybody so far.16
Some migrants felt that organisations are not able to help or interested in helping
with long-term solutions; they view these organisations as resources for assisting
with immediate problems. ‘There are a lot [of organisations], they come, and they
give their help, they go. When they see that they need to come, they come and
they give their help and they go.’17
However, the distrustful attitude towards both fellow-migrants and South
Africans seems to disappear in a different context. As one Zimbabwean
respondent says, ‘Myself, I’d always trust South Africans when I was at home.’18
Thus, it seems that the economic desperation of migrants, combined with the
scarcity of jobs in the city, is one reason for the lack of trust – and thus, lack of
collaboration – among migrants in Johannesburg. 
Preliminary conclusion
The respondents to this study are failing to mobilise as a result of issues of trust
and fear of deportation. Due to the specific context in which they live, there is an
over-reliance on established organisations to provide basic services. There does
not appear to be any significant desire to self-mobilise or to seek out other
avenues to meet their needs. Language barriers, lack of trust and documentation
were listed as key issues for migrant survival, integration and mobilisation.
Statistics from the African Cities Database (ACS) show that migrants in
Johannesburg neither approach, support nor receive significant help from
organisations designed to aid migrants, refugees and inner city residents.
14 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 29 September 2009. 
15 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 29 September 2009.
16 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant, Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
17 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant Johannesburg, 1 October 2009.
18 Interview with a Zimbabwean migrant Johannesburg, 28 September 2009.
154    Chapter 6• 100% of migrants surveyed report that they do not receive food, aid or other
forms of support from international organisations, churches, locals or other
sources;
• 98% of migrants do not support police or security committees;
• 98% of migrants do not support organisations run by migrants, refugees
and/or inner city residents;
• 97% of migrants do not support organisations that work with migrants,
refugees and/or inner city residents (it is interesting that twice as many South
Africans support these organisations, though this is still a low number);
• 98% of migrants have not visited UNCHR offices;
• 92% of migrants do not support cultural organisations; and
• 77% of migrants have not been to an NGO or church group that works with
migrants.
In light of these numbers, it is interesting that a higher percentage of migrants
support religious organisations, rotating credit associations/stokvels and sports
clubs. The number of migrants who support rotating credit associations/stokvels
and sports clubs is small, but it is still higher than the number of migrants who
support migrant-oriented organisations.
•  50% of migrants support a religious organisation. There is an interesting
variation between national groups: only 10% of Somalis support a church or
mosque group, compared to 59% of Mozambiquans and 70% of Congolese;
• 15% of migrants give money to rotating credit associations/stokvels;
• 11% of migrants give money to sports clubs.
A significant percentage of migrants feel that they have no place to turn when
they are in need, while a smaller percentage of migrants rely on social networks,
such as family and friends, as well as privately funded sources of help, such as
lawyers. Less than 5% of respondents indicated that they would approach either
a domestic or an international NGO or aid organisation, religious organisation or
organisation run by migrants from their home country for help.
• To borrow R500:
• 36% of migrants would approach a friend;
• 55% of migrants either feel that there is no place to find help, or do not know
where to find help.
• To borrow R5000:
• 17% of migrants would approach a friend;
• 75% of migrants either feel that there is no place to find help, or do not know
where to find help.
• For legal advice:
• 42% of migrants would approach a private lawyer;
• 29% of migrants either feel that there is no place to find help, or do not know
where to find help.
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• 36% of migrants would approach a private lawyer;
• 45% of migrants either feel that there is no place to find help, or do not know
where to find help.
• For accommodation:
• 42% of migrants would approach a friend;
• 36% of migrants either feel that there is no place to find help, or do not know
where to find help.
Migrant networks are small and do not effectively address migrants’ needs once
they are settled in Johannesburg. Most migrants access social networks before and
during their move to the city, and some approach friends for small loans or help
with accommodation after they are settled. However, few receive help finding
employment, which is the main impetus for migration to Johannesburg. 
• 15% of migrants work for a migrant of the same country of origin;
• 18% of migrants received help with employment when they first arrived;
• 24% of migrants received help buying tickets or with travel arrangements to
Johannesburg;
• 24% of migrants provide loans to others in South Africa, which is over twice
the number of South Africans who loan money to others (there is also a
significant breakdown along national lines; 52% of Mozambiquans provide
loans, compared with an average of 25% of other migrants);
• 35% of migrants received help with transportation money to Johannesburg;
• 57% of migrants received help with accommodation when they first arrived
in Johannesburg;
• 61% of migrants received general information about Johannesburg. 
From the ACS, it appears that migrants are not seeking help from organisations
or social networks upon arrival in Johannesburg. The overwhelming feeling
among migrants is that there are no institutions to turn when they need help.
5 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS: SOUTH AFRICAN 
ORGANISATIONS
This section is based on organisational interviews with 24 South African-based
organisations that are working on migration-related issues. A table of
organisations that consented to being identified in this study appears in Appendix
B, and the questionnaire in Appendix C was structured around five parts: a history
of the organisation, its organisational structure and capacity, main activities,
collaboration activities, and perception and experiences of mobilising.
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The civil society sector that is working on refugee and migrant issues in South
Africa is relatively small. Broadly, they can be divided into four groups, with the
exception of one government office: 1) international donors and NGOs; 2)
national NGOs formed and run by South Africans who have migration or refugee
issues as one of their programmes; 3) migrant-formed and led CBOs or smaller
NGOs which are less established and formalised than Group 2; 4) FBOs, some
of which also have NPO status, and one local government office. The very
different levels at which these organisations work have created structural
limitations for collaboration.
The activities, structure, focus and resources of these organisations differ. A
discussion will follow, based on these groupings. A total of 24 organisational
interviews were conducted with a range of organisations in South Africa.
 
Table 7: 
Composition of respondents South Africa (organisational)
Group Type of organisation No. of organisations
1 International donor, 
organisationa
a. Two of these organisations failed to respond to numerous requests for interviews therefore
information is based on desktop research only.
3
2 National NGO 7
3 Migrant-led CBO/NGOb
b. Six of these organisations were interviewed by colleagues from FMSP for another project.
8
4 FBO 7
Local Government 1
Total 26
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ORGANISATIONS
History of organisation
Of the three organisations, two are international agencies and the other is an
FBO. All have offices in most continents, and two of the three have operated in
South Africa for more than a decade.
Organisational structure and capacity
The structure of the agencies differs; generally, international offices are either
regional or country offices with different levels of authority and budgets. The
number of staff and level of skill varies from 50–75 and includes administrative,
financial professional and support staff. 
Main activities, target group, geographical location
All organisations are working nationally and based in Gauteng. Two of the three
work through local implementing partners and provide technical assistance to the
national government. The main activities are centred on emergency relief,
research, voluntary repatriation and integration and access to services. The FBO
has a specific mandate to work with the poor and vulnerable and provides
emergency and material relief for up to two months to those in need. It has a
community-oriented approach, whereas the international agencies work more at
a national level. Two of the organisations work only with refugees, the other with
migrants and refugees. 
Collaboration and mobilisation
None of the organisations appear to have close relationships with FBOs , local
NGOs and CBOs . There is a sense that national level collaboration between
themselves and government is good, but this has not translated into close working
Table 8: 
Group 1: number of years in operation
Organisation Year of starting 
operations in SA
1 1980
2 1997
3 Not known
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the daily fight for survival amongst migrants on the one hand and scarce
resources amongst organisations on the other has pushed large scale mobilisation
into the background. The external agenda setting of these organisations coupled
with senior staff who are often do not have extensive experience in the South
African context, has impeded the legitimacy and impact of these organisations
and isolated them from many local NGOs, FBOs  and CBOs  .
GROUP 2: SOUTH AFRICAN-RUN NGOS
History of organisation
The vision and founding rationale of these organisations is rooted in particular
areas of social and political justice which also form their core focus. These areas
include anti-apartheid struggles, gender violence and access to legal protection.
Most of these organisations have been established for more than 20 years
although they have only begun working in the migrant and refugee area since
1998. All have formal NGO status.
Organisational structure and capacity
Generally, organisations falling in this sector are better funded and resourced than
migrant-led organisations. Five of the seven organisations have international
funders, while the other two rely on private donations and smaller grants. The
organisations have functioning boards, clear structures, defined programmes,
Table 9: 
Group 2: number of years in operation
Organisation Year of establishment Year began working 
on migrant issues
4 1989 1998
5 2006 2007
6 1955 2005
7 1921 Not known
8 1979 Not known
9 1979 Not known
10 1998 1998
160    Chapter 6more staff with higher skills and rely less on volunteers. They also have stronger
links with existing government and NGO forums than migrant-led organisations.
Main activities, target group, geographical location
The main activities of these organisations include working toward the eradication
of gender violence, trauma counselling, disaster management, home-based care
for HIV sufferers, advocacy and lobbying, capacity-building of service providers,
and legal assistance and litigation. None of these organisations work exclusively
on migration issues; rather, migrants and refugees are mainstreamed into the
organisations’ overall programme and target groups.
Most of the organisations work at a national level, with field offices across
the major cities in South Africa. They work with South Africans and non-
nationals. Two of the seven work only with refugees and asylum-seekers, due to
donor conditions. 
Collaboration and mobilisation
Most organisations work actively with local and national government
departments and local FBOs and NGOs in their area of locality to refer clients
for support and services. Most find such relationships useful as these allow them
to stretch resources and reach more people. In most cases, collaboration has not
extended beyond the referral system.
Some of the challenges identified for mobilising in the migrant sector include
insufficient resources and funding; lack of national co-ordination among
organisations; high levels of distrust among migrants, organisations and
government; language barriers; the difficulty of working with large and diverse
groups of people; the relatively short time that migration issues have been on the
national agenda and the corresponding lack of awareness or knowledge on how
to deal with them; and a lack of strategic partnerships with media and churches.
Migrant mobilisation is understood in different ways; some organisations see
it as a government-supported initiative, while others feel civil society or even
migrants themselves need to take the lead. However, most agree that the target of
mobilisation should include a clear and consistent national policy on migration,
easier access to documentation, and efforts to foster awareness and
understanding of the rights of migrants.
GROUP 3: MIGRANT-LED ORGANISATIONS
History of the organisation
All the organisations interviewed were started by migrants in response to the
social, economic and political inequalities facing them in South Africa. Many were
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or the state and felt a need to establish a body that would represent their interests.
All, with the exception of one, which was started earlier, were established between
2005 and 2009. Six of the eight organisations were formed on national and ethnic
lines. The other six have a broader Pan-African base. Six of the organisations are
registered as non-profit organisations (NPOs)19. The status of the other two is
not known.
Organisational structure and capacity
Most of these organisations have a weak organisational structure and weak and
limited capacity. All have less than 15 staff, many of whom have multiple roles,
with the founder often acting as chairperson or director. All claim to have boards,
but their function is not well articulated. Seven of the eight organisations do not
have stable or long-term funding from recognised donors. Most rely on
membership fees to sustain their activities, and have short-term partnerships with
other NGOs or government to implement specific projects. One organisation has
an international funder.
Main activities, target group, geographical location
The range of activities is diverse and includes the following:
• Skills training for entry into business and employment;
• English classes;
• Peace-building and integration by integrating migrants and locals in community
groups;
• Emergency and material relief;
• Marches, learning-sharing dialogues, advising South African government on
Zimbabwean issues; 
• Protesting against the xenophobic attacks; 
• Mobilising all migrant organisations;
• Working toward a non-xenophobic South Africa by promoting African culture,
education and cultural exchanges;
• Promoting the interests of the Somali community in South Africa in relation to
protection and documentation;
• Working toward development in the DRC.
Broadly, the range of activities can be summarised into three themes: contributing
to national interests in the home country; facilitating access to services and
protection in South Africa; and working toward integration in host communities.
19 NPOs exist to serve some public interest and do not operate to make a profit. NGOs are non-
governmental bodies that include NPOs.
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and/or representatives in other cities in South Africa. Most claim to be reaching
thousands of migrants either through direct membership or via church activities,
internet groups and community forums.
Collaboration and mobilisation
Most organisations have had negative experiences in working with government
and civil society in South Africa, citing issues of legitimacy and distrust as the
major stumbling blocks in establishing working relations. Some are outwardly
hostile toward the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):
‘For them [UNHCR], a refugee is an imbecile.’20
‘Many international organisations employ people who have no knowledge of the
context on the ground, and many have hidden agendas.’21
‘UNHCR is a corrupt body which benefits its “cronies” only.’
Others sense a feeling of being taken advantage of by government to satisfy
public opinion:
Yesterday, a member walked into Luthuli House [ANC Headquarters in
Johannesburg] and told people he represented the Malawian community in SA. They
treated him like a big man and gave him ANC posters to distribute. He just went in
to see what would happen.22
It is evident from the interviews that relations between the government, civil
society and migrant communities are strained. Although there are cases of
collaboration, these are at local levels and are mostly isolated and not formalised.
What is encouraging, though, is the greater degree of collaboration within and
among migrant communities, particularly following the May 2008 attacks.
Most concede that collective mobilisation has not occurred in South Africa
on the scale to which it should, due to insufficient collaboration because of
competition for resources and status among stakeholders, lack of funding,
inconsistent policies and bureaucratic and uncommitted practices from
government. Some of the key challenges to mobilising migrants include language
barriers, distrust in the communities and lack of resources.
Some of the successes in mobilising have occurred through strategic
partnerships with the media. This has led to increased publicity and credibility,
and access to funding and other crucial resources such as office space and access
to telephones and the internet.
20 Telephonic interview with the director of organisation A, Cape Town, 15 July 2009.
21 Telephonic interview with the director of organisation C, Cape Town, 24 August 2009
22 Interview with a project co-ordinator, organisation B, Johannesburg, 10 September 2009.
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History of the organisation
All but one of the organisations were established after 1994 by various churches
and other FBOs to respond to the needs of migrants and refugees who
approached these institutions for assistance. All have NPO status, and a further
six identify themselves as FBOs as well. Most are Christian, although one is
interfaith. 
Organisational structure and capacity
The size of each organisation is small, with all having less than 15 staff. The
typical structure includes a board or committee which has an oversight role, a
director who is responsible for management and fundraising, an administrative
and financial officer and programme staff  made up of social workers, auxiliary
social workers, community workers and paralegals. Most state that they are under-
staffed and do not have sufficient professionals, particularly social workers.
Funding is a key challenge for all organisations; two of the seven are UNHCR
implementing partners, and the remaining five are funded through a combination
of private church donations, specific church funds and private donations. One
has additional funding from the Department of Social Development. All cite lack
of funding as the main obstacle to implementing their programmes.
Table 10: 
Group 3: history and organisational structure
Organisation Years in 
operation
Number of staff Status
11 2006 5 staff, 11 
volunteers
NPO, FBO
12 1998 Not known NPO, FBO
13 1996 7 staff, varying 
numbers of 
volunteers
NPO
14 Mid 1990s 13 Started as an FBO 
now NPO
15 1994 11 FBO now NPO
16 2002 5 NPO, FBO
17 More than 40 years Not known Church and NPO
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The main activities and target groups of the organisations may be distinguished
by the principal funder. The UNHCR implementing partners target only refugees
and asylum-seekers, and focus their activities on:
• weekly orientation sessions where information on the rights of refugees and
access to services is given;
• limited material support, based on need and availability of resources; and
• psycho-social assessments of all applicants, and referrals to relevant service
providers.
The other five organisations target all non-nationals, regardless of status (one
focuses exclusively on migrant women and children), and most offer one or more
of the following services:
• English language classes;
• direct intervention with service providers and state institutions to facilitate access
to services such as documentation, child support grants, education, health, etc.;
• direct service provision, mainly in the form of shelter, primary school education
and material relief;
• specialised services such as trauma counselling; and
• assistance with job placement.
In addition to the above, one organisation has a specific focus on integration; its
activities include children’s groups and youth groups, and community workshops
which target non-nationals and locals.
Despite limited funding and insufficient staff, organisations seem to have a
wide reach, and most would like to expand their activities to reach more people,
given additional resources.
Table 11: 
Group 3: main activities and target group
Organisation Average number of 
people receiving 
direct services 
monthly 
Geographic location
11 230 Johannesburg and Pretoria
12 Estimates 1000 Cape Town
13 Shelter to 40 women Cape Town
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Most of the organisations seem to enjoy credibility among migrants, and sound
working relations with local government and other local NGOs. Many work
closely with each other at a local level, and with other NGOs through informal
referral systems, in order to stretch resources. At a national level, collaboration is
weaker. Many do not work with national NGOs or government departments. The
non-UNHCR funded organisations do not have a positive view of the situation,
with many stating that they are uncertain of the UNHCR’s exact role. CoRMSA
is seen to have an information function only, with no substantive organising role.
Several organisations discussed how repeated funding proposals to the
Department of Social Development have been unsuccessful, and there is a
general feeling that bureaucratic hurdles exists in dealing with national
government departments such as DHA and the Department of Labour. 
All organisations, with the exception of one, feel that there is insufficient
collaboration between stakeholders on migration issues. Most organisations have
found it difficult to mobilise migrants due to language barriers, ethnic and
national divisions, insufficient knowledge, skills and funding to mobilise, and the
lack of a common mobilising factor. All agree that the key challenges facing
migrants in South Africa are documentation and access to basic services such as
housing, shelter and work.
Generally, there appear to be more challenges than opportunities to
mobilising, with practical and structural problems identified as key obstacles.
Preliminary conclusion
The organisations interviewed for this study fall into four broad groups. Firstly,
the international donors and development organisations that have global agendas,
bigger budgets and more resources. Their main activities differ, from
international relief to resettlement and establishing partnerships with government
agencies. 
The second group are the more established South African-based and run
NGOs, many of which work on a range of developmental and human rights
issues, of which migrant and refugees’ interest is one. Some of the challenges that
they face include lack of adequate funding and scarcity of skills. Their main focus
is on access to rights and service provision, and includes raising awareness of and
14 700 Durban
15 800 Cape Town
16 500 Durban
17 More than 3500 Johannesburg
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specialised and in-depth services such as legal assistance and trauma counselling.
In most instances, services are available to all residents of the geographic area in
which they operate, including locals and all categories of non-nationals. 
The third group consists of migrant-led organisations. These have been
established mostly in the past ten years, and are marked by weak institutional
capacity and limited, unstable funding. Some work with specific national groups
while others work more broadly. Most have a local focus, and have not had good
relations with key state and national players. 
The final group consists of FBOs that have more of a relief and material
assistance-approach to their work. They work with all categories of migrants, and
seem to have credibility and a wide reach.
6 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS: NAIROBI
This section is based on an analysis of the African Cities Dataset, which surveyed
755 migrants and Kenyans in Nairobi in 2007, as well as and organisational
interviews and/or desktop research regarding six organisations working on
migration issues in Nairobi.
What is known about individual mobilisation and collective action
Statistics from the Nairobi ACD show that migrants have slightly more contact
with state institutions and NGOs than those surveyed in Johannesburg, but that
most do not seek assistance, support or information from these bodies.
The majority of migrants in the Nairobi survey (83%) have refugee status,
which is higher than the 48% in the Johannesburg survey; yet only 57% have
visited the local UNHCR office, and 88% have not been to the local Department
of Refugee Affairs. Despite recognised legal status, migrants are reluctant to
approach the institutions set up to assist them. Most would seek support for
work, advice, shelter and money from religious organisations, friends and family,
or feel that there are no available options.
• 58% have not been to an NGO; 
• 99% do not support any NGO for migrants; 
• 97% do not support any NGO run by migrants; 
• 97% do not contribute to social or sports clubs;
• 98% are not part of any police forum;
• 95% are not part of any community forum. 
As was the situation with migrants in the Johannesburg survey, respondents are
more likely to approach FBOs or religious institutions when in need.
• 37% would go to a religious group for legal advice;
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• 60% would ask a friend for assistance if they need accommodation, 16% a
religious organisation, and 2% a migrant-run NGO.
Social networks
Ninety-eight per cent of migrants have been encouraged by family or friends to
come to Nairobi, or have been supported through the provision of
accommodation, general information on Kenya, or money for purchasing a ticket.
Almost three-quarters of those sampled used money from family and friends to
pay for their trip. For most, family or kin were their first contact in Nairobi.
Table 12: First contact for migrants in Nairobi
First contacts Nairobi Frequency Percent
Did not know/did not 
respond
4 0.57
Local Kenyans 151 21.42
Kin or family member 
already in Kenya
319 45.25
Members of pre-migration 
community
84 11.91
People from country of 
origin
62 8.79
Kenya aid workers/NGO 28 3.97
Kenyan government 
officials
3 0.43
Religious leaders 6 0.85
Chiefs/village heads from 
home country
1 0.14
Chiefs/village heads from 
Kenya
1 0.14
Employer 12 1.70
Education institution 2 0.28
Other 32 4.54
Total 705 100.00
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of money such as R500 (81%). For a larger amount of R5000, 34% would go to
a bank and only 11% to a friend, while 20% feel there is nowhere they can go.
Work 
Seventy-two per cent of migrants could not find work upon arrival in Nairobi.
This improved somewhat after time, but 67% were still unemployed at the time
of the survey, and a small number (17%) were self-employed. If they did not
work, 59% of migrants used their savings to support themselves, suggesting that
self-sufficiency was a more significant resource than organisations or networks. 
Identity
Ethnic, tribal and religious identity was strong among the respondents, and most
would fight to defend these:
• 96% are proud to identify with their ethnic group identity;
• 95% would fight to defend their home country;
• 91% would fight to defend their tribe or ethnic group; 
• 83% would defend their religion;
• 51% would defend Kenya. 
Collective action
A total of six organisational interviews were conducted in Nairobi, and were
supplemented by internet-based research. A breakdown of these appears below.
A complete list of consenting, participating organisations appears in the
Appendix Due to the small number of respondents, findings will be summarised
and analysed as a whole.
 
Table 13: 
Composition of respondents – Nairobi (organisational)
Type of organisation Number 
International NGO or agency 2
NGO 1
FBO 2
Migrant run NGO 1
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With the exception of one organisation, the respondents have been working on
refugee issues for less than 15 years. This is higher than in the South African cases.
Generally, the FBOs have less of a developmental or human rights perspective in
their mission than the other organisations. This is reflected in their mandate and
activities.
Organisational structure and capacity
With the exception of one of the international NGOs, all the respondents have
between 5 and 20 staff and make use of a varying number of volunteers. The
FBOs are the least resourced in terms of staff, capacity and funding. Both FBOs
have a staff of five, who are skilled in theology. Their main funding is from
member contributions and other churches. In contrast, the NGOs have skilled
Total 6
International NGO or agency 2
Table 14: 
History, mandate and legal status – Nairobi
Organi-
sation
Year 
established
Mandate Legal status
1 1951 Foster positive 
migration 
management that 
benefits migrants 
and locals
International 
NGO
2 1999 Entertain and 
educate refugees 
through film and 
media
International 
NGO
3 1996 Provide trauma 
counselling to 
refugees
FBO
4 2004 Missionary FBO
5 1998 Promote and 
protect rights of 
refugees
Migrant-led NGO
6 1973 Facilitate access to 
the legal system for 
the poor
NGO
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and communication specialists, and draw funding from international donors such
as the UNHCR, US Government and other development-oriented donors.
Main activities, target group, geographical location
The main activities of the organisation can be grouped into three broad
categories: material relief, personal intervention and public interest. All
organisations work in the two main refugee camps in Nairobi: Daadab and
Kakuma.
Material relief
This includes the work of mainly the two FBOs, and consists of feeding schemes,
visits to the sick, motivational talks and emergency aid packages.
Personal intervention
All the organisations have some component of this in their programmes.
Activities range from legal advice, assistance in obtaining documentation, and
scholarships for education, to psycho-social intervention, including trauma
counselling.
Public interest activities
All the organisations work on public interest issues at some level. These include
increasing awareness among refugees on their rights, interfaith dialogues to foster
understanding and tolerance, intervention with police on arrest and detention
issues, training of police and judiciary on the rights of refugees, policy reviews,
monitoring the implementation of the Refugee Act 2006, and public interest
litigation.
The number of people reached each month ranges from 150 to 400. In a city
with a population of 96 000 legal refugees, most recognise that this is insufficient.
Most organisations cite lack of funds and language barriers as the main obstacles
to increasing their reach. 
Collaboration and mobilisation 
Mobilisation is understood in different ways; for some organisations, mobilising
migrants means educating or empowering them. For others, mobilisation is about
joint co-ordination and collaboration in the sector. For the latter, this appears to
occur mainly for events, rather than for systematic, long-term change on migrant
issues.
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government departments and international agencies on facilitating access to
documentation and services. There is very little collaboration between FBOs and
other actors. They do not seem to share the same platforms or work from the
same mandate.
All organisations felt that more funding was needed to mobilise properly, and
that language barriers and ethnic divisions among migrants prevent proper
collaboration. Working in camps is also challenging, as people have restricted
spatial movement and are reluctant to seek solutions for themselves.
All organisations felt that lack of documentation, social support and security
were the key issues affecting migrants in Kenya, and called for state-led self-
settlement and integration schemes to improve conditions for migrants and
locals.
7 FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Migrants have not mobilised significantly in South Africa or Nairobi, at a
collective or individual level. 
Individual mobilisation
• Many migrants in South Africa fear deportation if they claim public spaces
for protest, whilst others feel that addressing immediate needs such as shelter
and food is more of a priority. 
• In Nairobi, living in refugee camps, with restricted movement and active
service providers, hinders the opportunities for mobilisation, and one
questions whether camps foster a dependency mindset. The interviews with
migrants in Johannesburg who live in a closed, “camp-like” context where
agencies provide many free services has also raised similar concerns
regarding a lack of agency on the part of migrants.
• In both countries, language barriers, documentation, lack of awareness of
their rights, and lack of trust of state officials, donors, NGOs and migrant-
led organisations are listed by migrants as key barriers to claiming rights. 
• Migrants in South Africa cite the long response time for organisations to
assist them, and discrimination, as additional factors that impede their claims
to rights in South Africa.
• Migrants in Nairobi and South Africa are accessing services through a variety
of sources, which include social networks and FBOs. A limited number claim
rights from NGOs and the state. More information is needed on how
migrants access these channels, and what strategies they adopt to survive.
• Previous studies on migrant mobilisation show that migrants tend to
organise along ethnic lines. However, the Zimbabweans interviewed in this
study saw other Zimbabweans either as competitors for jobs, or as potential
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ethnic or national background. Most respondents shared the attitude that if
they wanted to solve problems, they needed go home.
• It appears that respondents are not mobilising because they do not have
adequate resources (time), lack strong networks (trust within the ethnic or
national group), and do not enjoy a political environment that is conducive
to mobilisation. This relates to popular mobilisation theories, which cite
these three factors as important considerations in mobilising.
Collective mobilisation
• The absence of a common agenda to mobilise behind, limited funding, and
fragmentation in the sector have contributed to a weak and fragile civil
society in South Africa.
• The migrant sector in SA – comprising migrants, NGOs, donors, migrant-
led organisations and government – is plagued by power dynamics, mistrust
and politics, which impede effective and comprehensive collaboration
• Collaboration between the different organisations working in the migrant
sector in both countries appears to be ad hoc, and largely confined to
referrals, information-sharing and participation in joint public events. There
appears to be no clear strategy or target for collaboration in the sector.
Collaboration across different levels and with different stakeholders is
limited.
• NGOs in both countries, whether migrant-led or not, are not reaching
enough migrants. The capacity of organisations to meet the needs of
migrants is inadequate. Services are not well co-ordinated, skilled staff and
resources are scarce, and collaboration is not formalised. Institutional
relationships need to be built and personal relations strengthened in the
sector. 
• Migrant-led organisations are formed largely along ethnic and/or national
lines, and their targets of mobilisation are social/economic/political
inequalities. This may have contributed to a lack of mobilising across migrant
groups.
• Migrant-led organisations have had some success in collective mobilisation
when they have used the media as a strategy to mobilise. Identifying such
local sources and having the knowledge, time and funds to access them is
critical in realising the potential of this resource. 
• In South Africa, migrant issues are addressed at four levels: international
donors and agencies, South African-led NGOs, migrant-led NGOs and
FBOs. Better collaboration among and between these levels, and with
government, is needed. 
• In Nairobi, the main activities of the organisation may be grouped into three
broad categories: material relief, personal intervention and public interest. All
organisations work in the two main refugee camps in Nairobi. Addressing
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would increase opportunities for mobilisation, and migrants’ access to rights. 
• National-level NGOs appear to have significant potential in mobilising for
migrants’ rights in both countries. They have more resources, better
institutional capacity, and experience in advocacy and mobilising. Ensuring
that migrant issues are integrated into national discourses of development is
a key part of tapping into this potential.
Institutional analysis
• The absence of a clear and consistent national migration policy, which
provides for effective migration management systems and structures, and
ensures that the rights of migrants are protected, together with the absence
of implementation by various levels and branches of the state hampers local-
level efforts at improving services and relationships for and among migrants. 
• Migrant issues in South Africa are not integrated into the overall
developmental agenda of civil society and government. Only a small number
of South African NGO’s have a migrant focus in their programmes. With
their greater resources and organisational strength they are ideally situated to
reach more migrants.
• Awareness of and funding for migrant-related programmes within
government departments, national NGOs and migrant-led organisations is
needed to integrate and prioritise migrant issues within the broader civil
society agenda.
• The level of mistrust in the sector in South Africa needs to be addressed.
Competing political and personal agendas, and confusion and suspicion over
the role of the state and international donors, need to be discussed. Crucially,
several common objectives for migrants’ rights must be identified in order to
create inclusivity and collaboration in the sector.
• Mobilisation is understood in different ways among NGOs in both
countries. Some see it as collaboration, and others as empowerment or
education of migrants. Most identify different types and levels of stakeholders
as key players in any mobilisation efforts. A clear understanding of the
meaning and target of mobilisation and the responsibilities of different
stakeholders is needed, before any successful co-ordination can take place.
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List of organisations which participated in this study and agreed to be 
identified:  South Africa
Organisation Geographical location
Black Sash Johannesburg, works nationally
Bonne Esperance Cape Town
Cape Town Refugee Centre Cape Town
Central Methodist Church Johannesburg
Centre for Study of Violence and
Reconciliation
Johannesburg, works nationally
Legal Resources Centre Johannesburg, works nationally
Refugee Pastoral Care Durban
Refugee Social Services Durban
Scalabrini Refugee Services Cape Town
Sonke Gender Justice Network Johannesburg, works nationally
South African Red Cross Society Johannesburg, works nationally
Xaveri Movement Johannesburg
Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum Johannesburg
List of organisations which participated in this study and agreed to be 
identified: Nairobi
Organisation Geographical location
Africa Refugee Programme-Great Lakes Nairobi
Deeper Life Restoration of East Africa Nairobi
Filmaid International Nairobi
Kituo Cha Sheria (Urban Refugee Program) Nairobi
Norwegian Refugee Council Nairobi
Legal Resources Foundation Nairobi
Refugee Council of Kenya Nairobi
UNHCR Nairobi
7CHAPTER UNLOCKING THE POTENTIALFOR CIVIC ACTION ANDSTRUCTURAL CHANGE:REFLECTIONS ON MOBILISINGSOCIAL JUSTICE
Jeff Handmaker and Remko Berkhout
The situation of backyard-dwellers is a ticking time bomb waiting to explode ... if it
remains unattended to. We are hopeful that as we pursue the matter in higher courts,
a precedent, compelling positive action on the part of all duty-bearers to the right to
housing in relation to backyard-dwellers, will be set.1 
1 CAPTURING THE SPIRIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
This book has attempted to capture the spirit of an international conference on
Mobilising Social Justice in Johannesburg in November 2009, where complex issues
around social justice were discussed in the framework of the Hivos-ISS
Knowledge Programme on Civil Society Building. Inspired by similar
experiences, the citation above by a South African human rights lawyer confirms
that social and economic inequalities continue to undermine stability and
democratisation issues in South Africa. These inequalities are indeed reaching
boiling point; and social movement activists are working together with lawyers,
faith-based and traditional leaders and community mobilisers to try and address
massive and growing disparities between rich and poor. In trying to address these
inequalities, the country’s formal democratic institutions are being seriously
tested, and there is a growing fear that the institutions are fast losing the
legitimacy they acquired in the wake of democratic dispensations during the early
to mid-1990s.
In this concluding chapter, we unpack the main objectives and questions of
the Knowledge Programme. We take account of various reflections to the
preceding chapters. We also suggest some areas for further reflection.
1 South African attorney Louise du Plessis, reacting to the decision of the North Gauteng High
Court in Pretoria to confirm the eviction of several hundred poor people living in shacks on a
corporate-owned farm, ‘High Court rules against Itireleng evictees’, Press Release, Pretoria:
Lawyers for Human Rights, 1 March 2010.177
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and after consulting with numerous colleagues in Latin America and Southern
Africa, ISS and Hivos developed a set of objectives for the knowledge
programme in 2008. The objectives of the knowledge programme served as the
starting point for a process that took almost two years to unfold. These were (1)
to support innovative research, which led to the choice of the research projects
that are reflected in this book; (2) to translate this research and generate useful
material for dissemination among various audiences; and (3) to promote the
exchange of knowledge to stimulate both a debate and dialogue, which led to the
organising of this conference. The five research chapters that were developed and
collected in this book, one of which was accompanied by a documentary film, still
have much more to contribute. This book is merely the latest phase in a process
that will continue to unfold as the emerging insights find their way into
dissemination events, civil society deliberations, and follow-up projects for
further research. 
The programme was also informed by a number of research questions that
framed the choice of research projects that would be supported and affected the
organisation of the conference. How can we understand the dynamics of civil
society formation and the role of local actors in this process? How does civil
society-building as a process contribute to structural changes in the unequal
balance of power in society? And how do external actors – donors as well as
support or solidarity organisations – contribute to this process? This concluding
chapter will reflect on all three of these research questions.
2 DYNAMICS OF CIVIL SOCIETY FORMATION
The dynamics of civil society formation is a multi-dimensional topic that cuts
across every chapter that is included in this book. Power is clearly a central
element in understanding and explaining these dynamics. In theorising the
dynamics of civil society formation, it is important to understand why civil society
or civic actors, of all descriptions, decided to embark on a particular campaign or
other strategy. How did they go about doing so, and did this end up leading to
structural change?
As one participant commented, civic strategies are essentially about ‘the art
of the possible’. However, there is some dispute regarding how to define what
civil society is. Is it any civic actor? Must they have a direct relationship with the
state? Can it be, as some participants argued at the conference, those who set
themselves apart from the state? Can it be uncivil society, which may decide to be
confrontational in relation to the state? Are these even worthwhile questions, and
does civil society simply define itself in relation to particular circumstances?
Notions of citizenship will also differ. For example, migrants are often
missing from such discussions, even when these discussions concern the
discrimination seen against them. Do civic actors include the ‘untouchables’, as
Sharukh Alam asks in the epilogue? Do they include, in the South African
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discussed the issue extensively in chapter five of this book, the quality of a poor
person’s citizenship remains a point of bitter contention.
The dynamics of civil society also speak to interactions with the state, as
argued in chapter two in this book, especially in relation to legal activism
advocating the accountability of the state. However, there are other forms of civic
expression within the state, such as in cultural life. Some argue that civil society
can also be seen to act outside the structures of the state; civic-driven change or
action from below.2 This also begs the question: what is the state? Is it, in the
words of one conference participant, the ‘vicious, uncaring state’ or the ‘cuddlier
picture’ of the state, as represented by courts, parliament and other, more formal
features of the state? Jenkins’ contribution reminds us that the institutions of the
state are also a work-in-progress, and that there are spaces for constructive
engagement that are underutilised.
Whatever one’s relationship with the state, it is clear that the state, or features
of it, has turned against the people, as confirmed by Dawson in chapter five and
Dugard in chapter four. Police have stifled protest, often in violent ways. The city
of Johannesburg has failed to deliver to the people of Phiri, and the constitutional
court has failed to provide a remedy. Furthermore, as was mentioned in the
conference debate, the people – especially social movements such as the Anti-
Privatisation Forum – have turned against the state. Worse, people seem to be
turning against each other in South Africa, with the outbreak of violence against
migrants in Johannesburg being an especially horrifying example.
Understandably, the dynamics of struggle still relate very much to interactions
between different sections of society. 
Jinnah’s contribution illustrates an observation echoed widely among
conference participants: that NGOs and social movements may be perceived as
elitist in their representation of issues and communities. They may not necessarily
possess the legitimacy that they claim in their relations with state institutions. On
the other hand, this dynamic of representivity and legitimacy forces one to
consider the politics of elites, as it is clear that the relationship between certain
prominent representatives of civil society and representatives of the state can
often lead to things getting done in a way that confrontational interactions cannot
do them. At the same time, one must remain connected with the interests and
demands of communities directly affected by social justice issues, and failing to
do so is what often leads to charges of elitism. 
Finally, there is a need to examine the rights consciousness of individuals and
officials, both in government and in civil society, or as Sharukh Alam mentions,
a ‘cultural consciousness’ which may transcend rights-based approaches. Alam
elaborates on this theme in an afterword to this book, explaining the subtle but
2 See, for example, Fowler and Biekart, 2008.
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in India.
3 STRUCTURAL CHANGE
As the conference revealed, the contributions of civic actors to structural changes
in the unequal balance of power in society relate notably to gender inequalities,
but also ethnic disparities, religious differences, and differences of class.3 Clearly,
‘structural change’ is a concept to be unpacked further, and social consciousness
is an important part of this.
Some argued that structural changes were incremental, accomplished over a
long period of time, while others argued that there was a need for a rupture, a
dramatic event that gets the state’s attention, the company’s attention or broader
society’s attention. Therefore it is also important to reflect further on the nature
of (and timeframes in which one wants to see) structural change taking place. Is
civil society’s participation in a government-led process, which may take several
years, giving effect to a right? Is it better to focus on legal process in the courts,
to participate in the budget process in parliament, or to contribute to a policy-
making process led by a government department? What is the quality of civic
participation in a government-led process? Does this participation advance rights,
or does it amount to co-option? When is it appropriate to change one’s strategy?
It is clear is that civil society organisations implicitly understand the dynamics
of the processes they engage with, but it can be helpful, from a strategic point of
view, if organisations articulate these dynamics more explicitly. The budget
process in chapter four, for example, is complex and multi-layered, and requires
careful analysis and timing at an early stage in the process for civic interventions
to be successful. 
There was much scepticism expressed at the conference about legal
interventions, and in particular, their lasting effect. In some cases, government –
whether represented by the police, or by administrative officials – simply fails to
comply with a court order. In the case of non-compliance, the prospects of a legal
remedy can feel rather hollow. Even worse, the goal of legal interventions, which
have tried to promote respect for (and compliance with) economic and social
rights contained in South African constitutions, can be felt to be rather
meaningless. 
However, quantifying the cost of delivering economic and social rights can
be productive; not only for litigation purposes, but also in defining the position
one might take in the budget process, and in explaining the costs of litigation in
relation to an early, government solution to a problem. For example, the cost of
producing a court record can be close to a million rand, money that – it could be
3 See also Crenshaw, 1991.
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contribution reveals, legal interventions should not only be evaluated by
courtroom outcomes, but on their relationship to the broader struggles from
which they originate.
A number of interventions at the conference highlighted concerns that the
Constitutional Court was failing the people in a number of key decisions,
especially in the area of economic and social rights; although as mentioned, the
visibility that such high-profile trials gain in the media contributes to a public
consciousness about such issues. This echoes studies from social movement
theory, which suggest that the impact of collective action is as much about
influencing the climate of ideas in the efforts of social movements to construct a
collective identity and contribute to associational life, as it is about realising
concrete policy changes.4 In South Africa, there are many relevant institutional
frameworks beyond the courts and parliament with which one can interact,
including ANC branches, ward councillors, local and national government-
appointed committees, and others that filter much information through the ranks
to local, provincial and national government. This is especially the case with the
ANC, which has a broad, democratic structure. However, there are also co-
operative platforms between municipalities and civil society groups, such as
migrant groups, who have been included in broader notions of city citizenship.5
4 EXTERNAL ACTORS
Several of the chapters – and many contributions from participants – focused on
the nature and quality of interventions from external actors. What defines an
external actor? Some expressed concern as to whether there is an over-emphasis
on impact. NGOs are often said to be mirrors of the external donors who support
them. Such general statements may overlook the potential for more constructive
engagement, and underestimate the genuine willingness to learn displayed by
many donor agencies. Prominent representatives from major donors in the South
African social justice sector, such as the Ford Foundation and the Foundation for
Human Rights, attended and supported the conference. 
As discussed (especially in chapter two), civil society organisations must
contend with a constant tension between supporting the progressive policies and
practices of government on the one hand, and maintaining their critical
independence on the other. It is important to make certain processes accessible
4 Warren, M. (2001) Democracy and association. Princeton, Princeton University Press; Diani, M. and
D. McAdam (eds) (2003) Social movements and networks: relational approaches to collective action.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Tarrow, S.G. (ed.) (1998) Power in movement: social movements and
contentious politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Meyer, D.S., N. Whittier, et al. (eds)
(2002) Social movements: identity, culture, and the state. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5 Examples include the Local Government Working Group on migration issues, established in
Johannesburg by the Forced Migration Studies Programme at the University of the
Witwatersrand as a platform for organisations, local government officials, police and experts;
and Tutumike, a civic-municipal government working group in the Cape Town area.
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support, as well as to development practitioners in general. These would include
the legal process, the budget process and other processes for claiming rights.
Above all, one cannot adjust social justice issues effectively without bringing
people to the process, a point remarked upon earlier. In other words, it is not only
NGOs who ought to be part of these processes, but also people in the
communities who are experiencing water cut-offs, who are experiencing
xenophobic violence. They can speak directly to the policy-makers, with the
potential for a much stronger impact than the NGOs. The attempts of the Civil
Society Knowledge Building Programme to adopt an inter-disciplinary approach
to addressing these issues was remarked upon by conference participants as a step
forward, yet the studies discussed at the conference and reflected in this book
merely scratch the surface of community dynamics at grass roots level. For
example, the question: ‘What was really behind the protests?’, discussed by
Dawson, continues to make headline news in South Africa as this book goes to
press; but there is still a dearth of in-depth analyses of the realities experienced by
ordinary citizens in South Africa.
5 UNLOCKING THE POTENTIAL FOR STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE 
As we stated in the introduction, this book cannot offer a conclusive analysis of
civic mobilisation strategies for social justice. The preceding chapters have
offered various perspectives on civic strategies for change, to serve as food for
thought for practitioners and as academic reflection on the dynamics of civic
action. The next section shares additional reflections on civic strategies for social
justice. 
First, the studies seem to indicate that successful civic action requires a
certain level of long-term, strategic thinking. Jenkins’ research demonstrates that in-
depth knowledge of governance processes may be a necessary ingredient for civic
actors striving for more responsive governance. Handmaker argues that civic
action requires thorough context-analysis, and a sound appreciation of the
conditioning nature of structural boundaries, which is itself defined by a specific
historical context. In the Mazibuko water case, civic actors combined broad-
based social mobilisation with engaging the state in court through a long and
expensive process – which offered few tangible results, but much inspiration to
the activists; and considerable media attention. Not all NGOs involved in the
complex dynamics of migrant rights seem to be getting this message, judging by
the disconnect between migrants’ realities and NGO programmes revealed by
Jinnah and Haloday in chapter six. 
In addition, the studies show that successful civic action most often involves
a combination of different strategies. Dawson’s impression, in chapter five, is that
community protest on its own does not seem to have led to much progress.
Dugard clearly illustrates the shifts that can occur as a result of a strategic
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media and international networking, a conclusion echoed by Handmaker’s case
studies, discussed in a larger study that is summarised in chapter two. NGOs
trying to influence the long-term cycles of the budget process risk a disconnect
with the issues and people that they are working for, but also create opportunities
for influencing the content of government budgets in a meaningful way. 
The studies also reveal that strategic networking is a key ingredient for civic
action. The Mazibuko case is a notable example: communities, social movements
and specialised human rights NGOs joined forces with successful results.
According to Jinnah and Haloday, a reason for the lack of progress on human
rights accountability for migrants and refugees might be a relative lack of co-
operation in the migrant sector. The strong implication of this is that
organisations should avoid being too exclusive; linkages between existing
networks, and the swopping of experiences and strategies, could be very
productive. NGOs that tend to be wary of social movements and other broad-
based civic groupings could potentially do more to engage with a broader sector
of civil society that works outside of the formal structures to which NGOs are
more accustomed. For example, Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) and the
Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) have both demonstrated that it can be
very productive to build partnerships between their NGOs and more informal
community structures.
The cases discussed in this book also force us to (re)think conventional conceptions
of change. Was the final ruling of the constitutional court in the Mazibuko case
simply a defeat for the Phiri community, or a building block for the long-term
process of constructing a more just society through law? Are violent protests
random eruptions of irrational civic unrest, as the mainstream media tend to
suggest, or do they reveal underlying patterns of civic energy that are not being
drawn upon by civil society? There might be a need to explore new
methodologies for supporting civil society groups working in the area of social
justice, including groups that often fall outside the radar of most donor
organisations.
In short, long-term, complex struggles may require different kinds of
resources and connections. This is where donor institutions come in. The
arguments in this book serve as a plea for long–term, flexible donor strategies that
balance predictable funding with other sources of support, such as capacity
development and international networking. However, with the exception of a few
donors, donor practice points in a different direction; making persistent use of
logical frameworks, adopting apolitical approaches to ‘alleviate poverty’ – in
short, a tendency to aim for short-term results and a desire for quick, tangible
benefits. 
The processes that set external agendas could be critically questioned. Are
agendas set in The Hague? In South Africa? Do these processes involve NGOs?
Local communities? Social movements and other broad-based civic structures? Is
this a meaningful involvement in setting an agenda? 
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needed; and that new partnerships could be forged, not only between donors and
the organisations they support, but also horizontally, between other external
actors. One can listen to (and, potentially, involve oneself in) local debates – and
in this regard, support for locally based and generated research is both necessary
and valuable in the spirit of true solidarity, which is always a dialogic process.
Well-grounded academic research is important as a starting-point, but it also
needs to be translated for use by practitioners. It cannot merely be what Dr Patrick
Matlou of the Africa Institute has termed blue-sky research, which serves little
purpose on the ground.
6 KNOWLEDGE INTEGRATION OR CO-PRODUCTION 
OF KNOWLEDGE?
In promoting knowledge integration (or, in some instances, the co-production of
knowledge), we acknowledge that there is often a slippage or overlap in
relationships and agendas between development practitioners and researchers.
Whatever the nature of these relationships, it is important to critically question
who benefits from this knowledge, and what these supposed benefits are.
Researchers are always concerned with practice, even when their research is
at an abstract level. Furthermore, it can be difficult to draw a line between the
different roles one plays as an individual. There is not necessarily anything wrong
with an activist working in an academic environment; but it is necessary for one
to be clear where one is coming from in taking a particular position, and
academics are under a greater obligation to argue the basis for coming to a
particular conclusion, conceptually and empirically. Of course this does not mean
there is no need to bridge the gap between the activism and academia. 
The problem of research fatigue often arises within communities who are
tired of being the subject of study, without being engaged in setting the research
agenda, and seeing at least the limited impact of that research in the community’s
long-term welfare. There are numerous examples of students (as well as senior
researchers) coming to a community, asking many probing questions, and then
leaving to write up their findings without sharing them afterwards. Even worse, a
different researcher may arrive in the same community a year later, asking the
same questions and coming to similar conclusions, leading to little visible impact
on the community.
Over-theorising is also a problem. For example, a great deal of time is spent
on determining what the people actually are, without asking what they are doing, let
alone why they are doing it.
In order for the goals of researchers to be meaningful to those outside the
world of academia, those goals may need to be questioned; in particular, the terms
and conditions under which knowledge is produced and disseminated. For
example, knowledge is often trapped in a prestigious publication that few people
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research. Does the involvement of small numbers of academics reading an article,
or commenting at an academic conference, necessarily achieve a social justice
objective? Should that be the sole purpose of research? Sharing one’s research
with others (especially development practitioners, and others in civil society) is
part of the solution; but making it accessible in a relevant way, and in what
another colleague of ours refers to as human English, is a far greater challenge, and
a crucial one. Even more fundamental is the need to build strong, respectful and
critical relationships with communities, from the setting of research agendas right
through to their implementation and the dissemination of findings. The next step
in this process, therefore, is to further demystify and share the findings contained
in this book and in other academic studies of civic mobilisation and social change.
Methods and ethics of research are just as important as (more philosophical)
ontological and epistemological questions that are asked with the aim of making
research more objective.6 As Landau and Jacobsen have argued, also of concern
is the way in which the ‘dual imperative’ is addressed, relating to, on one hand,
producing research in a sound, objective manner and, on the other hand, being
policy relevant.7 This is especially crucial when one is researching communities
that are especially vulnerable or having a marginal existence. The Wits Forced
Migration Research Programme, Centre for Sociological Research and CALS,
whose researchers produced three of the chapters in this book, have set a good
example in this regard, being doubly conscious of not only paying careful
attention to ensuring high standards in their data-gathering and analysis, but also
ensuring that the results of their research feed into public debates and especially
policy discussions. In this way, one can hopefully contribute to changing or even
eliminating the structures that lead to injustice.
7 GIVING DEVELOPMENT A MORE HUMAN FACE
This book cannot capture the total flow of ideas and the richness of the
conference proceedings. Indeed, as noted in the preface, there is room for
criticism of the conference itself, especially in terms of the stark challenges Pheko
and Sebastien observe in transcending deep-seated racial, class and gender
divisions in the country. The fact that the majority of presenters and participants
at the conference were white is a discouraging representation of the face of
academia and even of activism, not only in South Africa, but worldwide. We
certainly agree that there needs to be far more effort in the future to ensure
greater diversity. As Pheko and Sebastien argue, one must have a keen eye on
history, but the old divisions of the past also need to be transcended. 
National and global struggles for social justice are no longer exclusively
framed by relations between the North and South, race or gender, although these
6 Ontology refers, generally, to the philosophical nature of being, while epistemology refers to
the manner in which knowledge is gathered.
7 K. Jacobsen and L. Landau, 2003.
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Contemporary struggles relate so much more to the current economic and
political world order. 
As contemporary debates on development co-operation in The Netherlands
have revealed, there are noted divisions between those who define the world
order on the basis of interdependence, and others who are stuck with nationalist
sentiments of isolation from the world order. These isolationists also advocate the
exclusion of others (including refugees and other migrants) from the national
community. Isolationists also reinforce crude and deliberate forms of legal and
political exceptionalism, including a deliberate undermining of international law
and the United Nations institutions. A more interdependent perspective may
foster new alliances and strategies in the struggle against global apartheid.
At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the remaining vestiges of social
and economic apartheid remaining in South Africa. As we were finalising this
book, Eugene Terreblanche, the South African white supremacist leader and
founder of the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) was allegedly murdered
by two of his farm workers (one of whom was a 15-year old child), purportedly
over a pay dispute, amid numerous allegations of exploitation and abuse by
Terreblanche. Meanwhile, the South African courts and the ANC leadership have
censured the ANC youth leader, Julius Malema, over his chanting of the anti-
apartheid struggle song Ayesab Amagwala, which includes the line ‘shoot the boer’
(farmer). From another perspective, it was pointed out at the conference that, in
a country with one of the highest incidences of rape in the world, issues involving
gender relations did not receive enough attention.
Clearly, issues concerning race, class, gender and other power relations
continue to permeate socio-cultural relations in South Africa. They also frame the
public debate, including discussions about Mobilising Social Justice. And yet it is also
encouraging that such issues are openly confronted in the public discourse, rather
than being deemed irrelevant and simply ignored.
Ultimately, we believe that in order to be meaningful and relevant to
development practitioners and civil society in general, both development research
and development practice need to have a quality that sociologists such as
Margaret Archer have humbly argued is simply part of being human.8 Her
sentiments as a scholar are shared by Yasmin Sooka in the epilogue to this book.
These sentiments are also shared by another well-known figure in South Africa,
who fought for social justice at a time when it was difficult to be optimistic about
the prospects for toppling the racist apartheid policies and regime of the day. And
yet this man – Stephen Biko – managed to find inspiration, both for himself and
for so many others; and so we close with his words:
8 M. Archer, 2006.
  Unlocking the potential for civic action and structural change: reflections on mobilising social justice    191We have set out on a quest for true humanity, and somewhere on the distant
horizon we can see the glittering prize. Let us march forth with courage and
determination, drawing strength from our common plight and our brotherhood.
In time we shall be in a position to bestow upon South Africa the greatest gift
possible – a more human face.9
References
Archer, MS (2000) Being Human: The Problem of Agency. Cambridge, U.K.; New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Biko, S and Stubbs, A (1996) Steve Biko - I Write What I Like: A Selection of His
Writings. London: Bowerdean.
Crenshaw, K (1991) ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color’, Stanford Law Review 43(6): 1241.
Fowler, A and Biekart, A (2008) Civic Driven Change,.Den Haag: Institute of Social
Studies.
Jacobsen, K and Landau, LB (2003) ‘The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research:
Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research
on Forced Migration’, Disasters 27(3): 185–206.
9 S. Biko, 1996: 98.

E
P
IL
O
G
U
E TRANSFORMING
OUR SOCIETY
Conference address by Yasmin Sooka1
As South Africans, we are incredibly fortunate to have a constitution that is not
merely a formal document regulating public power, but embodies the
constitutional imperative to remedy South Africa’s apartheid past and to
transform our society into one in which there is respect for human dignity,
freedom and equality; a just society. 
The constitution envisions the transformation of South Africa as a
collaborative process involving the state, the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary, as well as civil society. The constitution’s Bill of Rights represents a
social contract between the state and society to build a better life for all South
Africans. Our constitution also provides for a participatory framework in which
it is envisioned that civil society will play a role in framing policy and legislation.
WHAT IS ‘SOCIAL JUSTICE’?
Listening to the use of the term ‘social justice’ throughout the conference, it
became clear that we all understand this quite differently. A recent study
conducted by the Carnegie Trust in the United Kingdom, which looked into the
role of civil society in this area, found that many civil society organisations define
social justice as a framework of political objectives pursued through social,
economic, environmental and political policies; based on the acceptance of
difference and diversity; and informed by values concerned with achieving
fairness, the equality of outcomes, and treatment recognising dignity and equal
worth, and encouraging the self-esteem of all. The meeting of basic needs is
defined through cross-cultural consensus and reducing substantial inequalities in
1 Yasmin Sooka is Executive Director of the Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa. The
editors offer special thanks to Marlieke Kieboom for producing a first compilation of Ms
Sooka’s conference presentation.193

  Transforming our society    195wealth, income and life chances; and above all the participation of all, including
the most disadvantaged.2 
The report also went on to say that social justice should give groups and
individuals fair treatment and a share in the benefits of society. Everyone in that
society should be given a fair chance in building a society which is fair and just, in
which everyone has equal opportunities and full representation in all aspects of
life.
WHAT IS ‘CIVIL SOCIETY’?
Defining civil society is a little more difficult. In some of the definitions, people
talk about the political space that is inhabited by a heterogeneous public
comprising a contradictory political project (with ideological orientations) and a
variety of voluntary associations and networks, including trade unions, social
movements, NGOs, CBOs, religious organisations, academics and the media. 
One challenge is: where do we place business, given its important role in the
politics of a nation? If we consider further the way in which business influences
both the state and civil society, this is an important consideration. The
assumption one makes is that in an undemocratic society, civil society is a
safeguard against undemocratic state power, with the notion that its participatory
role provides a basis for the limitation of state power. And even in a democratic
state, civil society’s participation in governance is considered essential, as it
provides a means for individuals and groups to mitigate majoritarianism. This is
especially crucial for marginal groups that are not otherwise able to win sufficient
backing to see their values reflected in the policies and laws of the state. The
burden has, in fact, shifted to civil society as the new custodian and protector of
human rights, particularly in this region where there is an increasing tendency to
discourage direct government involvement in economic activities, and instead to
turn to private companies to boost economic growth.
A further assumption that we make is that civil society is synonymous with
democracy. Our experience in South Africa over the last 15 years demonstrates
that civil society often reproduces the democratic deficits within civil society, and
this is particularly true in terms of race, class, ethnicity, and gender. It is not
enough to combine participation with top-down democracy. Civil societies are
often identified in a development discourse as a vehicle for extending democracy.
This has not always been so, but it is really a participatory notion of citizenship,
one that is active, engaged and grounded, that really produces social change. 
Of course, citizenship itself is a contested concept, and often lacks coherent
meaning. Participatory citizenship is identified as a product of peoples’ concrete
2 Gary Craig (2009) Civil society associations and the values of social justice. London: Carnegie Trust.
Also available at: http://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/publications/civil_society_associations_
and_the_values_of_social_justice.
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as an offshoot of formal democracy. It seeks to expand the political meaning of
citizenship and to relate it to the everyday political realities of ordinary people. By
extending the scope of citizenship rights beyond the legal acquisition of civil
liberties, ordinary people can claim citizenship and rights through their own
political actions and processes. Participation is often linked to the struggle to
extend democracy and to deepen the construction of alternative power relations. 
However, citizen participation is also characterised by power struggles and
conflicts between various social interests. The notion of participatory citizenship
is realised not only through the formal channels of participation – we’ve seen
many of them in South Africa – but also in the streets, in neighbourhoods, in
squatter camps, and in many other spaces in everyday life. Participatory
citizenship offers prospects of a higher democratic and substantive outcome,
since it recognises the dynamic way in which people exercise agency within the
public sphere. However, it’s important to consider the evolution of civil society
in post-transition South Africa.
The ruling African National Congress’ (ANC) conceptualisation of South
Africa’s post-apartheid state-society relations has been rooted in the notion of a
liberal citizenship project; for example, the ANC’s radical talk of popular
democracy and people-driven transformation actually espouses a hierarchical and
highly institutionalised relationship between the rulers and the ruled. In line with
the liberal paradigm, representative democracy is seen as the high point of
political achievement. In this country, particularly since 1999, leadership and
representation has been privileged over the spontaneous actions of the masses.
The masses and the ANC membership in general are expected to follow the party
line, and not to be too critical of leadership and party decisions. In fact, the word
‘deployment’ has become the new term that is used. Meanwhile, although citizens
are encouraged to participate in state-provided spaces for participation, decision-
making power resides within elected bodies.
The state is also conceived as the producer of knowledge, endowed with a
professional expertise and competency to make rational policy decisions, while
civil society has been reduced to the apolitical role of implementing directions
from above. Civil society organisations have also been encouraged to move out
of the political arena, and to engage in voluntary and self-help activities and assist
the government in service delivery. The liberal paradigm has been the philosophy
of the ruling party. Consequently, the state has had a contradictory impact on the
evolution of civil society in this period of democracy.
THREE KEY POLITICAL OUTCOMES
The evolution of civil society in post-transition South Africa has been captured
by three key political outcomes. The first is co-option, the second
bureaucratisation, and the third is the rise in insurgency and the emergence of
social movements. This is interesting if you consider that the South African
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civil societies of any democratic transition, and probably produced, institutionally
at least, one of the most robust democracies, particularly on this continent. While
the ANC was in exile, a vibrant, mass-populated democratic movement under the
banner of the United Democratic Front emerged inside the country, made up of
the trade union movements, civics, NGOs and religious bodies. So when one
looks at that history from the present, one is obliged to ask questions.
Co-option
In terms of co-option, I think the first fissures emerged in the structures of the
democratic movement shortly after the ruling party obtained state power.
Following the post-independence path of other national liberation movements,
particularly in the Southern region, the ANC’s political strategy promoted greater
power for the ruling party, and government autonomy. Power came to be
centralised in the state, allowing the regime to assert its hegemony and control
over the direction of the country’s nation-building project. In addition, senior
civil society leaders were co-opted into the bureaucratic and political apparatus of
the state. This caused a dilution in the institutional capacity of numerous civil
society organisations, and certainly left them vulnerable to state influence. This
has been demonstrated by changing capacities, particularly in two ANC-alliance
society formations in the post-apartheid period. Who can forget the work of the
Women’s National Coalition, particularly in driving an agenda for advancing
women’s rights?
And yet, today, where is the women’s coalition? Where have they been on
issues of sexual violence? Where have they been in the struggle against HIV/
AIDS? One also has to look at the case of the South African National Civics
Organisation (SANCO), in which local activists made the organisation so
hierarchical and bureaucratised that its internal democracy became a sham.
Branches of the civics lost their autonomy. Today, the national office of SANCO
has little or no capacity to co-ordinate events, leaving local activists uninformed
about the activities and positions of the organisation.
Bureaucratisation
Bureaucratisation has also become a major challenge. After having listened to the
budget process in Frankie Jenkins’ presentation, one must ask how a small CBO
somewhere in the rural areas could possibly know about these formal processes.
While participation is an institutional obligation, state-civil society relationships
have become incredibly bureaucratised. Many critics of South Africa’s system of
participatory governance argue that these spaces tend to be occupied by civil
society actors who are considered to be close to the ruling party, and who have
established collaborative relations with the regime, leaving opponents without a
voice. The institutional environment of invited spaces has also been identified as a
barrier to popular grassroots participation, especially for marginalised groups who
lack the necessary vocabulary and the rhetoric that are endemic to South Africa’s
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the logistics or the funds to put forward their constituencies’ perspectives in these
spaces.
Take the case of Zimbabwe. Here, COSATU has been the most vocal critic
of the government’s silent diplomacy role. When arms from China arrived in South
Africa, destined for Zimbabwe, we saw COSATU emerge as one of the main role-
players to stop the shipment of arms to Zimbabwe, in the face of government
intransigence on this issue. 
The rise in insurgency and of social movements
In the post-transition phase, we have witnessed the rise of insurgency in the
townships, and of course the emergence of a number of new social movements.
This is not unsurprising, of course, as South Africa’s liberation movement
consisted of a mass mobilisation and a robust civil society. However, we need to
accept that the first two outcomes – co-option and bureaucratisation – contracted
civil society in the immediate aftermath of 1994, and decimated radical grassroots
activism born of the 1980s and early 1990s. As a result, many communities were
left without the organisational mechanisms that had become their vehicles of
struggle in the pre-1994 period. Soon the situation became untenable, particularly
after the post-1999 government, which increasingly took on a neo-liberal agenda,
as articulated in its Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. It
also became very clear that the approach of GEAR was going to privilege profits
over people, as opposed to the re-distributional thrust of the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP). The ANC government became increasingly
intolerant of opposing voices, fearing that they would unsettle the nation-building
project.
Paradoxically, this situation gave rise to an assortment of social movements,
the most notable being the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the concerned
Citizen’s Forum, the Anti-Privatisation Forum and the Soweto Electricity Crisis
Committee, to name a few. These movements began to assert the constitutional
rights of poor and marginalised communities which had struggled against political
and economic exclusion. The TAC is cited as one of the best examples of
participatory citizenship that has been mobilised for social justice. Their
combined strategies of research, advocacy, lobbying, and litigation have really
pushed the boundaries, using the constitution and protest as tools. When the
TAC litigated against the state, challenging government policies on anti-retroviral
drugs to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV – and won their case – one
of the lawyers said that: ‘The judgment was simply the conclusion of a battle that
the TAC had already won outside the court, but with the skilful use of the courts
as part of a broader struggle’. 
While the TAC case focused mainly on health issues, the focus of social
movements generally has been on distributional issues and democratic politics. A
main goal of their struggle has been to reduce the delegation of power vested in
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control and decision-making power, particularly over issues of public policy and
basic services. The engagement of these movements in mass action has usually
been triggered by disenchantment with the formal channels of participation.
In a study of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign (MPAEC), it was
observed that members of the campaign were disenchanted with the main, formal
channels that were offered to them for voicing their concerns and making
demands. The local government and its councils – and much of the hope they had
established in these recently formalised decentralised structures to facilitate
greater participation in decision-making and inclusive government – have
withered with the past.3 
The political practices of social movements have often been condemned as
illegal by the ruling party and the state. We need to take this objection to
participatory actions chosen by citizens themselves much more seriously. It is
important for civil society to oppose any notion that the only citizen participation
allowed is in officially sanctioned channels. We must challenge the notion of
citizenship that is state-centred, with the state not only becoming the granter of
citizenship but also, absurdly, defining the spaces for citizenship participation.
We must note the work of groups such as the APF, and of course Abahlali,
that have been struggling and mobilising within a wide range of spaces.4 These
more recent movements present demands and deploy actions that are
contextually effective in gaining results. They’ve used protest action. They’ve used
courts. They’ve used laws. They’ve gone to the local councils. Abahlali engages in
mass mobilisation. It has done incredible media work and pursued court action in
its struggle against evictions and forced removals. It has also used the promotion
of access to information with great success, to force the city of Durban to reveal
its removal plans.
In the example of anti-eviction campaigning, activists have received
additional training in video communication and basic journalism as a means to
document their community suffering and to disseminate information. More
importantly, people’s concrete social struggles to realise socio-economic rights
have become a political school for collective learning and consciousness-raising.
Knowledge production has begun to be owned by communities. Their knowledge
originates from the everyday reality of people, and in this way, citizenship has
acquired a more substantive meaning, transcending the notion of legal or civil
citizenship.
3 Rebecca Pointer (2004) ‘Questioning the Representation of South Africa’s “New Social
Movements”: A Case Study of the Mandela Park Anti-Eviction Campaign’, Journal of Asian and
African Studies 39(4): 271–294.
4 For more information on these social movements, see: http://apf.org.za/ and http://
www.abahlali.org/.
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heavily influence by the role of specific actors, notably Zachi Achmat, Patrick
Bond and Trevor Nguane. We have to acknowledge that concerns have been
raised about the way differences have been accommodated in social movements.
This is particularly true when we look at the question of gender, and why most of
the women who have been at the centre of their campaigns are not present in
leadership positions. We need to acknowledge the ambiguity of civil society,
which often contradicts the liberal notion that civil society is synonymous with
democracy.
The evidence shows that the organisational mechanisms of civil society that
are used to express participatory democracy can themselves fall victim to the
strictures of representative democracy, which often replicates the inert,
bureaucratic, institutional norm of participation. Many critics argue that there’s
nothing in civil society that automatically ensures the victory of the democratic
project. All that civil society does is provide actors with values, the space, and the
inspiration to battle for democracy. However, the work of social movements in
South Africa illustrates the changing patterns of citizen participation and political
participation.
In this new, participatory paradigm, citizens are using a mixture of direct and
indirect forms to engage with the state. This new style not only changes the level
of participation, but seeks to place more control in the hands of the people, and
in this way their participation becomes linked to citizen influence. Conceived in
this way, civil society can involve and encapsulate a plurality of voices.
A MORE RADICAL CONCEPTION OF CITIZEN 
PARTICIPATION
Civil society can also promote a more substantive and radical conception of
citizen participation. Firstly, it becomes a product of political struggle. Secondly,
it includes a more inclusive notion of rights, which extends not only to the
decision-making power of socio-economic rights, but also becomes the terrain
where citizens and non-citizens can establish solidarity ties or networks.
A statement that really illustrates this is the response of the Abahlali
movement to the recent attack on non-citizens that erupted in different
townships of South Africa. Part of the statement they made reads:
There’s only one human race. Our struggle in every real struggle is to put the human
being at the centre of society, starting with the worst off. An action can be illegal; a
person cannot be illegal. A person is a person, wherever they may find themselves; if
you live in a settlement, you are from that settlement, and you are a neighbour and a
comrade in that settlement. We condemn the attacks, the beatings, the rape and
murder in Johannesburg against people born in other countries. We will fight left and
right to ensure that this does not happen here in Kwazulu.
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own rights, we extend this to other people whom we recognise as also being
human. As civil society, we must be conscious of how we will respond to the new
challenges we are facing, such as migration, xenophobia, food insecurity, threats
to housing, lack of access to water, lack of access to electricity, and
unemployment. These new challenges will define whether civil society can in fact
be an instrument of change. As one writer puts it:
To enjoy liberty is not only to enjoy equality before the law, but also to have the
capacities and the material and resources to be able to pursue desired causes of
action. Political equality can then not be obtained without a measure of economic
equality, and without it democracy is likely to become a vehicle for the maintenance
of elite dominance.
This is the challenge to all of us. The challenge is for civil society: how can it truly
become a participatory citizen?
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As a political being, I can identify five distinct phases. I’m mutant like that. Each
of these phases tells a story, which I want to share with you.
A LIBERAL SECULAR CITIZEN
I started off as a liberal secular citizen, because I grew up as a Muslim in India in
the 1990s. The Muslim identity in India is a peculiar one, because following its
independence in 1947, India was divided into India and Pakistan. The Muslims
claimed a separate nation for themselves, and got it. Some Muslims remained in
India, and they had to deal with that historical baggage. As is the case with
remainders usually, the Muslim identity clubbed together – across class and caste
and gender – and they are all considered as one, with similar experiences.
Other than that, the Muslim identity in India has always been suspect. The
Muslim loyalty to the Indian nation itself has also been suspect. I grew up
experiencing this, and this Muslim identity almost felt like a burden. I wanted to
shed it. The Indian state was inviting. It was offering the promise of neutral
citizenship, so I grabbed it with both hands. Other people also did, and all that
was required was to shed visible symbols of one’s identity in the public space, to
decry any religious identity, and be a liberal, secular citizen. That was easy, and we
did it. 
But, in the late 1990s a Hindu right-wing party came to power, and there were
widespread communal riots. As usually is the case, the poorest Muslims suffered,
the poorest Muslim women suffered the most, and the state looked the other way.
It then fell upon civil society to negotiate with the state, and to talk about minority
rights and human rights and to ask the state what it was doing. That was also the
time that a lot of people like me realised that being secular and being a liberal
citizen was not so much a function of progressive politics as it was of privilege.203
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who cannot, and those people were the ones who were killed in the communal
riots.
POLITICAL MUSLIMS AND CULTURAL MUSLIMS
So we took a deliberate decision to locate ourselves as political Muslims or
cultural Muslims in the public sphere. We weren’t practising Muslims, but we
wanted to voice the Muslim identity. So, with other peace workers and civil
society actors, we started negotiating with the state, using the vocabulary of
minority rights and human rights, and it all went really well until one day I was
invited to debate a Hindu right-wing fundamentalist.
This man was sitting in a panel and was making it clear that India was a Hindu
state and all Muslims should leave India and go to Pakistan or Arabia or wherever
they wanted to go to. Then it was my turn to speak, and I sang a little poem by a
respected Muslim poet, which is about how the Muslims came to India from
Arabia. They came to stay. They came and burnt their boats, because they wanted
to make India their homeland. As I was singing, a young man got up in the
audience, and he was in a rage. He was very angry and he started shouting.
At first I thought it was my singing that had caused his rage, but then I
assumed he was a right-wing fundamentalist, and I said, ‘Yes, yes. I know you
have a problem with my position.’
And he said, ‘No, sit down, you fool. I’m a Muslim too.’
And so I asked: ‘So if you are a Muslim, what is your problem then? Why are
you so angry?’
He said that I didn’t come from outside. He said I was always Indian, that I
was an indigenous person, and at some point had converted to Islam. He said: 
That doesn’t make my identity and your identity similar, just because we are Muslims.
We are ethnically different. You are urban and an authoritative working-class Muslim,
and I am indigenous, organic and Muslim! When you talk about minority rights, and
when you negotiate with the state on minority rights, you collapse all internal
differences within the Muslim community. You present us as one monolith, which
we are not. You are negotiating for entitlements and privileges with the state, using
minority rights, for your own interests; you voice that vocabulary, but you serve the
upper-class, upper-caste male Muslim.
I responded: ‘Well at least I’m not a man, but a Muslim woman!’
206    AfterwordCONFUSED
This was the third phase of my political being; I was confused. I went from being
a secular liberal citizen, to an evolved secular citizen, to just being confused.
I then fled India, and arrived in Cape Town, South Africa. That was a
liberating moment for me. Maybe it had something to do with the history of Islam
in Cape Town. But I was amazed at the way Capetonian Muslims had been able
to use faith as a means of resistance. That might have had something to do with
a particular history of Islam in Cape Town. Islam came to South Africa through
oppressed people, through aborted people, so therefore faith for them had to be
necessarily resistant. By contrast, Islam in India came through the rulers. It came
through the occupying forces of the subcontinent. I had never seen Islam in the
same spirit in India as I saw in South Africa.
The second very important encounter and experience I had in Cape Town
was with an activist of the Black Consciousness movement. And again, I was
struck by the fact that alternative, normative frameworks are possible; that
alternative histories and imaginations can be created; that other ways of living are
possible. I felt enriched, and went back to India, trying to do something back in
India.
LOOKING FOR SITES TO ARTICULATE ALTERNATIVE 
CONCERNS
That’s when the idea of the Patna collective came about; we wanted to look for
sites where alternative concerns could be articulated, using different vocabularies.
The first thing I learned was to rethink what was happening on the ground in
India. I felt that I had been very dismissive of all groups, all people who didn’t use
a vocabulary of human rights. I considered them communal, regressive. I started
to rethink that.
I will give you a brief example. There was this medieval mosque, which had
become a contested site between Hindus and Muslims. The Hindu right-wing
group claimed that when the Muslims came to India, they razed every important
Hindu worship place to the ground, and built mosques on those sites, and they
claimed that this mosque was on such a site, and they wanted it back. They wanted
to build a temple on it. The Muslim version was that it was just an ordinary
mosque; it hadn’t been constructed on a Hindu site of worship, so it had to
remain with them.
Earlier, I had dismissed this as an irrelevant conflict over a site of worship,
which didn’t matter at all. But it was much more than that. It was a claim to the
nationhood of the Indian nation. The Hindus said that Muslims did not have a
claim to the Indian nation, because they were outsiders; they were invaders. When
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staking a claim to the Indian nation. 
We at the Patna Collective spent the first few months after we set up looking
for sites related to faith or religion that would possibly give us the space to be
activists, to project concerns or ideologies, but in a different kind of way. I did a
lot of travelling to find these sites, and I spoke to people. One person told me to
visit the shrine of an Islamic warrior. I didn’t know why he was asking me to do
this, because these were just the people I wanted to avoid; self-appointed warriors
of Islam who conquered land and people in the name of Islam. But I went
nonetheless, expecting to find a huge monument to some Islamic warrior.
Instead, I found a small town, a small shrine and a huge open courtyard, and
reached it late in the evening.
The courtyard was full of people, lots of colour. Some kind of festivity
seemed to be happening. There were people wearing colourful clothes, preparing
a feast. Most people seemed to be Hindu, from the way they were dressed. I
thought I had reached the wrong place, but the people said: ‘No, this is the right
place, join in!’
I asked, ‘What is happening?’
They said: ‘A wedding.’
‘Whose wedding?’
Then they said, ‘The saint’s wedding!’
I was amazed. This was a medieval saint. I assumed he had passed on. But
they sang and they feasted through the night. Just before dawn, there was a Hindu
priest who was supervising the festivities. He rushed outside and he looked
skywards, and he said, ‘The stars are not aligned evenly this year. All of you go
back home and come back next year.’ And so I asked, ‘Please explain, what is
happening.’ And this is what happened.
The story goes that there was this young Islamic warrior who was getting
dressed for his own wedding when he heard the sound of women wailing outside.
He rushed outside and he saw a community of Hindu cow-herders who had come
to him, and who were saying that the local King had asked for an increase in taxes.
When they refused, he arrested all the men in that community and slaughtered all
the cows. These women were now going to fight the King and they had come to
ask the Islamic warrior to help and fight with them. So he left his own wedding
to help them, and he was martyred.
To this day, the Hindu cow-herders celebrate this each year, in this particular
way. I spoke to some of them and asked them why they celebrated the feast of an
Islamic warrior. The Hindu priest said that Islam, to him, represented an open
kind of ideology. It was the Islam of the oppressed; it meant resisting all kinds of
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that the Islamic saint had a reason to defend cows, which are symbols of
Hinduism in India. They said: ‘These were not the cows of the Brahmans; these
were the cows of the oppressed, and we identified with that.’
THE PATNA COLLECTIVE
And with that story, I rediscovered a site for activism. The Patna collective works
from this particular shrine, trying to build on those imaginations and ideas.
